The growing militarization of outer space reflects a shift from its earlier perception as a protected, peaceful domain to an arena where nations are actively advancing their strategic and military capabilities.

What was once considered a neutral space reserved for exploration and scientific endeavors is now a key frontier in national defense, with various countries developing satellite-based weapons, anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, and other technologies aimed at asserting dominance and protecting their interests in orbit. Yet, the debate on which PAROS stands does not address contemporary issues of space weaponization, leaving gaps in debate regarding the rapid development of ASAT capabilities and other weaponized technologies. This transformation highlights the increasing strategic importance of space, where geopolitical rivalries are extending beyond Earth’s atmosphere.

Key treaties like the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and the 1979 Moon Agreement are central to the legal debate. Article III of the OST mandates that space activities comply with international law and the UN Charter, emphasizing peaceful usage. Article IV is nuanced: it bans weapons of mass destruction in orbit but allows for military use, stopping short of comprehensive demilitarization. Specifically, Article IV (2) enforces a strict prohibition on military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies, underscoring their exclusive peaceful use. The Moon Agreement reiterates this, banning any hostile acts on the Moon.

Overall, while the OST sets some boundaries on space weaponization, the current regulatory environment remains permissive, providing ample scope for military activities and development. This leeway, coupled with emerging security threats like cyberattacks and the deployment of space-specific military assets, suggests a gap in international law as it pertains to evolving security dynamics in space.

Despite these frameworks, current space laws permit extensive military activities. Conventional weapons and intelligence-gathering are permissible, while recent actions—such as ASAT (anti-satellite) tests conducted by China, the U.S., and India—illustrate the trend of increased militarized maneuvers. India, for instance, demonstrated its ASAT capabilities on 27 March 2019 through “Mission Shakti,” successfully striking a satellite in low Earth orbit with a kinetic kill vehicle. The test created hundreds of pieces of debris in low Earth orbit, increasing the risk of collisions with other satellites and space missions. This debris can persist for years, heightening the potential for incidents that could damage crucial space infrastructure and disrupt global services such as communications, navigation, and weather forecasting. Such actions contribute to an arms race in space, shifting the focus from peaceful exploration to conflict preparedness

Additionally, nations like the U.S. and France have established dedicated military space forces, underscoring a commitment to space defense. These forces, such as the U.S. Space Force, have developed capabilities like satellite jamming to prevent enemy access to satellite communications, and strategies emphasize the need for military superiority and defense in space.

Gul Qaiser Sarwani, a Pakistani delegate to the UN, warns that any conflict originating from outer space could have far-reaching effects beyond space itself, impacting all aspects of life on Earth—even in countries without space capabilities. He emphasizes the lack of progress in international negotiations to prevent an arms race in space (PAROS), despite the goals set by the Outer Space Treaty of the 1960s. Sarwani notes that divisions among countries on how to secure space have widened, with conflicting approaches and competitive agendas complicating efforts.

To address these challenges, Pakistan advocates for a “holistic approach” to space security, calling for actions that address dual-use technologies (those with both civilian and military applications) and explicitly warfighting-oriented space capabilities. Sarwani reinforces Pakistan’s long-standing support for a legally binding treaty on PAROS and its contributions to non-binding initiatives like Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs). Historically, such measures have often paved the way for binding agreements, and Pakistan believes they hold similar potential for space security.

An updated PAROS, aligned with current realities, could play a critical role in reducing and managing the growing array of space-based threats that pose risks to global stability. Unlike in the past, where space was predominantly a domain of exploration and scientific advancement, the modern space environment faced issues stemming from weaponization, militarization, and dual-use technologies. There needs to be a PAROS agreement that would address these threats by establishing clearer limitations on military activities in space, providing frameworks for transparency in ASAT weapon development, and setting international norms against the deployment of destabilizing technologies, including those that could interfere with satellite communications or navigation systems.

To move PAROS beyond the decades of stalled negotiations within the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), there is an urgent need for a robust debate on establishing a legally binding treaty and regulatory regime that aligns with international law. While the CD has been instrumental in bringing attention to the risks of an arms race in space, its limitations in producing actionable outcomes have prevented PAROS from adapting to contemporary challenges. By shifting the focus to a treaty-based approach, member states could work toward creating enforceable legal mechanisms that prevent space weaponization, prohibit offensive uses of space assets, and ensure transparency in the development of space technologies with dual-use potential.