Poland will lead the Council of the European Union for the next six months. However, its rising status in the EU suggests that its leadership role in the EU may extend far beyond this term.

This will be Poland’s second time as president of the Council, thirteen years after it first held the position. Now twenty-one years on from when it first joined the EU, it stands as a country and an economy utterly transformed. Working alongside Germany, France, Italy and Spain as part of the so-called ‘Big Five’ of the EU; as a member of the Visegrad Four alongside Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia; and as a member of the Weimar Triangle along with France and Germany, Poland emerges as a key political player in internal EU affairs and in EU external action, especially in spurring EU responses against Russian aggression and as a supporter of EU enlargement.

Poland assumed presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 January 2025, taking over after six months of Hungary at the helm. Poland will work alongside Denmark and Cyprus as a ‘trio’, allowing for continuity and long-term planning over a period of eighteen months. As a close friend of Poland, Ireland will be attentive to its policies and priorities before Ireland takes over the reins in 2026. There is hope that after Hungary’s presidency, Poland, with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, will succeed in building consensus amongst EU Member States. However, this hope of greater unity of purpose does not extend to optimism for six months of plain sailing for the EU. It must contend with Russia at its eastern borders, war and humanitarian crises in the Middle East and the forthcoming Trump presidency under which EU-US relations will be tested, while also addressing stalling competitiveness and a fragmented political scene within the EU.

Poland’s priorities for its six-month presidency are to strengthen European security in all its dimensions: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food and health. Additionally, Poland will support a merit-based EU enlargement. What these priorities mean in terms of their implications for Ireland and the wider EU project, and in terms of Poland’s increasing role as a power player are explored below.

Perhaps Poland’s biggest objective for the EU is that of strengthening external security. In its presidency programme, Poland pledges to support debates on defence spending and strengthen cooperation with NATO and non-EU partners. Poland is already the biggest spender on defence as a percentage of GDP in the EU and NATO and believes that other EU countries should commit much more. Ireland must feel its ears burning. Figures from December 2024 put Ireland lowest on spending on defence in the EU. Though Ireland’s history and geography mean that defence has almost been a non-issue, Prime Minister Tusk has urged for Ireland to show solidarity and support for increased protection of Poland’s borders.

Under the heading of internal security, Poland promises to address the challenges of migration – particularly the instrumentalization of migration as hybrid warfare by Belarus and others– as well as to enhance civil protection capacities and to address terrorism and radicalisation within Europe. Migration has become a highly politicised issue in Poland: in December 2024, Donald Tusk announced a controversial asylum strategy that would enable the temporary suspension of the right to asylum in particular border territories. Tusk has also publicly opposed elements of the EU Migration Pact, which is due to take effect in June 2026, immediately before Ireland assumes the presidency of the Council.

The alarm bells sounding on EU competitiveness in the wake of the Draghi Report are echoed in Poland’s presidency programme, where its plans for the Competitiveness Council include reinforcing the foundations of the Single Market and developing an EU industrial policy. To ensure economic security, Poland seeks to address supply chain dependencies and mitigate against the protectionist actions of third countries. Though the US is not mentioned explicitly, US President-elect Trump’s proposed changes to US trade policy are undoubtedly the elephant in the room.

Notable in its absence from Poland’s seven dimensions of security is the concept of climate security, which could have focused on building the EU’s resilience to climate events and reducing our reliance on fossil fuels. Poland, like many EU countries, has experienced sharp dissent from farmers on aspects of the EU Green New Deal. The share of gross value added of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in Poland is furthermore twice that of the EU average. Therefore, perhaps the exclusion of climate as a heading was a strategic decision accounting for domestic political pressures. However, the programme does mention the importance of developing technologies to facilitate a clean energy transition under its energy security priorities. Poland will also seek to combat climate disinformation under its information security priorities and promote a move away from penalties and obligations in terms of climate goals, and instead focus on rewards and incentives.

Poland’s food security priorities include shaping a strong Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and simplifying the goals of the European Green Deal so that it is “acceptable” to farmers. It is interesting that the potential challenges posed by Ukraine’s accession to the EU, given its huge agricultural output are only briefly mentioned. Ukraine’s CAP transfers would likely be in the region of 25% of the CAP budget, meaning that Poland’s own agricultural dominance could be unsettled. Poland and Ukraine have already conflicted on the issue of grain imports to the EU, a matter which is currently before the World Trade Organisation. Ukraine’s accession would likely mean that Poland swings from being the largest net recipient of EU funds to an overall net contributor. Ireland’s CAP payments would also change significantly with the introduction of Ukraine to the EU, thus Poland’s leadership as an honest broker on this matter will be of great interest nationally.

On enlargement, Poland emphasises its role as the “best possible instrument for the European Union to strengthen and promote peace, democracy, rule of law and prosperity in Europe”. Foreign Minister Sikorski has expressed his commitment to opening the “fundamental issues” chapters of the enlargement processes with both Ukraine and Moldova during the next six months. Unlike defence policy, this is an issue on which Poland and Ireland are completely ad idem. Both countries are enthusiastic supporters of a merit-based approach to enlargement, though questions such as Ukraine’s impact on CAP remain unexamined.

Poland’s presidency programme is ambitious and far-reaching, though often focused on issues that are already domestically popular, including addressing migration and strengthening the EU’s defence sector. Poland’s presidency of the Council comes at a time where domestic challenges, including elections for a new Polish President in May 2025. Tusk’s Civic Coalition party is eager to see the election of a candidate aligned with its objectives, given that President Duda of the PiS Party has thwarted many of the Civic Coalition’s plans for rule of law reform, making the promised policy changes of Tusk’s 2023 election campaign an almost impossible task. These domestic challenges could have hindered Poland’s ambitions. Instead, Poland has grasped the presidency as an opportunity to show its readiness and maturity as a leader on issues that strike into the existential heart of the future of the EU: defence and enlargement.

That Europe’s centre of gravity is shifting eastwards is acknowledged by commentators and EU scholars alike. The ‘old’ powers of Germany and France find themselves embroiled in internal political turmoil that hinders their leadership capacity. In addition, Central and Eastern European economies boast some of the strongest growth rates in the EU. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies forecasted a 2.6% average growth for Eastern European member states, compared to a 0.6% growth for the euro area in 2024. Poland emerges here as a frontrunner, with an expected growth rate of 3.6% in 2025. But perhaps most consequentially is the fact that enlargement and defence – two of the most defining issues of the EU’s strategic agenda for 2025-2029 – will have the most impact on Central and Eastern member states like Poland, which is where these issues most strongly championed. Poland’s desire for Europe to “become a bit more Polish – especially in terms of political realism and proper assessment of key actions” confirms that ambition to lead Europe in a direction of increased security. Further, that Poland’s priorities are, by and large, becoming EU priorities, shows the strong position Poland already occupies as a power player in the EU.

Poland’s place in the EU has evolved significantly since it first held the Council presidency in 2013 as a relative newcomer, to now, where it seeks to lead the path forward for a transformed EU. Its presidency programme shows enthusiasm for change and a desire also to lead that change. Though national challenges, including the upcoming presidential election, may have dampened the language on climate change obligations, Poland has shown it is serious about its leadership role. The power vacuum that currently exists in France and Germany, and the strong economic position that Poland enjoys, suggest ripe conditions for it to emerge as a leader even beyond these six months, given that the EU will inevitably lean towards Poland for direction on Russia and on enlargement.

Poland’s chosen motto for its presidency – ‘Security, Europe!’ – could hint at exasperation at the EU’s slow response to defence issues. After all, it had warned of Russia’s threat to the EU long before western Member States woke to the reality, and now shoulders much of the EU’s burden in supporting Ukraine in both military and humanitarian terms. ‘Security, Europe!’ however also rings as a rallying cry from a country that sees itself as a lodestar that can lead Europe and help shape its identity as it responds to an altered geo-political and economic landscape.