Carlo Galli
There are three reasons that have underpinned the success of the Right, and they are partly contradictory. The first is the upsurge in protests that has been going on for the last twenty years or so. These movements are rooted in the contradictions of the neoliberal paradigm. Around ten million votes have switched from one party to another on the mere promise of change, with one party suddenly becoming the central party in the political game. This was the case with Matteo Renzi’s Partito Democratico, then Matteo Salvini’s Lega, Beppe Grillo’s Movimento Cinque Stelle, and finally Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia.
The second reason is the demand for security. A large part of Italian public opinion is convinced that it lives in a world of insecurity. This is reflected in the issue of public order, where the focus is on migrants, but there is also a fundamental economic insecurity. There are no longer any fixed jobs; they have become precarious or poorly paid. There is no longer any hope of a stable future or belief in progress, which was once the basis of the success of Christian Democracy during the so-called First Republic of 1947–93.
The third reason for the rise of the Right stands in contradiction with the demand for “more government” implicit within the demand for security. It is a demand for less government, which translates into a rejection of fiscal pressure and bureaucracy. These sentiments are objectively understandable, but they are manipulated by the Right.
The Right is using these three factors, which brought it to power, to move even further into post-democracy. It cannot keep its economic promises, especially the one to cut taxes. It has not been able to keep its sovereigntist promises either. The Right is not sovereigntist. The Meloni government has bowed to Brussels’s positions and has done nothing to oppose the basic logic of the European Union. It has accepted the new [deficit-restricting] Stability and Growth Pact, for example. Nor has it shown any sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs, where it has taken an almost embarrassingly Atlanticist stance on the situation in the Middle East.
In the end, the Italian right is no more sovereigntist than it is fascist. The truth is that the Meloni government has accelerated all the worst dynamics that were already underway. The first of these is the disappearance of the public sphere. Italy has become a place where there are only individuals and no longer an articulated society. By an articulated society, I mean a society in which, for example, there are parties and trade unions involved in social conflicts. Now there are only atomized and frightened individuals. And that’s the aim of the Right: to maintain this individualistic fragmentation of society.
This individualism is not that of the aggressive, triumphant, heroic or even entrepreneurial individual. No, it’s a frightened, terrorized, worried individualism of people who want protection, tax exemptions, and to be left to deal with their own problems without too much fuss. And the Right feeds and facilitates this individualism.
That’s why the Right recently pushed through the law on “differentiated autonomy” for the Italian regions: the aim is to encourage the fragmentation that lies at the heart of this social thinking. It’s strange, a Right that doesn’t defend the idea of national unity. That’s because it prefers division; it’s the party of division. It’s no coincidence that this Italian right, which doesn’t make much reference to many European conservative intellectuals, takes its cue from Giuseppe Prezzolini, an intellectual from the early years of the twentieth century who defined himself as a skeptic. He believed in nothing. There is only strategy.