The Once and Future Transatlantic Alliance: A More Active and Independent Europe Can Bring America Back to the Table
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/once-and-future-transatlantic-alliance
Posted by ForeignAffairsMag
The Once and Future Transatlantic Alliance: A More Active and Independent Europe Can Bring America Back to the Table
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/once-and-future-transatlantic-alliance
Posted by ForeignAffairsMag
13 comments
[SS from the essay by Michael E. O’Hanlon, Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution; and Paul B. Stares, Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention at the Council on Foreign Relations.]
The transatlantic alliance has weathered many crises over the past 80 years, some of which seemed existential at the time. But the one now roiling the alliance feels different and much more treacherous. Unlike previous episodes of transatlantic discord, which mostly revolved around how the alliance should respond to an external threat of one kind or another, the challenge today comes from within. European leaders are asking themselves whether the United States—the alliance’s founder and steadfast champion for eight decades—is still committed to the security of Europe and the West more generally. Recent statements by U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior advisers suggest that the answer is no.
Many European leaders now believe they have no choice but to declare strategic independence from the United States and launch a crash program to defend their continent alone. But they should not. Aside from the incredible expense of achieving a credible European defense posture without U.S. military support, even voicing such an intent risks hastening a total divorce that would threaten the security of both Europe and North America. Abandoning the alliance now would amount to “committing suicide out of fear of death,” as the nineteenth-century German statesman Otto von Bismarck described preventive war.
Instead, Europeans must try to save the alliance. They can do more to defend their continent so that the burden does not fall disproportionately on the United States—an obligation that European leaders now widely acknowledge and accept. Actually shouldering their part of the burden will require demonstrating a clear commitment to ensuring Ukraine’s security and independence after a cease-fire. The signs are promising that a broad-based “coalition of the willing” led by Europeans is coalescing to do just that.
[SS from the essay by Michael E. O’Hanlon, Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution; and Paul B. Stares, Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention at the Council on Foreign Relations.]
The transatlantic alliance has weathered many crises over the past 80 years, some of which seemed existential at the time. But the one now roiling the alliance feels different and much more treacherous. Unlike previous episodes of transatlantic discord, which mostly revolved around how the alliance should respond to an external threat of one kind or another, the challenge today comes from within. European leaders are asking themselves whether the United States—the alliance’s founder and steadfast champion for eight decades—is still committed to the security of Europe and the West more generally. Recent statements by U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior advisers suggest that the answer is no.
Many European leaders now believe they have no choice but to declare strategic independence from the United States and launch a crash program to defend their continent alone. But they should not. Aside from the incredible expense of achieving a credible European defense posture without U.S. military support, even voicing such an intent risks hastening a total divorce that would threaten the security of both Europe and North America. Abandoning the alliance now would amount to “committing suicide out of fear of death,” as the nineteenth-century German statesman Otto von Bismarck described preventive war.
Instead, Europeans must try to save the alliance. They can do more to defend their continent so that the burden does not fall disproportionately on the United States—an obligation that European leaders now widely acknowledge and accept. Actually shouldering their part of the burden will require demonstrating a clear commitment to ensuring Ukraine’s security and independence after a cease-fire. The signs are promising that a broad-based “coalition of the willing” led by Europeans is coalescing to do just that.
Some of these figures are impressive (in a scary way). It is honestly very tough to know what the Trump’s admin plan is and what is driving the current rhetoric. There is a sense that Trump is mercurial and petty, but I’ve been wondering recently if there isn’t a sense of impending doom that is driving all this talk – a realization that the empire is crumbling; sky high debt, very real social fractures, little willingness at home to die for the “greater good”, seen in many western countries struggling to recruit for their army, China catching up, etc.
It is not to defend the way Trump has been acting, but he is right that Europe has deprioritized its security, notably because the US provided a protective umbrella (make no mistake, the US benefits from it too, it is not out of charity). And while his ways appear reckless and impulsive, probably in part to gain support at home with his electorate, the overall message is clear: we’re spread too thin.
We may not like how he’s doing it, but it is a fair assessment that us Europeans will need to live with. Seeing how Spain and Italy, most notably, are blocking efforts made in the EU reminds me a bit of a toddler whose toy was taken away from them. Lots of frustration but little willingness to act.
A simple Yes or no wise, Do Europeans sincerely believe there will be foreign troops in Ukraine?
the idea of foreign troops in Ukraine sounds like delusions of grandeur to me as an American, since it’s such a legal/obligation/justification gray area outside of NATO if those troops are attacked, that it becomes Russias dream in my mind.
At first I thought it was the EU just saving face, but the storyline keeps going, so I feel the need to ask if people are serious about it.
There are no such thing as “peacekeepers” without Russia’s approval, and since Russia hasn’t changed their stance of no NATO troops in Ukraine for the past 18 years — is the EU serious about sending troops to FIGHT Russia over a non nato country when the EU could simply wait for RUSSIA to attack a nato country and just nuke them justifiably?
I think at the core of the situation is that the US wants to focus more on the Pacific and not be tangled up with Europe so deeply with their forces. I wouldn’t be surprised if the end goal is for the US to have a relationship with Europe along the same lines that Russia has with its pacific allies. Its going to take the entire focus of the US to properly operate in the pacific theater. An intention that has long been hinted at since the Obama administration.
From a “pro western ideas” perspective, I think an independent Europe will be a net positive for everyone on this side of the fence. Acting as another major counter weight in the region to help protect western focused views. But an independent Europe isn’t just that. Its also a unified Europe. And looking at the variety of drama going on outside of reddit in Europe on various topics (such as Ukraine with the differing views of North, West, South, and Eastern European countries) , it does look like there’s some work to do on that front.
NATO has been out of shape, and reforms are long overdue. USA currently accounts for nearly 70% of NATO’s military expenditure, while nearly 9 European nations haven’t even met the 2% target.
Trump’s a nuisance, but de-prioritization of Europe and Middle East was seen even during the Biden administration since the US is focussing more on the Pacific. There’s a need for European nations to reach a consensus on recognizing the need to collaborate more given the modern warfare.
For eg, most western European nations have ratified the CCM which prohibits production and transfer of cluster munitions. However, the war in Ukraine showed that modern warfare pragmatism cannot be compromised for idealism. The Baltic nations will need these defenses in the future.
Turning a blind eye to strategic loopholes will only cause more damage in the future. Trump might be hostile, but Europe needs to wake up from its strategic slumber.
Has the U.S. government and the Trump administration ever considered that if Europe actually does manage to build itself into a formidable military power again that we don’t need the U.S. anymore?
Like, a lot of people seem to be looking at this in the sense of “Oh, America was paying so much more for their military than Europe. A Europe with a bigger military will finally make it even!”
But, here’s the thing, a Europe with a military that rivals the United States doesn’t need the United States. This reduces U.S. leverage over Europe.
Europe’s comparatively underpowered military for its size and economic power (Europe has a larger population and the second largest GDP collectively on the planet) puts Europe into a dependent position on the United States. It keeps it willing to go along with almost whatever the U.S. wants.
But a Europe which has a larger military will not need to do that anymore. They can build warm relations with China if they want. Stay out of any U.S.-China conflict if it happens. Go after whatever foreign policy goals they want, even ones the U.S. doesn’t like.
The idea of America trying to push Europe into spending more on defence has always been hilarious to me. Hey, I support it. I’m European, I want us to have a more powerful military and I want us to have a foreign policy that’s much more independent of the United States. But the United States might quickly realize that a more powerful Europe is not so amenable to things like U.S. foreign adventurism or randomly breaking the Iran Deal (something that was a real blow for European fossil fuel needs).
America was always going to be spending huge amounts on their military, regardless of whether it was in NATO or not. If it wasn’t in NATO it would still have huge military spending. Both because the U.S. has an empire to uphold and because defence contractors have enormous political power. U.S. defence spending has nothing to do with Europe. They basically got NATO for free so long as no war actually broke out.
And NATO, even with an underpowered Europe, was still by far the most powerful military alliance in the world. Not to mention Europe buying enormous amounts of U.S. weapons.
If Europe finally manages to build out a proper military, I’ll love to see it. But something tells me that if that happens the U.S. might come to regret it trying to make it happen. As Europe carves out a completely independent foreign policy, stops buying U.S. arms in favour of its domestic arms industry and warms relations with China. Or at the very least carves out a much more equal position in NATO, instead of the current European vassalage.
For the record, I support NATO. Even though recent events with Trump have made me doubt if the U.S. can be relied upon. But what I don’t support, and have never supported, is European vassalage through NATO. I want an equal partnership.
From President Obama onwards, Washington has grown increasingly dissatisfied with subsidising European defence. That’s America’s prerogative as a free and sovereign nation, but it’ll have to accept that Europe spending more on defence realistically means a commensurate reduction in American influence.
>But should war [with China] break out, the Europeans could still back the United States and its other Asian allies by, for instance, helping the U.S. military block the shipment of Middle Eastern oil to China.
Why would Europe do this when the Trump administration is flirting with Putin, threatening tariffs, and expressing designs on Greenland?
>Europe’s strenuous efforts to support Ukraine have revealed serious limitations to the continent’s defense industry: it is too fragmented.
Since when was the US interested in promoting a consolidated EU defence base that would compete with American manufacturers?
>But at such an isolationist moment in U.S. politics, Washington may need Europe to show the enduring value of this partnership.
Why would Europe need to show Washington the value of NATO if it’s investing enough to look after itself? By definition a policy motivated by ‘Fear of Abandoment’ would ideally be intended such that Europe could at least survive America leaving NATO,
(IMHO the most likely outcome of any hypothetical European re-armament would be initial America hostility due to US manufacturers being frozen out, followed by Washington desperately seeking some kind of some kind of reset as the consequences of such vast spending filter through)
European NATO members should use the same trick as France did in the past. They should threaten to get in bed with America’s current mortal enemy (China) exactly like when Charles de Gaulle made continued NATO participation (even as far as aligning with the soviets) contingent on Truman supporting their colonial possession of Vietnam!
It remains to be seen. I think if everyone manages things well it would be healthy for both America and for Europe. There was always this idea that the world would be divided into three roughly equal spheres of China America and Europe. Maybe that’s how it will pan out. I hope that Europe and America will strategically coordinate. Neither side should have a vested interest in being totally independent of the other. The force multiplication is too enormous a protective asset against Eurasian authoritarianism. And too many people stand to benefit from two out of three blocs throwing their weight behind pluralism and individual liberties.
> Many European leaders now believe they have no choice but to declare strategic independence from the United States and launch a crash program to defend their continent alone. But they should not. Aside from the incredible expense of achieving a credible European defense posture without U.S. military support, even voicing such an intent risks hastening a total divorce that would threaten the security of both Europe and North America
> Instead, Europeans must try to save the alliance. They can do more to defend their continent so that the burden does not fall disproportionately on the United States—an obligation that European leaders now widely acknowledge and accept. Actually shouldering their part of the burden will require demonstrating a clear commitment to ensuring Ukraine’s security and independence after a cease-fire.
This is such a confusing set of statements. Europe should not rearm because it’s expensive. Instead, Europeans must save the alliance, by spending more such as to be able to fight Russia independently, and on top of that accepting an externally imposed bad peace deal that will fatten Russia and the US (Which is rebuilding NS2 and plans to insert itself in that trade), at the expense of the EU and Ukraine.
How is the solution the author proposes not a superset of the one he denies? How does the EU face Russia credibly without rearmament?
Not to discuss the obvious elephant in the room, why would the EU do any of this without _any credible guarantee_ from the US that its efforts will be rewarded? In fact, when dealing with Trump any leverage is a weakness, as he abundantly insists.
Help this make sense to me, somehow
I’m not sure EU will want that sort of diner guest.
The ideal situation would be for Europe to spend more on defence while working towards mending the fence with Washington. That way, both sides can come to the table as more equal partners, rather than one where Europe acts as the junior. Ultimately, just as Hungary and Slovakia are being difficult in the EU, the US is also on a much bigger scale. You don’t throw away long standing alliances, because some members of NATO have gone off the deep end, you work towards bringing them back into the fold. Of course, if the US proceeds to physically attack Canada and Greenland, then all bets are off. Until then, it’s never too late.
Despite major disagreements on certain issues, the US, Canada and EU all broadly share the same geopolitical challenges. Those suggesting that the EU should get closer to China are ignoring the fact that they have been helping Russia against Ukraine, without themselves getting directly involved. Russia, China, Iran and NK are all antagonistic towards the West.
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