Germany and France reacted decisively to the Russian invasion. But before that, they let Putin have his way and left their Polish partner out in the cold. Things cannot go on like this in dealings with the Kremlin.
For too long, Germany and France have misjudged Putin’s Russia. The war of aggression against Ukraine makes it brutally clear that the two EU heavyweights were wrong, but most Central European countries, and Poland in particular, were correct in their analysis of Moscow’s intentions. And it is these countries that today stand by Ukraine’s side without any ifs or buts. The sensational trip to Kiev by the heads of government of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia was not only a courageous gesture, it underscored the self-image of many Central Europeans that they are now Europe’s frontline states in the confrontation with Russia – and therefore also Europe’s spearhead in terms of support for Ukraine.
Less than three months ago, newly elected Chancellor Olaf Scholz took up the cudgels for Ostpolitik in his first government declaration: In the SPD and beyond, a reading of Willy Brandt’s doctrine long prevailed, according to which a non-democratic Russia was to be integrated through dialogue and trade – in other words, through mutual economic dependence. On the basis of its history, Germany must “more and more often make the attempt at understanding (…),” Scholz said as late as December 15, 2021, when Russian tanks had long since taken up positions on the Ukrainian border.
In this speech, the Chancellor also announced the construction of new gas-fired power plants. After all, a leitmotif of Ostpolitik from the very beginning was “change through trade” – and with it came the convenience of cheap energy imports.
It was barely two years ago that French President Emmanuel Macron said phrases like “Who is NATO’s enemy? Russia is not today.” In the future, he said, the transatlantic alliance should primarily fight Islamist terrorism. In addition, he declared NATO “brain dead.”
Like Scholz, Macron’s Russia policy was also based on a great predecessor: on Charles de Gaulle and his Détente (détente), on the Gaullist vision of a European Community from “the Atlantic to the Urals.” In dialogue with Putin, Macron wanted to design a new security architecture from “Lisbon to Vladivostok” that would take Moscow’s concerns seriously. This would have had the nice side effect of making Paris Moscow’s main point of contact on security issues in Washington’s place.
Let the useful be combined with the pleasant, goes a French proverb. But Berlin also acted according to this maxim when it came to Russia. The warnings of the Central and Eastern European EU states against Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions were not heard: Germany and France simply did not take Central Europe seriously.
Whether under Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel or in the early days of Olaf Scholz, the Federal Republic diligently built pipelines to Russia, whose revenues from gas and oil today finance the war of aggression. When the Eastern European partners protested, it was dismissed as the whim of traumatized and insignificant states that, as former subjects of the Soviet Union, behaved in an overly emotional and overly nationalistic manner. If Washington was pushing to terminate the Nord Stream 2 project, it was only because the Americans were looking for a new market for their costly liquefied natural gas. However, the intentions one assumes of the other say a lot about one’s own political way of thinking.
Same story in Paris. When the Eastern Europeans supported the United States in the misguided 2003 Iraq War to secure its loyalty, then-President Jacques Chirac groused that these “new EU countries” had missed a good opportunity to “keep their mouths shut.” They should defer to Paris and Berlin.
Thank you for this, and the translation – great job and a good article
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Germany and France reacted decisively to the Russian invasion. But before that, they let Putin have his way and left their Polish partner out in the cold. Things cannot go on like this in dealings with the Kremlin.
For too long, Germany and France have misjudged Putin’s Russia. The war of aggression against Ukraine makes it brutally clear that the two EU heavyweights were wrong, but most Central European countries, and Poland in particular, were correct in their analysis of Moscow’s intentions. And it is these countries that today stand by Ukraine’s side without any ifs or buts. The sensational trip to Kiev by the heads of government of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia was not only a courageous gesture, it underscored the self-image of many Central Europeans that they are now Europe’s frontline states in the confrontation with Russia – and therefore also Europe’s spearhead in terms of support for Ukraine.
Less than three months ago, newly elected Chancellor Olaf Scholz took up the cudgels for Ostpolitik in his first government declaration: In the SPD and beyond, a reading of Willy Brandt’s doctrine long prevailed, according to which a non-democratic Russia was to be integrated through dialogue and trade – in other words, through mutual economic dependence. On the basis of its history, Germany must “more and more often make the attempt at understanding (…),” Scholz said as late as December 15, 2021, when Russian tanks had long since taken up positions on the Ukrainian border.
In this speech, the Chancellor also announced the construction of new gas-fired power plants. After all, a leitmotif of Ostpolitik from the very beginning was “change through trade” – and with it came the convenience of cheap energy imports.
It was barely two years ago that French President Emmanuel Macron said phrases like “Who is NATO’s enemy? Russia is not today.” In the future, he said, the transatlantic alliance should primarily fight Islamist terrorism. In addition, he declared NATO “brain dead.”
Like Scholz, Macron’s Russia policy was also based on a great predecessor: on Charles de Gaulle and his Détente (détente), on the Gaullist vision of a European Community from “the Atlantic to the Urals.” In dialogue with Putin, Macron wanted to design a new security architecture from “Lisbon to Vladivostok” that would take Moscow’s concerns seriously. This would have had the nice side effect of making Paris Moscow’s main point of contact on security issues in Washington’s place.
Let the useful be combined with the pleasant, goes a French proverb. But Berlin also acted according to this maxim when it came to Russia. The warnings of the Central and Eastern European EU states against Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions were not heard: Germany and France simply did not take Central Europe seriously.
Whether under Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel or in the early days of Olaf Scholz, the Federal Republic diligently built pipelines to Russia, whose revenues from gas and oil today finance the war of aggression. When the Eastern European partners protested, it was dismissed as the whim of traumatized and insignificant states that, as former subjects of the Soviet Union, behaved in an overly emotional and overly nationalistic manner. If Washington was pushing to terminate the Nord Stream 2 project, it was only because the Americans were looking for a new market for their costly liquefied natural gas. However, the intentions one assumes of the other say a lot about one’s own political way of thinking.
Same story in Paris. When the Eastern Europeans supported the United States in the misguided 2003 Iraq War to secure its loyalty, then-President Jacques Chirac groused that these “new EU countries” had missed a good opportunity to “keep their mouths shut.” They should defer to Paris and Berlin.
Thank you for this, and the translation – great job and a good article
We warned you guys…
Good article, in a way that I agree with it.