Anand Menon and Jannike Wachowiak examine the challenges, choices and polices around Europe for the UK government. [This is an extract from UK in a Changing Europe’s report ‘Choices and challenges for UK foreign policy’].

The challenges

Years of underinvestment have left the UK ‘unprepared for sustained conflict’. Like other European states, it has come to depend on the United States for its security: in 2023 the combined share of NATO defence spending contributed by Europeans stood at 28%. Europeans are reliant on US intelligence, air defence, and command and control capabilities. All this in a context characterised by war in Europe, conflict in the Middle East, and an increased danger of Russian aggression.

The major single challenge, then, is to ensure UK security in this altered environment. While the UK-US security relationship remains close, and whilst, as pointed out elsewhere in this volume, some UK capabilities are valued in Washington, it is not clear that the US under President Trump will be as dependable as it has been in the past, or as committed to the centrepiece of European defence efforts – NATO.

And unlike in the past, the UK is not a member state of the EU and so does not have an easy European alternative. When it comes to European partners, the challenge will be to find a way for the two sides to construct and purchase sufficient capabilities to mitigate their dependence on the US.

As things stand, there are good reasons to doubt this will be possible. European Commission proposals to reinforce European defence industries via collaborative projects and joint procurement have not yet been backed by sufficient funding from member states.

Even if they are, it is far from a given that the UK will be able to participate in these efforts. Existing initiatives, like the European Defence Fund, are limited to single market members. The Commission has highlighted the UK’s importance as a partner in security and defence, as have various member states. Yet the recent proposal to boost the EU’s defence industry does not foresee a role for the UK. Nor do recent landmark reports (by Niinistö, and Draghi) on EU military preparedness and competitiveness.

UK policy to date

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with nuclear capabilities, and a first-class foreign service and intelligence capabilities, the UK has played an important role both in NATO and, as a member state, in shaping EU foreign and security policies. Indeed, the key principle of British foreign policy was to avoid having to make a choice between the US and Europe – hence the widely deployed concept of the UK as a ‘bridge’ between the two.

Whilst playing a leading role in the creation of EU defence capabilities, therefore, London consistently cautioned against duplication with what NATO was doing and explicitly foresaw the EU handling the ‘softer’ side of security, while European defence remained the exclusive prerogative of the Atlantic Alliance. London, therefore, opposed the idea of a permanent EU military headquarters.

Even in the relatively short period since the 2016 referendum, the UK’s policies towards the EU have fluctuated. Theresa May outlined a twin-track approach incorporating ‘strengthened bilateral relationships’ with European partners, and a ‘deep and special partnership’ with the EU that went ‘beyond existing third country arrangements’. Boris Johnson, however, excluded security and defence from the negotiations with the EU in 2020 – and consequently there is no formal security agreement in place at the time of writing. The March 2021 Integrated Review (IR) defined the UK as a ‘European country with global interests’ and signalled a ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific. The war in Ukraine forced a recalibration, with the IR Refresh seeing Europe placed front and centre. Rishi Sunak’s government also promised to ‘step up’ the UK’s presence in northern Europe, including through the Joint Expeditionary Force, and sought participation in an EU project to facilitate cross-border movements of soldiers and equipment.

The change of government in July 2024 witnessed another striking change in tone. As part of its much vaunted ‘reset’ of UK-EU relations, Labour wants a ‘security pact to strengthen co-operation on the threats we face’. On defence, it is seeking a ‘bespoke’ relationship, and has signalled an interest in the EU’s plans for a European Defence Industry Programme. In addition, the government has already negotiated the UK-German Trinity House Agreement on defence and intends to update the Lancaster House agreement with France.

Choices for the government

The government faces various strategic choices, not least, how to finance increased spending on defence.

By far the most significant decision is the UK’s position between the US and Europe. Keir Starmer, understandably enough, has denied that the UK faces any kind of choice between the two. Yet the UK’s ability to continue to act as a bridge has been severely compromised by Brexit and might be even more so if the Trump administration casts doubt on its security guarantee to Europe. Enhancing European military capabilities may itself cause tensions with Washington –  the outgoing American Ambassador to NATO, appointed under President Biden, has already criticised the EU’s ‘buy European’ policies.

A ‘security pact’ with the EU could take different forms (binding or non-binding, comprehensive or narrow). Most likely is a non-binding joint declaration this spring focussed on high-level ambitions. We will probably have to wait to see how effective the government is at persuading the EU to allow it to participate in capabilities-building initiatives. And even longer to see whether, in a break with tradition, these EU initiatives have a significant impact on military preparedness.

There is also the question as to how far the UK supplements its relationship with the EU with ties to member states. The government will need to decide whether it wants to build relationships with other partners in the way it has started to do with Germany. Given that the UK no longer attends meetings between EU ministers, maintaining these relationships takes more time and resources, albeit the European Political Community has provided a biannual opportunity to meet.

When it comes to smaller multilateral formats such as the E3 or the Weimar Triangle plus, whilst London would surely welcome the ability to coordinate policy more regularly with key member states, it remains to be seen whether those states can be persuaded to invest in frameworks that are disliked by their smaller EU partners.

This is, in sum, a crucial moment in terms of UK and European security. Insecurity and uncertainty impose choices as the UK seeks to navigate a world made significantly more complicated by both Brexit and the second Trump administration.

By Professor Anand Menon, Director, UK in a Changing Europe and Jannike Wachowiak, Research Associate, UK in a Changing Europe