The EU is on track to adopt its first Strategic Compass which will serve as blueprint for a common European Defense. The draft has been presented and is currently being analyzed by member states (more info in comments)

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  1. [source](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/106337/strategic-compass-eu_en)

    A Strategic Compass to make Europe a Security Provider

    Why do we need a Strategic Compass?

    Europe is in danger: we need to operate in an increasingly competitive strategic
    environment. The purpose of the Strategic Compass is to draw an assessment of the threats
    and challenges we face and propose operational guidelines to enable the European Union to
    become a security provider for its citizens, protecting its values and interests.

    The Strategic Compass is a political proposal to prevent the major risk the EU is facing: that
    of ‘strategic shrinkage’, or the risk of being always principled but seldom relevant. That is
    why it defines a high ambition and presents concrete means to make this ambition a reality.
    Recently, the debate about European security and defence has switched gear. In her State
    of the Union, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen called for the
    EU to take its work on defence to the next level, moving from a ‘defence eco-system’ to a
    genuine ‘European Defence Union’. Shortly afterwards, the President of the European
    Council, Charles Michel, declared that ‘2022 will be the year of European defence’, adding
    that a stronger EU role on security and defence would also strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.
    That same month, President Biden, in a joint statement with President Macron welcomed ‘a
    stronger and more capable European defence, that contributes positively to transatlantic
    and global security and is complementary to NATO.’ Then, in October, EU leaders discussed
    the impact of major geopolitical events and decisions which had put into question Europe’s
    ability to defend its interests and vision. They agreed that Europe cannot afford to be a
    bystander in a hyper-competitive world.

    European citizens are also aware of this new context. According to many opinion polls, they
    want the EU to contribute in a more active way to their security and that of the world. They
    want the EU to protect them from the dangerous world we live in. They understand that we
    must connect the defence efforts of the Member States, avoiding duplications and gaps in
    our critical capabilities, to be more efficient in providing this protection. And they know that
    our security starts away from our borders. So we need to project our presence in the world,
    promoting security in our neighbourhood and with our partners.

    So far, so good. However, in practical terms major questions remain: act how exactly? To
    face which threats and challenges? With which means? And with which implications for the
    EU? Answering these questions is the rationale for the Strategic Compass that EU leaders
    tasked me as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to prepare.
    During the drafting of the Strategic Compass I have become ever more convinced that,
    because of history and geography, we Europeans don’t see the world in the same way. And
    that is why we don’t yet share a common strategic culture. We have to realise that there
    will always come a time when each Member State needs the EU, just as the EU needs each
    of its Member States to respond collectively to threats of a changing nature. So, a necessary
    first step was to come up with a shared threat assessment, which we did in November
    2020 and we used as the basis for this Strategic Compass.

    The starting point of the Strategic Compass is to recognise that Europe is in danger. It faces
    new threats that are not just military or territorial. We are seeing the return of power
    politics and zero sum conflicts with competition between states intensifying. At the same
    time, interdependence is becoming increasingly conflictual and soft power is weaponised.
    In recent years, the classic distinction between war and peace has been diminishing. The
    world is full of hybrid situations where we face intermediate dynamics of competition,
    intimidation and coercion. Indeed, the tools of power are not only soldiers, tanks and planes
    but also disinformation, cyber-attacks, the instrumentalisation of migrants, the privatisation
    of armies and the political control of sensitive technologies or rare earths. We have to be
    aware that the defence of Europe will require a new, comprehensive concept of security
    and that emerging technologies will have a profound impact on future warfare and
    European defence.

    The geopolitical stage is also becoming more complex. More and more states are behaving
    as partners on certain issues and competitors or rivals on others. International relations are
    increasingly organised on a transactional basis. For the EU, which remains the world’s most
    open space and which borders many areas of conflict, this is a real challenge. Even more so
    because there are also worrying dynamics such as the collapse of states, the retreat of
    democratic freedoms, violations of international and humanitarian law, plus the attacks on
    the ‘global commons’: cyber space, the high seas and outer-space.

    Europeans will continue to favour dialogue over confrontation; diplomacy over force;
    multilateralism over unilateralism. But it is clear that if you want dialogue, diplomacy and
    multilateralism to succeed, you need to put power behind it. That’s the point of ‘learning
    the language of power’.

    In drafting this Strategic Compass, I have been guided by the conviction that we must be
    ambitious, because the fast-worsening strategic environment is compelling us to act. But
    equally, we should be result-oriented and avoid our usual European tendency to go for
    conceptual or institutional discussions, thus side-stepping the harder task of enhancing our
    capacity to act. It is often easier to talk – and disagree – in abstract terms, than it is to act and
    agree on how to do things in concrete terms.

    This attitude we cannot afford. To prevent the risk of ‘strategic shrinking’, the Strategic
    Compass proposes ways and means for the EU to handle the challenges it faces. This will
    require political will, without which nothing is possible and operational efficiency, without
    which everything is pointless. Taken together, these two ingredients will enhance our
    credibility, without which our ambitions will come up against reality.

    The EU must use the full range of policies and instruments, looking at the same time for
    legitimacy, flexibility and willingness to participate, in line with the Treaty provisions. The
    EU needs to be able to conduct operations in all circumstances, including those involving the
    use of force, as foreseen by the Treaties. To secure European interests, we need to do this in
    a pragmatic and flexible way, depending on the context of the crisis, the urgency, the
    willingness and the capacity of Member States to act.

  3. [The EU’s Strategic Compass is a defining moment for European defense](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-eus-strategic-compass-is-a-defining-moment-for-european-defense/)

    —

    For the next six months, France holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU). Its overall goal, according to President Emmanuel Macron, is “to move from being a Europe of cooperation inside of our borders to a powerful Europe in the world, fully sovereign, free to make its choices and master of its destiny.” Applied to the field of defense, it means “learning the language of power,” according to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, and being willing to act more rigorously to defend its interests wherever they are threatened.

    Paris is now determined to translate intent into actions and make European defense more operational. That’s why the bloc’s Strategic Compass—its very first white paper on defense—will be a key deliverable of the French presidency. Some might argue that the only way EU leaders can talk about taking action is by publishing a new paper. But the Strategic Compass will offer firm commitments, not just promises.

    The document will lay out a common strategic vision for EU security and defense, as well as set up achievable and practical objectives along a timeline. With mechanisms to measure progress, such as an annual progress report by the European Council, it will amount to a real road map. There will be strong incentives to follow up on the commitments included, as the document will be endorsed by the heads of state and government and will leave room for potential revisions. The Strategic Compass will be a barometer for both member states’ and the bloc’s ambitions to make the EU a leading security provider for its citizens.

    With this objective in mind, the EU first needs to assess its specific strategic environment and priorities. For example, despite recent progress in various European defense initiatives, there’s still no common understanding of the threats and challenges facing the EU as a single entity. But the Strategic Compass will begin to address this: For the very first time, and at the highest level, Europeans will collectively release a joint threat assessment (the first EU Threat Analysis was classified and never endorsed by the member states’ leaders). This high-level endorsement is critical because it signals a level of political unity that has so far been largely absent.

    As tensions over Ukraine reach a boiling point, the ongoing dialogue between European capitals and Brussels on this topic should lead to a shared understanding of what Russian behavior and ambitions, for example, mean for European security. That doesn’t imply alignment on everything—but it’s key to identifying the way forward in addressing the challenges posed by Russia, some of which (such as disinformation) are better addressed within the EU. Because the bloc has limited assets to address a very large range of difficulties (some are better left for NATO to deal with), the Strategic Compass should avoid giving blurry guidelines by clearly ranking the challenges and threats—something the EU’s first threat analysis failed to achieve.

    Second, based on this threat analysis, the Strategic Compass should offer an action plan that is both ambitious and achievable. It would set up targets in key areas, focusing particularly on the ability to act, to invest, to secure, and to partner. For instance, the EU and its member states currently lack critical strategic enablers for various operations—which is why the United States provides key intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the French-led Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, and why the Europeans were unable to continue evacuations from Kabul last August without US support. The Strategic Compass should lay out capabilities worthy of investment, such as force protection or surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

    The Strategic Compass will also reinforce EU space policy with a specific defense and security strategy, expected by the end of next year. Many other objectives are also currently being prepared, with target dates to achieve them. Those includes securing EU access to increasingly contested domains like cyberspace, outer space, and the seas; reducing strategic dependencies; streamlining decision making; and improving the mandates for European operations and missions to be led more efficiently.

    The EU also needs to build and strengthen reliable partnerships. Potentially following a new EU-NATO joint statement on cooperation, the Strategic Compass should demonstrate that strategic autonomy goes hand-in-hand with strengthening cooperation with partners. In that regard, both NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass are the respective institutional instruments that define ambitions for renewed NATO-EU cooperation. Discrepancies between the two would be detrimental to their collective credibility. The Strategic Compass can confirm the EU’s will to foster cooperation in defense with the United States where necessary—demonstrating that making Europe stronger does not weaken transatlantic ties. That’s why the first strategic dialogue on security and defense between the EU and the United States should take place in the next few months.

    The elements for an ambitious Strategic Compass are all lined up: the evolution of the international strategic environment, US recognition of “the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense,” and the timing of the French presidency of the EU Council. This unprecedented exercise can pave the way for a stronger Europe, and failing to successfully fulfill the Compass and its ambitions means the EU will remain merely a junior partner—rather than the key player the United States actually needs in this time of strategic competition.

  7. The sooner, the better. Must step up finally, US and Russia dominating the world with China snapping at their heels, Europe nowhere to be seen. We are lightweight between the superpowers

  8. Great, the last 10 years have had a consistently deteriorating security environment in Europe. We are also too divided to act effectively. Move certain foreign policy rights to the EU, without requiring unanimity, and work on building shared complementing military power. That way, we can actually start to stabilize our own neighbourhood…

  9. Europe is in danger? European democracy definitely is. From the EU. Physical danger? Doubtful. Who is going to invade the EU? Russia? And what, risk nuclear war with NATO? Already the EU is undemocratic as well as autocratic. Imagine what would happen if the corrupt old fucks in charge had an army… No thanks.

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