Battle of France in 40 Seconds (Full Credit to Eastory on Youtube)

29 comments
  1. On s’est fait avoir par la méthode Napoléonienne : va le plus vite possible de manière organisée et envoie 100% de ta force sur 50% de la force ennemie. Tu en ressors comme les allemands début juin (ou comme Napoléon tant de fois au siècle précédent).

  2. En fait, c’est pas si exceptionnel pour la seconde guerre mondiale de se faire balayer comme ça sur plusieurs centaines de kilomètres. Mais à l’échelle de la géographie française, ça fait évidemment beaucoup plus mal que dans le désert libyen ou la steppe ukrainienne.

  3. Où on voit que la guerre éclaire, ce sont seulement quelques unités mobiles mais tactiquement concentrées. La majorité de l’armée allemande était des troupes conventionnelles.

  4. Tant de victoires sous l’ombre apres cette branlée épique. Le dernier compte toujours en premier, telle est la réalité.

  5. Sympa mais dommage que l’on ne voit pas l’armée des Alpes qui a aussi était héroïque jusqu’à la fin

  6. Pour ceux que ça intéresse, petit commentaire de u/Vineee2000 que j’ai sauvegardé qui détaille bien la situation :

    > It is correct that one of their main factors was the fact that the Germans have attacked through the Aedennes instead of going through Belgium.

    > Now, it’s not like they didn’t anticipate this possibility at all, they have even wargamed this scenario; but their main war plan was built assuming an attack through Belgium and they failed to adjust rapidly enough once this was shown to not be the case.

    > It also has to be noted that they were correct in their belief that a large armoured force would have trouble navigating the Ardennes. Panzer Group Kleist at one point had suffered a traffic jam as long as 250km. However, Belgian forces originally holding the forest have retreated far too quickly, and the French reinforcements, who arrived expecting them to still be there, had to follow suit.

    > Even once the French concluded the main attack was coming through the Ardennes, they assumed the Germans, once they crossed the river, would take some time to mass their artillery for further breakthrough. Instead Luftwaffe unleashed a literally unprecedented until now aerial bombardment, effectively replacing artillery with bombers.

    > Even still, the French assumption was not bad. Panzer Group Kleist, once they crossed the river Meuse, was, in fact, ordered by their commanders to halt and build up strength. Guderian has proceeded to creatively interpret these orders before finally outright ignoring them, and pressing the attack instead, but to the credit to the French command, his own commanding officers did not expect that.

    > Like most things in history though, fall of France is not a simple thing, and a lot of events contributed to it happening. This is not helped by the amount of myths and surface-level takes surrounding it. Here’s my breakdown of some key elements that truly made it happen:

    > • Overcommitment to the Belgian front (ironically). Plans to keep reserves on French soil as opposed to Belgian have been considered, and would have probably turned the tide, but ultimately were not chosen.

    > • The sheer incompetence displayed by the French command. Demanding orders given over telephone to be driven to you by car in writing. Flying around on a plane to 3 different locations in one day while your forces are actively engaged in fighting and trying to get a hold of you. Commander in Chief getting sacked in the middle of this battle, and the new appointment getting a good night’s sleep as his first act in office and then spending a few days making courtesy visits while your entire armed forces are literally getting encircled. These are all real things that happened in this conflict among various memebers of the French command.

    > • Poor general state of the French Army in the aftermath of Great Depression and political turmoil. French Army was mostly conscripted, with a very short tour cycle, and a lack of professional soldiers. This was partly due to a lack of funding, and partly due to French politicians fearing a professional, long-standing army core could amass too much power or even launch a coup. It naturally had a negative impact on their war fighting ability.

    > • Poor state and command of the French airforce specifically. A major component of German recepie for success was heavy direct air support, to an extent replacing the lacking artillery capabilities of their mobile units, as I mentioned earlier. This would have not been possible, or at least far harder, if the French airforce contested the skies over Ardennes and Meuse, but it was far too small for that, allowed itself to suffer far too heavy casualties in Belgium, and was overcommited to Belgium in the first place. (The latter being an arguably worse blunder for planes, who can just decide to fly to a place hundreds of kilometres from the one they flew to yesterday while still being based in the same airport)

    > • Unprecedented aggression and initiative displayed by Guderian and Rommel. Now, the German military had a tradition of independent officers going all the way back to Prussia, so seeing talented commanders making their own calls on the ground in Wehrmacht is hardly surprising. Still, the sheer extent to which they went was remarkable, going as far as literally sabotaging their own communications to stop hearing the orders to halt in case of Rommel. Frankly, such aggressive advances, if it were not for all the other points, would have been suicidal. But I suppose in that place and time that call worked out for them.

    > • Despite all of the above, still some amound of sheer luck was involved. Just as the Germans were encircling the French armies in Belgium, on May 23rd, the commander of the whole First Army Group, and the only person there briefed on the counterattack plan to break out of the encirclement, died in a car crash, leaving the whole army group leaderless for crucial days. The early Belgian retreat from Ardennes was very fortunate, too. Had the town of Stonne, – that overlooked the German bridgeheads over Meuse, – been successfully captured by the French, Germans would have struggled to bring the rest of their forces over under French artillery fire quickly enough to achieve the effect they did. Considering the town changed hands 17 times, it had to have been at least a somewhat close call. Not to mention exploits like Rommel driving unescorted through effectively French-held ground in just his armoured car, and passing multiple French formations who assumed it must have been their own officer, because surely a German would not drive through their ranks unprotected.

  7. Je suis fière d’avoir eu dans ma famille des Résistants. Mes grands parents me montraient les photos, les blessures qu’un d’eux à eu, deux cadres sculptés par un de mes arrières grands père, dans le bois en stalag avec une photo de ma grand-mère enfants dedans, ils me racontaient leurs histoires du temps de guerre. J’admire la Résistance Française et me passionne pour l’histoire depuis. Et je peux affirmer sans broncher que c’est grâce à eux qu’aujourd’hui, que nous avons pu chier sur leur héritage.

  8. Les numéros correspondent à quelque chose? Je pense que le 3 correspond au groupe de de Lattre de Tassigny mais je vois pas à quoi ça correspond.

    Aussi j’aimerais bien suivre de Gaulle, il est où notre général?

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