IN BRIEF: Disinformation in Slovenia
Dominant narratives: security-oriented. anti-migrant, islamophobic, connected to Palestine and freedom of speech
Main disinformation spreaders: domestic news outlets (especially owned by Hungarian actors) and politicians, international outlets (Breitbart), Russia (increasingly)
Most widespread false stories: Slovenia unsafe to live, hospitals performing gender-affirming surgeries on minors, Vladimir Putin’s fake speeches
Combating disinformation: fact-checking, research, convincing people about the falsehood of some claims
Today, we delve into Slovenia’s disinformation landscape with Anuška Delić, founder and editor-in-chief of Oštro centre for investigative journalism.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: With its dynamic media landscape and high level of digital engagement, Slovenia faces unique challenges in combating disinformation. What are the dominant disinformation narratives circulating in the country?
Anuška Delić: In the past two years, we have seen narratives aimed at convincing the public that Slovenia, and specifically its capital, Ljubljana, is not a safe place to live. This is often accompanied by anti-migrant hate speech. More recently, there has been a rise in narratives connected to Palestine and migrants from Muslim countries.
Another key issue revolves around freedom of speech, particularly in relation to Slovenia’s proposed new media law. The current law, adopted in 2005 and amended a few times, does not recognise digital media. Some elements of the proposed law have sparked disinformation narratives, particularly claims that freedom of speech should be absolute—similar to interpretations in the United States.
However, in the European Union, freedom of speech is limited by other rights, in accordance with human rights conventions. This debate aligns with broader global discussions, where figures like Elon Musk promote the idea of unrestricted free speech.
Who are the main actors behind these disinformation campaigns?
Aside from social media, which plays a role everywhere, Slovenia has several portals responsible for spreading disinformation. Our fact-checking platform, Traskrinka.si, has identified that many of these portals are owned by Hungarian businessmen with ties to Viktor Orbán.
While the media outlets themselves are Slovenian, their financing is often opaque. A few years ago, we investigated digital advertising on these portals and found indications that their revenue from ads alone was insufficient to sustain their operations. Nova24TV.si, the main disinformation portal, also operates a TV station under a formally different owner but with clear connections.
A major question remains: who funds disinformation? In Slovenia, politicians play a significant role. Parliamentary questions are sometimes used to amplify disinformation—an issue that often originates on social media, moves into political discourse, and then gets picked up by aligned media outlets. While these portals have no formal political affiliation, they tend to support right-wing narratives.
Additionally, Slovenia is influenced by international disinformation campaigns. For example, we recently investigated a case where a Slovenian disinformation portal published a story mirroring a campaign in the US, falsely claiming that hospitals were performing gender-affirming surgeries on minors. Our research traced the sources back to Breitbart and similar outlets.
Unfortunately, even mainstream media sometimes fall into the trap of spreading disinformation. Due to high workloads and financial pressures, journalists may not have the time or resources for in-depth verification. Many media organizations prioritise advertising revenue over investigative journalism, which weakens editorial oversight. As a result, our team often has to fact-check reports from mainstream outlets as well.
Speakers from certain EU countries often mention Russia in discussions. Is this also the case in Slovenia? Do national actors there promote specific nation-driven disinformation?
Traditionally, Russia hasn’t had a strong influence in Slovenia, though we’ve seen some related to the war in Ukraine. Recently, however, we’ve noticed an increase in the dissemination of what appear to be fake speeches attributed to Vladimir Putin.
If disinformation related to Russia does surface, it often seems to be used to support national debates rather than to push a broader Russian agenda. Unlike in Serbia, where Russian narratives have a stronger foothold, Slovenia’s linguistic barrier with the rest of the Balkans limits the cross-border spread of such disinformation.
Through our work with the regional fact-checking network C-Check, we’ve observed that even during COVID-19, disinformation rarely spread from Serbia to Slovenia. However, there has been more movement in this area recently, with Russian propaganda and fabricated Putin speeches appearing more frequently on social media.
What is the most widespread disinformation currently circulating in Slovenia?
Aside from the fake Putin speeches and freedom of speech-related disinformation, we’ve observed a recent uptick in Russian propaganda. These fake speeches, in particular, are unusually kind and engaging, gaining significant traction on social media.
How would you describe the unique features of Slovenia’s disinformation landscape?
From my experience, one of the most striking cases dates back to 2008. That year, the ruling party ran an illegal election campaign by distributing two free newspapers—one weekly, one daily—funded through obscure channels. These newspapers, filled with falsehoods and political attacks, were delivered directly to households across Slovenia.
At the time, free newspapers were common in countries with public transit systems, but Slovenia doesn’t have subways, so the distribution was highly targeted. The publications used fake bylines, but my investigation later revealed that real journalists were behind them, concealing their identities.
I see these newspapers as a precursor to today’s online disinformation. They aimed to manipulate public opinion through fabricated stories, much like modern digital campaigns. Today, the same tactics appear in social media snippets and online portals.
Do you believe this case was unique?
I believe so. While free newspapers existed elsewhere, I’m not aware of another instance where they were used explicitly as a covert political campaign. This mirrors how disinformation is now weaponized to manipulate public discourse.
So, the key takeaway is that disinformation ultimately serves an anti-democratic goal?
Absolutely. It poisons public debate, making people uncertain about whom to trust. Many resort to so-called „independent research,” but this often reinforces pre-existing biases. Ultimately, disinformation—regardless of the topic—undermines democratic dialogue.
Politics moving onto social media has only exacerbated the problem. Governments no longer need press conferences; they can simply post on X. This shift hasn’t helped safeguard democratic discourse—instead, it’s turned politics into a social media spectacle.
What’s being done to counter disinformation in Slovenia, and what more constructive measures would you recommend?
As a long-time journalist, I have to say that something blasphemous is that fact-checking should be an integral part of journalism. I’m very sorry that we now have fact-checking as a standalone genre.
But we do have a fact-checking department at Ostro, like I mentioned earlier. We try to do as much as we can. We also detect trends and produce disinformation analyses on things—like the allegations that Slovenia isn’t a secure country and that Ljubljana is not a secure capital—and some other things we’ve traced back to the far right, essentially.
So I know you wanted a positive note, but I don’t have one. Honestly, I think until someone figures out how to catch each social media or media user the moment they consume disinformation, I don’t think we can do much other than putting out fires that multiply far faster than we can tackle them.
Until then, I think we should start working across sectors. The fight against disinformation shouldn’t be just a media or political issue. The faster we find a solution to catch people in real-time, quote-unquote, and tell them, „Hey, what you’re reading is disinformation,” the better.
But at the moment, I don’t think there’s much we can do. I don’t know the technical solution to this, but it’s clear we need real-time interventions.
Something like community notifications, but more advanced?
No, not community notifications. They don’t work because the problem is that by the time a fact-checking department publishes its analysis, the disinformation has already been replaced by something else.
The problem is that once a fact-checking department publishes a fact-check or analysis, the disinformation that’s the subject of it is already gone and replaced by something else. You literally need to catch it in real-time, which at the moment, I don’t know how that could be achieved technically.
Just conceptually, I think it’s really important to catch someone in the moment and tell them, „Hey, what you’re consuming right now is harmful.” It’s like when we have medical warnings, like, „Consult your doctor before taking this pill.”
It’s about knowing what our informational diet is right now and how we’re going to tackle it. I don’t think journalists, fact-checkers, or fact-checking organizations alone can handle it because we always come in after the fact.
So that’s kind of how I see it. Again, I have no idea what can actually be done. I’m just dreaming of a solution that, right now, seems to be the only possible one with what we know.
You can learn more about the disinformation landscape in Slovenia here.
