The (re)emerging fraternal ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh must be taken to their logical conclusion. They must lead to a permanent rapprochement between them, overcoming all impediments—past and present, real and perceived. They must also ward off inimical efforts to (re)create doubts and chasms between the two peoples. These ties must become multidimensional, encompassing political, diplomatic, economic, trade, cultural and social, military and security, sports, education, and tourism, among others. They must establish free trade agreements, encourage investments in each other’s economies, promote visa-free travel, restart direct flights and maritime links, and facilitate exchange visits by politicians, scholars, businesspeople, students, artists, writers, journalists, sportspersons, and people from all other walks of life. The Pakistan-Bangladesh reconciliation must aim to bring about a comprehensive (re)engagement between the two peoples and restore long-lasting bonds. They could also start cooperating in regional and international affairs.

Pakistan is a formidable military-nuclear-missile power in its own right. It has repeatedly demonstrated the necessary military capacity and capability to safeguard its vital national interests. It religiously maintains full-spectrum deterrence and a viable strategic balance with its regional adversaries at all times. Not only does it possess extremely professional, disciplined, combat-hardened, well-equipped, and well-trained armed forces, but it has also exhibited the necessary political and military will to defend itself against all odds. Through bilateral collaboration, it could help Bangladesh develop and hone similar military prowess to deter external aggression. Pakistan has a significant military-industrial complex that could meet Bangladesh’s requirements. Bangladesh has already shown interest in the JF-17 Block III aircraft. Pakistan could also consider providing naval vessels, mechanised/armoured vehicles, tanks, drones, artillery guns and other indirect fire weapon systems, air defence systems, all types of munitions, and even other weapon systems such as anti-tank and short-range missiles, subject to international regimes and conventions. The scope is limitless. Collaboration must therefore be unrestricted and forthcoming!

India, on the other hand, is likely to be highly apprehensive of this newfound bonhomie between two of its most important neighbours. It had invested massively in keeping them apart once and would now be clearly alarmed at these unexpectedly rapid developments. It will take stock of the emerging geopolitical and geostrategic environment and initiate immediate remedial measures. The loss of its Project Bangladesh is a serious setback in its efforts to become the unchallenged regional hegemon. It has slowly but surely lost influence and clout with almost all its neighbours, including the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and now Bangladesh. Geopolitical isolation seems imminent, if not already evident. India will need to act post-haste not only to contain the geopolitical and geostrategic malaise aggravated by Bangladesh moving out of its sphere of influence but also to recoup its losses elsewhere in the region. Geopolitically, it is clearly on the retreat!

What, then, are the options available to India in this increasingly unfavourable geopolitical environment in South Asia? First, it could accept the status quo and live with it. This is highly unlikely, as it goes against the very image of the regional hegemon that it holds of itself. Second, it could attempt to regain the confidence of Bangladesh and its people. It might continue flogging the dead horse of the 1971 debacle/war of independence relentlessly. However, it appears that its time has come and gone. The peoples of Pakistan and Bangladesh are now resolved and primed to move beyond their rather unfortunate past and towards a bright, shared, mutually secured future. Such Indian efforts are unlikely to succeed. Third, it could launch a well-considered strategy of coercive diplomacy as well as fifth-generation warfare against Bangladesh. This could include media and diplomatic offensives as well as trade wars. It might also start pressuring Bangladesh on border issues, water sharing, electricity supply, immigration, and other matters. False flag operations, à la Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K), could also be staged along the Indo-Bangladesh border. Furthermore, efforts could be made to destabilise Bangladesh internally through social and political upheavals, transnational terrorism, and other means. This seems to be the most likely approach for India. Fourth, as a last resort, it could even consider intervening militarily and/or attempting a regime change in Dhaka. This is highly unlikely, as the current government enjoys enormous popular support. Moreover, such an approach would not find any takers in the international community. India could thus potentially become inextricably embroiled in border disputes and/or kinetic operations on both its geographical extremes—North-Northwest and East-Northeast—ominously, even simultaneously. As a member of the QUAD, India may find that the US does not want it to expend its critical time, effort, and energies against anyone but the designated adversary.

India has clearly lost its overbearing presence and influence in Bangladesh and among other neighbours. It must move beyond the Chanakyan edicts and fashion a more modern, realistic, and relevant policy framework, in keeping with the realities of current geopolitical dynamics. It must realise that China is not only a global and regional power but also a South Asian power now. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is forging regional connectivity and economic interdependence within South Asia, excluding India. That alone might have contributed massively to India’s loss of influence and consequent isolation in the region. These are the geopolitical and geostrategic realities that India must recognise and accept. As long as the China factor remains relevant in South Asia, India’s dreams and ambitions of becoming the undisputed hegemon of the region will remain unfulfilled. Even the support of distant powers, no matter how powerful, may not be enough to change this emerging geopolitical reality. Could this push India further into the US camp—with untold implications for South Asian geopolitics?

Imran Malik
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at im.k846@gmail.com and tweets @K846Im.