One of the most important goals of the European Union in recent decades has been its effort to emerge as a global actor to achieve strategic autonomy, which was defined within its security mechanisms under its foreign policy. However, it has yet to gain the necessary executive capability.
Europe’s first attempt after World War II to establish an independent defense organization took the form of the “Western European Union.” This entity, which served as a defensive alliance against the threats posed by the Soviet Union, was dissolved in 2011, and its original responsibilities were transferred to NATO. This marked the beginning of the erosion of Europe’s independent defense following its integration into NATO.
In reality, NATO’s security umbrella and the presence of U.S. military bases in Europe prevented the emergence of any independent security institution until the Maastricht Treaty. After the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established as one of the three main pillars of the European Union. Influential members such as Germany and France made significant efforts to build consensus among member states to create an independent defense and security mechanism.
Despite substantial institutional progress in the form of the EU’s global strategy, including the “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO) and the “European Defense Fund,” significant obstacles remained. Externally, the lack of support from the United States for such a mechanism, which it viewed as potentially conflicting with NATO’s objectives, posed a challenge. Internally, disagreements among EU members over allocating substantial budgets to such a mechanism further complicated matters. However, one of the most significant challenges currently facing the EU’s strategic autonomy in the security domain is the war in Ukraine. The immediate and existential threat that the EU perceives from Russia on its eastern borders has deepened its reliance on the United States. Europe’s security dilemma on its eastern and southern borders, coupled with the U.S. security umbrella, has undermined the EU’s internal capabilities to achieve defense mechanisms aimed at strategic autonomy in two key ways. First, the serious threats posed by Russia to Eastern European countries have made their existential security heavily dependent on NATO and the United States. This, combined with the lack of an independent defense mechanism to protect their own security, has significantly increased these countries’ vulnerability to Russian threats. The security threats faced by Eastern European countries and their reliance on “rented security” have created divisions within the EU over the allocation of large budgets.
Western and Central European countries, perceiving the threat as less immediate, advocate for allocating more EU funds to defense mechanisms under the European Defense Fund. In contrast, Eastern European countries bordering Russia prefer strengthening cooperation with NATO and support increasing the presence of U.S. military bases in Europe. This internal divide led to only €5 billion of the proposed €13 billion for the European Defense Fund in 2017 being approved by 2020.
On the other hand, NATO’s more than seven-decade-long presence in defending European security has convinced many countries, especially those bordering Russia, that NATO is the only force capable of countering Russian threats, and that any alternative to NATO is unfeasible, at least in the medium term. This, combined with opposition from some U.S. administrations to the EU’s independent defense mechanisms, has created structural divisions and eroded the EU’s institutional capabilities to defend its own security. Additionally, Eastern European countries prefer to fulfill their commitments to allocate 2% of their GDP to NATO’s budget rather than investing in mechanisms for independent defense.
In reality, alongside the war in Ukraine and the heightened struggle of Eastern European countries for their existential security, the prospect of the EU’s strategic autonomy in the geopolitical dimension has been severely impacted and rendered nearly impossible. This is evident in the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO and the efforts of other non-NATO countries to join the alliance.
With the return of Trump, it seems that Europe’s security crisis has entered a new phase. The most significant issue for EU member states is the security deficit and increasing dependence on the United States, which is expected to deepen during Trump’s potential second term and over the next four years, making an independent EU defense mechanism even more unattainable. Another major problem is that France and Germany have not taken the security concerns of Central and Eastern European countries seriously, focusing instead on reinforcing U.S. presence in Europe’s defense and security. In such a situation, intra-European disagreements only increase dependence on the United States and deepen the divide over independent EU defense mechanisms. Therefore, it is unlikely that Europe’s desired security order will emerge from the ashes, even after the end of the war in Ukraine.