Koroonasertifikaatide süsteemi privaatvõtmete leke?

Mu suureks üllatuseks on se A. Hitleri sert täielikult valideeruv, mis tähendab, et see on plokiahelas sees. [Githubis spekuleeritakse](https://github.com/ehn-dcc-development/hcert-spec/issues/103) privaatvõtmete lekke üle Prantuse ja Poola terviseametitest.

Jääb veel väike võimalus, et keegi juurdepääsuga naljahammas on need serdid genereerinud või on keegi petnud endale juurdepääsu. Aga kui tõesti leke, siis tuleb tühistada kõik lekkinud võtmetega välja antud serdid ja see oleks ilmselt korralik löök passide usaldusväärsusele ja vesi antiväxxerite veskile 🙁

​

EDIT: võimalik on veel EU liikmete tervishoiusüsteemi koroonapassi genereerimise tarkvara häkkimine, mis tundub praegu isegi tõenäoline stsenaarium.

Foorumist:

>So, after a quick analysis I’ve found the following (results and original data stored here):
>
>Most of the certificates (e.g Adolf Hitler 1989, Joe Mama 1990, Spongebob Squarepants 1900) are generated by North Macedonia’s Ministry of Health system (KjE8h58xh7A=), but the actual country is set differently (AT, ZW, GB). I’m even surprised that this is possible to be honest.
>
>Two certificates have been signed using the French key (53FOjX/4aJs=): Hitler 1900 and Mickey Mouse 2001
>
>One certificate (Hitler 1930) has been signed by Poland’s key HhkeqvrtQ0U=
>
>The last, most interesting one, doesn’t even have a KID – but it seems to be recognized anyways (Ota Yhteyttä Wickr Rokotepassieu 1917): most probably this is using a bug in the app implementation
>
>I still strongly doubt a / multiple private keys have leaked, judging by the screenshots on 4Chan (I’ll add one here) the certificates are generated on some kind of EU provided portal. The chances that these have been hacked are way higher than the possibility that a private key (that is most likely on an HSM) has leaked.

​