Relations between the EU and Georgia continue to deteriorate. The parties actually admit that the relationship has fallen to its lowest point, and blame each other. The Baltic states have even imposed sanctions and visa bans on Georgia’s top officials.
Although, the leadership of Georgia refrains to respond with mirror measures. Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), which has retained the power for a fourth term in the disputed by the West parliamentary election in 2024, accuses euro-bureaucracy for the deterioration of relations. GD argues that the EU circles are trying to drag Georgia into a conflict with Russia and prepare the ground for a change of power in the country. The concerns of Tbilisi in this respect are not groundless.
Remaining one of the main irritants in relations between Georgia and the European Union (EU), the Russian factor is perceived in Tbilisi and Brussels somewhat differently. This difference represents a problem that is unlikely to be addressed under the conditions of the continuing war in Ukraine, and the global confrontation between the West and Russia.
The EU’s discontent of GD policy within the country and in relations with Russia predetermined the most recent strict-worded resolution of the European Parliament about Georgia, and harsh resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe(PACE) which encouraged the Georgian delegation to suspend work in PACE. Actually, these European bodies expressed the open non-recognition of the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in Georgia in 2024. These and other punitive measures by the EU, including suspending several programs of cooperation and funding, create a new and very serious barrier in relations, that naturally plays into Moscow’s hands.
The EU organizations are concerned over GD’s excessively cautious approach to Russia. This approach implies preference for a “survival policy” over a “value-based, and the line of a “sovereign democracy” in relations with the western partners, which the DG has been pursuing in recent years. It is not surprising that Moscow openly supports this policy.
In its efforts to regain influence in Georgia, Moscow has applied a range of hybrid warfare tools against Georgia. They range from confessional to economic factors. It seems that the West is not yet in a position to confront them with effective counter-measures, despite the millions spent for this purpose. A transparent audit of the effectiveness of these Western-sponsored programs whose recipients were Georgia’s pro-Western media and non-governmental organizations has probably not been carried out.
It is enough to list at least a few factors of this hybrid war, to understand the degree of the threat. The Russian military presence in Georgia’s secessionist regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, hovering like a sword of Damocles over the country, and Georgia’s continuing and alarmingly high economic dependence on Russia. They are powerful leverages of Russian influence.
According to various estimations, too many Georgian businesses are closely associated with the Russian market, generating tens of millions of dollars in revenue and the welfare of at least 700,000 Georgian households heavily depends on Georgia’s relations with Russia. This factor, inter alia, has a significant influence on the electoral behavior of Georgian citizens. During the 2024 parliamentary election, the GD’s slogan ‘War or Peace'[implying war with Russia] was more popular than the opposition’s slogan ‘Russia or Europe.’ It would not be an exaggeration to say that the actual Georgian “deep state” is divided into the conditionally “pro-European” and “pro-Russian” camps, despite the absence of diplomatic relations with Russia after the 2008 war, and Georgia’s official exit from all Russian-dominated post-Soviet structures.
The abovementioned tools maintain Russia’s permanent hold on Georgia, not to mention the backstage connections between the influential groups of both countries. The full picture of Russian influence in Georgia remains largely unexplored, despite numerous works on the issue.
That said, the EU must consider a full set of factors and the peculiarities of the Georgian national context in its efforts to counter Russian influence and simultaneously mend its worsening relations with Georgia. Breaking the vicious circle in bilateral relations is in the best interest of both sides, if look at the rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances.
The EU has a choice between a tough and pragmatic approach to its Georgia policy based on recent events in Georgia and GD actions. The perception of political processes in Georgia as ‘half empty or half full’ may lead to misreading the actual situation in the country. The demand for a new parliamentary election emanating from certain EU institutions, may not be the best solution, if reckon with a genuine situation in the country. A new election is not a demand of the majority of Georgian electors. Besides, the holding of a new election may lead to new and prolonged political turbulence. It’s easy to guess who will benefit.
Furthermore, there is still no convincing proofs of massive fraud in the 2024 poll. The EU’s strict stance towards Georgia, including various punitive measures, could urge GD to take protective measures, which may include increase of its multi-vectoral strategy at the cost of the pro-European path. The probability of breeding anti-European sentiments in a substantial portion of Georgian society with long-term consequences, should also be considered. Georgia’s transit potential and unique niche in the geopolitical plan for EU enlargement also should not be written off. Georgia is an important link in the transit of energy carriers to Europe, after the closure of the routes through Russia, and also an important link in the mega-project “Middle Corridor” in which the EU is going to become one of the investors. Georgia is also part of the EU’s promising projects to gradually pull it out of Russia’s clutches. All this requires at least political stability in the country.
Thus, its expedient if in the nearest future the EU finally decide and publicly declare its unambiguous attitude regarding the recognition or non-recognition of the results of Georgia’s parliamentary election 2024. The EU may be better off embarking on proactive engagement instead of punitive measures. This may include joint measures for searching ways to reduce Russian economic leverage in Georgia, how to make DCFTA more workable and EU financial injections into the industries, that are most dependent on Russia. A comprehensive analysis of effectiveness and efficiency of the EU-funded programs for fighting Russia’s “soft power” in Georgia is long overdue. The past frustration probably should not prevent the EU to reattempt its mediation to defuse a political conflict in Georgia, and not allow Russia to capitalize on it.
Given the current complex geopolitical circumstances and high stakes, hardly it would be wise for the EU to stay in an ‘autopilot mode’ when it comes to its policy in Georgia.