Even as Moldova loudly denounced Kremlin meddling in its October elections, a handful of government officials were quietly working to buy Russian gas, an established tool for political interference.

A leaked letter to Moldovan energy minister Victor Parlicov from the head of the Russian-controlled state company Moldovagaz in early October, suggests the Kremlin is keen to strike a deal.

Gazprom, the letter said, is not only ready to restart deliveries to Moldova proper after these were stopped in 2022 but would also be prepared to send as much as a third of Moldova’s annual gas needs in the first three months of next year alone.

Parlicov, who has authored numerous studies showing how Gazprom pushed Moldovagaz to rack up a $10bn debt, which it used to fan Transnistrian separatism, responded publicly that buying Russian gas would be just an “economic issue.”

His latest visit together with a delegation from Moldovagaz to St Petersburg on November 25 failed to reap the results he was expecting as negotiations were postponed.

However, it raises questions about his reasons for seeking renewed ties with Russia.

Moldova currently holds a gas supply agreement with Gazprom which expires in 2026. Under the deal, the producer was expected to deliver the gas to Moldovan consumers in both the government-run areas and to the Russian-occupied puppet state of Transnistria, where most of it would be used to generate electricity.

It’s almost as if Moldova’s government has forgotten the recent past. Since 2021, Moldova has suffered multiple crises after Russia cut supplies for two winters in a row, hoping to deter it from pursuing a European path.

Understandably apprehensive of the Kremlin’s relentless bullying and with the energy system close to collapse, the government sought Western assistance.

Numerous partners, both in Ukraine and the European Union (EU) mobilized at short notice to provide financial aid and expertise to help the government fight Russia’s abusive behavior.

Thanks to this support, Moldova freed itself from full reliance on Russian gas and gained the flexibility to buy alternative supplies on European markets.

By the end of 2022, the government had weaned the country off Russian gas for consumers and diverted all imports to Transnistria.

Under significant pressure from the EU, the Moldovan government has also initiated some required reforms such as creating the necessary conditions for competitive imports. However, these efforts have been too small and too slow, with many reforms still needing to be implemented.

The government allowed Gazprom-controlled Moldovagaz to retain its monopoly, where it controls over 97% of the retail market, and forced the only major private supplier, Rotalin Gaz Trading, owned by US investors, to halt operations.

Despite this history, Parlicov wants to resume talks with Gazprom over the contracted gas. He points to the fact that supplies to Transnistria are at risk because Russia’s transit arrangements with Ukraine expire on January 1.

While it’s true that the renewal of the transit deal is uncertain given Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine, Gazprom has an obligation to deliver gas to Moldova’s borders.

If the Ukrainian route is no longer available, it could instead be delivered from the south via Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.

This would require no government involvement.

Furthermore, although Parlicov is right to worry about the social and political implications of a possible gas curtailment to Transnistria in 2025, there is no indication that he and his government have devised a robust contingency plan.

There are difficulties here, it’s true. Transnistrians have been paying prices for subsidized Russian imports that are on average one-tenth of those paid by consumers in the rest of Moldova. This would make it difficult to supply them with expensive gas secured on European markets.

Nevertheless, if the Moldovan government was truly keen to align with the EU, its priority should have been to coordinate with Brussels to keep Russian gas out of the country and lock in Western funding to help reintegrate the divided country.

Parlicov seems persuaded that by importing Russian gas, the government could keep a lid on soaring tariffs in 2025, a highly sensitive issue among consumers, particularly ahead of elections next year.

While it’s true that prices for Russian gas in the first quarter of 2025 will be cheaper than those predicted on free markets, few efforts were made to buy alternative supplies for January and February when prices were much more affordable earlier this summer. 

The head of Russian-run Moldovagaz says that existing gas stock and purchases will cover only 65% of winter demand, which effectively raises fears over possible supply shortages during the cold season.

The government has not responded to questions from these authors, which makes it difficult for us to understand its reasoning.

Nevertheless, by seeking to renew discussions with Russia over gas supplies, it reinforces Moldova’s perceived weakness and betrays Ukraine, as the money paid for Russian imports would help replenish the Kremlin’s war chest.

Moldova is at a crossroads: to continue its difficult but overdue EU-aligned reforms, or return to old practices involving opaque deals with Russia which effectively tie a noose around its neck.

It is unclear whether the promise of cheap Russian gas will win the government additional electoral support in 2025. It is clear though that this is likely to lose Moldova the sympathy of its European partners.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) She works as a journalist specializing in European energy markets for the London-based Independent Commodity Intelligence Service (ICIS). Twitter: @ASabadus.

Sergiy Makogon is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) He was CEO of GasTSO of Ukraine (2019-2022) and is an energy expert with extensive experience in the European and Ukrainian gas markets.