Kurdish SDF fighters in northeaster Syria, 16 November 2015. Source: Wiki CC
An intriguing aspect of
the aftermath of the collapse of the Assad regime is the future the Kurdish-led
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Given the conflicts between the SDF and
Turkish-sponsored Syrian armed groups, what possible role could the SDF have
under the country’s new rulers? Could they follow a path similar to that of
their fellow Kurds in Iraq, and administer a federal entity?
Despite attempts at Kurdish
autonomy in Syria, fundamental historical, geopolitical, and structural
differences will render an Iraq-style outcome unlikely. Here are four key
reasons why:
1. Lack of
International Protection
Iraqi Kurds’ federal
status was not a direct result of the 2003 US invasion or the 2005 Iraqi constitution.
It dates back to 1991 when the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over
northern Iraq, granting Kurdistan de facto autonomy. For over a decade before
regime change, Kurds in Iraq had their own administration, a separate currency,
and security forces under international protection.
In contrast, Syrian Kurds
lack any form of international legal recognition or protection. No global power
has enforced a no-fly zone over Rojava, nor is there legal backing for Kurdish
autonomy. Without this kind of support, achieving a similar status to Iraqi
Kurds is improbable.
2. Limited Political
and Military Influence
Kurds in Iraq played a significant role in shaping post-Saddam Iraq and were key local collaborators with the forces that brought about regime change in the country. In Iraq, Kurdish factions were among the most powerful groups both militarily and politically following the 2003 fall of the regime. The Kurdish political leadership played a crucial role in shaping the new Iraqi government and constitution. Even prior to the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, Kurdish leaders were key participants in Iraqi opposition meetings, positioning themselves as central players in the country’s future.
In contrast, Kurds in
Syria have largely been excluded from political discussions regarding Syria’s
future. When Ahmed al-Sharaa declared himself transitional president on 30 January
2025, at a conference that included key armed groups involved in toppling the
Assad regime, major Kurdish groups were absent. Without representation in
significant negotiations, any ability to secure constitutional autonomy remains
weak.
3. Strong Regional
Opposition
The
geopolitical landscape in Syria also makes Kurdish autonomy far more difficult.
When Iraqi Kurds gained de facto autonomy in 1991, regional powers such as
Turkey and Iran lacked the military and political leverage to prevent it,
despite their reservations. Syria,
however, is a different case. Turkey maintains a significant military presence
in Syria and exerts strong political influence over Damascus. Ankara opposes
Kurdish autonomy, particularly any such polity led by the SDF, which it views
as an extension of the PKK. Unlike Iraq, where opposition was relatively weak,
Turkey’s active intervention makes a Kurdish federal region in Syria extremely
difficult.
4. Centralised
Governance in Post-Assad Syria
Post-2003 Iraq embraced
federalism and power-sharing, backed by the US, with the 2005 Iraqi constitution
explicitly recognising Kurdish autonomy. In Syria, decentralisation is not a
priority, at least not in the way the Kurds envision it (as a path to autonomy).
Many supporters of the new al-Sharaa administration oppose power-sharing and
the model of decentralisation implemented in Iraq after 2003. Unlike Iraq,
where external actors supported Kurdish federalism, no major power in Syria
advocates for Kurdish autonomy. Without such backing, the new Syrian powers are
unlikely to grant legal recognition to Kurdish self-rule.
Conclusion
While Iraqi Kurds
benefited from early international protection, political strength, and regional
dynamics that allowed for federal recognition, Kurds in Syria face a far more
challenging environment. The absence of international legal safeguards, the
Kurds’ political exclusion, entrenched Turkish opposition, and the Syrian administration’s
centralisation mindset make a federal Kurdish region in Syria unlikely.
This does not rule out
some form of Kurdish self-administration in Syria. However, achieving legal
recognition – particularly through constitutional guarantees, as in Iraq – seems
an improbable outcome at this stage.
