The recent 16th BRICS Summit, held in October of this year, gave fresh momentum to the group’s digital and geopolitical strategies, especially in the Indo-Pacific. The outcome of this summit is likely to have direct implications for the core themes of digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and the ongoing competition with the Quad. 

The summit also announced the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, into its fold, thus promising to strengthen BRICS’ outreach into regions that have high digital infrastructure potential. Russia announced its framework for the Digital Silk Road, which ties directly into creating a parallel digital ecosystem across member states. This expanded BRICS connectivity plan could rival Quad-led infrastructure projects like the Blue Dot Network, especially in underserved areas of the Indo-Pacific. Quad’s focus on open, secure, and resilient infrastructure may face stiffer competition now as BRICS consolidates its influence through larger membership and shared resources.

These raise a few questions: how will the inclusion of new BRICS members reshape the digital landscape in the Indo-Pacific? How will Quad nations respond to BRICS’ ambitions in cybersecurity and digital infrastructure?

The Quad strategically focuses on the Indo-Pacific with a primary focus on security in the Indo-Pacific, countering China’s growing influence, and promoting a free, open, and inclusive region. On the other hand, BRICS is not strictly Indo-Pacific-centric.  However, China and India, key BRICS members, have major stakes in the area. Russia, through its “pivot to Asia” strategy, has also increased engagement. Such an architecture creates indirect interactions, as BRICS and Quad member states pursue their objectives in the same geographic theater. While the US’s “pivot to Asia” is a counterbalancing mechanism to contain the resurgent China, Russia’s strategy is to diversify from the West and strengthen ties with Asia. QUAD is often seen as a security alliance, though it lacks formalized military commitments.

India is both in the BRICS and QUAD groupings and this puts it in a unique position to exercise what is known as ‘strategic autonomy’. In the Quad, India aligns with democracies like the US, Japan, and Australia to address security concerns, particularly about maritime security cooperation and China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. At BRICS, India collaborates with emerging economies, this time again with China, to address different sets of issues about global economic and development challenges and emphasize a multipolar world order. To an extent, India has been utilizing this unique presence in both groups to balance its security interests with its economic and geopolitical priorities and often acting as a bridge between the Global North (Quad) and Global South (BRICS). See Fig 1: the network graph illustrating India’s association.

Fig 1:  India is a member of both BRICS and QUAD groupings

In discussions at the recent BRICS summit there was increased emphasis on technological collaboration in AI.  China’s leadership has potentially set the tone for other members to take an interest in this. The UAE, which has a strong focus on AI development ( it is also ranked among the top nations in AI readiness), has brought added expertise to the table, bolstering BRICS’ collective capabilities. AI-driven innovations have significant potential that could enhance BRICS’ ability to offer competitive digital solutions in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Quad nations may need to accelerate their AI initiatives to counter BRICS’ collective technological capabilities, especially as AI becomes a decisive factor in digital economies.

In light of Russia and China advocating state-controlled cyberspaces, the BRICS summit’s emphasis on cybersecurity frameworks directly aligns with the group’s push for digital sovereignty.  The proposed collaboration on cyber threat mitigation could be strategic and has the potential of establishing BRICS as a significant player in the global cybersecurity dialogue, challenging Quad-led initiatives. Cybersecurity discussions also included creating suitable safeguards against interference in national data systems, impacting Indo-Pacific digital trust networks. Quad’s collaborative cyber defense efforts may need to scale up to address the increasing sophistication of BRICS-led frameworks.

BRICS reassured its commitment to strengthening digital economies through projects like the New Development Bank (NDB)’s digital transformation and digital infrastructure programs. NDB, formally known as the BRICS Development Bank, finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects of emerging economies. In the meeting, there was particular emphasis on collaboration in blockchain and fintech-related areas. This initiative positions BRICS as a strong contender in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s digital economy. In contrast, Quad nations may need to bolster their digital economy projects in the region to counter BRICS’ growing influence in areas such as digital payment systems. With an expanded membership, BRICS could further facilitate more widespread adoption of “BRICS-driven technologies” in the Indo-Pacific. Huawei has been continuing to lead 5G projects among BRICS member states. Hence Quad must focus on secure and transparent 5G networks. This is crucial if it has to counter BRICS’ technological advancements.

There are some issues with Quad’s digital openness model. The model may need to articulate clearer policies on balancing sovereignty and openness to maintain its influence in the Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the BRICS summit’s focus on digital sovereignty has underscored the importance of national control over cyberspace. In the current summit, the discussions included how dependence on US-led tech ecosystems could be reduced. Its expanded membership and push for advanced AI and cybersecurity initiatives, highlight a comprehensive strategy that could challenge Quad’s dominance. This evolving rivalry highlights the urgent need for a deeper analysis of how digitalization shapes geopolitics in this critical region.

There is a variation in the strategies of “technology as a geopolitical tool” with a focus on two groups of countries embedded in different (yet interconnected) geopolitical contexts, namely the Quad and BRICS. As a result of this commitment to technology, both groups have developed respective strategies that cast technology as a geopolitical tool. The BRICS Strategy for Economic Partnership employs soft measures to reach geopolitical goals by setting rule-based cooperation frameworks in the developing part of the continent and using global cooperation law. The strategy was directed mostly at China, scaling up its involvement in these directions. The actors of the Quad, in contrast, have much less commitment toward developing such initiatives, and thus they use hard power measures to attain geopolitical aims – a comprehensive approach to allocate diplomatic pressure and funds for reducing China’s influence in these regions as an answer to its earlier policies.

On the one hand, BRICS, the relative latecomer, attempts to push digitalization further in the direction of multipolarity, promoting inter-civilizational dialogue, developing cooperative formats with African nations, and providing digital access to those left out or marginalized by the major digital platforms. On the other hand, the Indo-Pacific Quad exhibits the efforts invested by the rising powers in promoting their strategies for digitalization in the regional architectural space as a statement of their ability to shape regional dynamics. As a geopolitical tool, the alliances within and between BRICS and the Quad are distinct. While intra-quad pacts are non-binding, the one signed with the EU has also gained significance because it is format-exclusive. Intra-BRICS arrangements, on the other hand, are binding owing to the multilateral nature, interests, and responsibilities of the signatory states. The difference between the two regional digital strategies is not only about ideology but also about interests and forces that drive the geopolitics of connectivity and digitalization.

As a leading member, China shapes BRICS’ agenda to align with its interests, often countering Western hegemony. Quad, on the other hand, explicitly seeks to counterbalance China’s assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific. India’s presence in both groups reflects its practical approach to balancing competition with cooperation.

Future research may help in gauging how the relative power structure may indeed begin changing once digital generations, beyond 5G, take an avowed center stage. For instance, hypothesizing how a post-quantum world or scenarios where pervasive AI comes into play may produce different structural and systemic realities. It is suggested that while there may indeed be areas as this trend develops, where BRICS countries and Quad members may incipiently end up cooperating, future scenarios, given the terrain, may also reveal that both camps may primarily and increasingly be juxtaposed against each other as they promote their ‘digital’ strategies.