25 January 1995 – The Norwegian rocket incident: Russia almost launches a nuclear attack after it mistakes a Black Brant XII, a Norwegian research rocket, for a US Trident missile.
25 January 1995 – The Norwegian rocket incident: Russia almost launches a nuclear attack after it mistakes a Black Brant XII, a Norwegian research rocket, for a US Trident missile.
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The Norwegian rocket incident, also known as the Black Brant scare, occurred on 25 January 1995 when a team of Norwegian and US scientists launched a Black Brant XII four-stage sounding rocket from the Andøya Rocket Range off the northwestern coast of Norway.
The rocket carried scientific equipment to study the aurora borealis over Svalbard, and flew on a high northbound trajectory, which included an air corridor that stretches from Minuteman III nuclear missile silos in North Dakota all the way to Moscow
The rocket eventually reached an altitude of 1,453 kilometers, resembling a US Navy submarine-launched Trident missile.
Russian nuclear forces were put on high alert as a result, fearing a high-altitude nuclear attack that could blind Russian radar, and the “nuclear briefcase” (the Cheget) was brought to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who then had to decide whether to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States.
Russian observers determined that there was no nuclear attack. No retaliation was ordered.
I highly doubt Yeltsin believed that the US just launched a nuclear attack on him for no reason.
One of the things we keep forgetting is that Russian and US take the prospect of nuclear attacks seriously and neither country can let their ICBM arsenals stay on the ground if they think the other side has launched a first strike, so it’s crucial that they get as much time as possible to make calm decisions about what they’re actually seeing on their radar screens. Due to geography, the continental US has plenty of time to decide if they’re seeing a real attack, but Russia’s response time is very short.
This is only one of the reasons we should get rid of these things. One day, it will go terribly wrong.
12 years after the more famous [1983 nuclear missile incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident).
It’s almost as if russia shouldn’t be allowed to have nukes in the first place.
Its strange that there isn’t an official channel to communicate these sorts of things in.
And that’s why putting any sort of missiles close to Russia’s border is bad. There won’t be time to make right decision in case of mistake like that.
looks more like a weather rocket
To be clear, the Black Brandt family is a Canadian-designed/produced rocket. This particular one was purchased/operated by Norway.
I had a model of it as a kid 🙂
” I fear people have lost that sense of dread.”
—
Building on George Shultz’s Vision of a World Without Nukes
by William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn
The Wall Street Journal
March 24, 2021
Most Americans are too young to remember the fear and dread of an atom
bomb or nuclear crisis.
For the past 15 years, the three of us and a distinguished group of
American and international former officials and experts have been
deftly and passionately led by our late friend and colleague, George
Shultz. Our mission: reversing the world’s reliance on nuclear
weapons, to prevent their proliferation into potentially dangerous
hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Without a
bold vision, practical actions toward that goal won’t be perceived as
fair or urgent. Without action, the vision won’t be perceived as
realistic or possible.
George led this charge with the tenacity of a U.S. Marine and the
wisdom of a man who held four cabinet positions for two presidents,
including secretary of state for Ronald Reagan. Reagan considered
nuclear weapons to be “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for
nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and
civilization.” He took that view and his most trusted advocate for it,
George Shultz, to a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in
Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986.
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev weren’t able to agree at Reykjavik to get rid
of all nuclear weapons. But they did succeed in turning the nuclear
arms race on its head, initiating steps leading to significant
reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces,
including the elimination of an entire class of missiles. Twenty years
after Reykjavik, George and physicist Sidney Drell organized a small
conference at the Stanford University’s Hoover Institution to discuss
what it would take to bring the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik
to fruition. This effort led to a joint op-ed in the Journal in
January 2007, which has been our guide ever since.
Over the several weeks before George’s death, each of us discussed
with him the world’s direction on nuclear arms. We shared our concerns
that progress on reversing reliance on nuclear weapons is slowing. We
discussed how technology, particularly cyber risks to early warning
and command-and-control systems, has introduced new dangers of blunder
or mistake. We discussed the tensions and policy paralysis with both
Russia and China. Characteristically, George’s approach was not to be
discouraged, but instead to get back to work. In that spirit, we offer
five points.
First is the need for a bold policy to walk back from these increased
perils. This will require a united effort from Washington and
U.S. allies on a policy that reduces nuclear danger while maintaining
our values and protecting our vital interests. Congress must organize
itself to play a meaningful role.
Second, for many decades, memories of a smoldering Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and the fear generated by the Cuban missile crisis, informed
and drove nuclear policy. As George told Congress three years ago, “I
fear people have lost that sense of dread.” Leaders of countries with
nuclear weapons must recognize their responsibility to work together
to prevent catastrophe.
Third, we must take action on practical steps that will reduce the
risk of nuclear use today while making the vision possible. Here,
there are signs of progress. A few weeks ago, Presidents Biden and
Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the New Start Treaty for five years,
ensuring that U.S. and Russian nuclear forces remain limited, with
verification and transparency. There is much more work to be done,
including securing nuclear materials to prevent catastrophic
terrorism.
Fourth, nuclear-weapon states should commit to conduct their own
internal reviews of their nuclear command-and-control and early
warning systems. These “fail-safe” reviews would identify steps to
strengthen protections against cyber threats and unauthorized,
inadvertent or accidental use of a nuclear weapon. These reviews
should also include options for establishing agreements between
nuclear powers precluding cyberattacks on nuclear command-and-control
or early-warning assets.
Fifth, creating robust and accepted methods to maximize decision time
during heightened tensions and extreme situations–especially when
leaders fear they may be under threat of attack–could be a common
conceptual goal that connects both immediate and longer-term steps for
managing instability and building mutual security.
George spoke passionately about how his children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren were the motivation for his extraordinary
commitment to nuclear threat reduction. He believed the life we leave
to our descendants is the most important measure of the life we have
led. George’s friend Bishop William Swing has written that “at the end
of time, the author of life will return to this created and loved
Earth and demand accountability for what we did to enhance or destroy
it.” George Shultz loved this earth and he spent his life enhancing
it.
Mr. Perry was secretary of defense, 1994-97. Mr. Kissinger was
secretary of state, 1973-77 and White House national security adviser,
1969-75. Mr. Nunn, a Georgia Democrat, is a former chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and a co-chairman of the Nuclear
Threat Initiative.