The End of European Fecklessness? 

Over the last weeks, Europeans have been hit with tariffs, called freeloaders, and have been accused of being pathetic. This has left Europeans confused and asking themselves: after all these decades of transatlantic partnership, which most would say benefitted both sides, why the sudden change of heart?   

To be sure, US complaints on the shortcomings of European security commitments are not new — ever since NATO agreed to commit 2% of GDP to defense spending  11 years ago, every administration has asked or told Europeans who don’t meet the mark to do more. And the answer from Europe has been: we will, or we are trying.   

Until now, both Republican and Democratic administrations have chosen to express their frustration mostly through diplomatic channels rather than thrusting US-Europe divisions into the open. With a few exceptions: In his first term, President Trump called NATO “obsolete” and threatened to leave the alliance (but then the US ended up increasing the budget for European defense by 40%). On the European aide, President Macron seemed to agree when he called NATO “brain dead”, but then failed to raise defense spending.   

The difference now, of course, is that the second Trump administration has inherited a Europe with a large-scale war on its continent. But even that failed to spur the kind of massive and transformative defense investment that Europe would need to supply Ukraine, much less defend itself.   

The US has lost patience and this administration has made clear that it is fed up with what it sees as a long-standing pattern of European fecklessness. Instead of polite diplomacy, they are asking: “If you said you would, why haven’t you done it already?” In truth, there is no compelling answer to that question.   

Much that European countries have said in response is true. They have pointed out that Europe has committed more than the US for Ukraine (in dollar amounts if not in military support) or that 23 out of 30 European NATO allies met the 2% mark in 2024, with some like Poland and Lithuania planning to spend 5%.   

All these points, however, are hollow excuses to American ears. The US pivot to Asia has been a clear and bipartisan US goal for years, and yet Europe is only now agreeing to spending rises to address huge capability gaps.   

Couple that with continuous European complaining about the United States that is so prevalent in European capitals (and has applied to practically every US administration), one can see why many in the Trump administration recoil against European diplomatic overtures, while others conclude that the only way to get Europe to do more is to cut it off completely. From this perspective, Europe has been the unreliable partner, not the US.   

To be clear, the US is yet to make any significant changes to its defense and security policy in Europe. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on April 3 that the US commitment to NATO remains, but the continent must agree to spend much more. Secretary General Mark Rutte de facto acknowledged American drawdown, saying that it would be coordinated with Europe. It seems a matter of when, not if.  

The European response does not help. One recent poll of European experts found that they assess a US pullout to bear the same level of existential risk as a Russian nuclear attack. To Americans, this sounds nothing short of absurd.   

The rhetorical threat alone, however, is working. Europe is finally moving to get its act together on defense — the EU is putting together an €800bn-plus ($880bn-plus) defense investment package, the UK and France are working to mobilize a European-led force for Ukraine, and even Europe’s serial security under-spender and the target of much US ire, Germany, has pushed through a change to its borrowing limits that could unleash an additional €600bn for defense.   

These measures are a welcome change, but none of this will be enough to ensure that Europe can defend itself, certainly not in the short- or medium-term. Despite many years of talks, there is currently no European army, and some countries barely have an army to speak of. The continent needs more uniformed personnel.   

For that to happen, more will have to follow the examples of Sweden and Lithuania, which have restored national service or conscription. This has been discussed in the big European countries — Germany is considering efforts to revive some form of national service this year — but the process is slow and hesitant. Judging from the current debate in Western European countries in particular, the kind of cultural and political revolution that would be needed for this to be an acceptable public policy is yet to take hold.   

For all the emotional outrage at the current administration’s reproaches, Europeans  have a lot to play for with the US. European defense companies should be working hand-in-glove with American counterparts to integrate the transatlantic defense industrial base.   

Rather than looking for retribution against US tech firms, in particular, Europe should embrace the opportunities presented by American leadership on AI as a means to remain competitive in the global tech race. Doubling down on defense technology investments now is a clear opportunity to jump-start European defense and deterrence in the short term, while building broader capacities and capabilities in the long term. Rather than worrying about what the US may or may not do, Europeans should focus on what they can do.    

It’s true that one can’t stand up an army or build a defense industrial base overnight, and here the US will also have to think about how far it’s willing to go in its reduction of security commitments in Europe. At the end of the day, leaving Europe too soon and too fast will leave the continent vulnerable to Russian military attack and pressures, which seem inevitable if Putin sees the opportunity, as well as encouraging voices in Europe who will use the narrative of “US unreliability” as an excuse to move Europe toward closer economic and even military cooperation with China.   

None of this would serve US global interests. Europeans would be wise to come up with a coherent and detailed plan with a clear six-month-to-10-year timeline for what’s needed to secure the continent and Ukraine. The US administration understands the value of an 80-year investment, but it’s up to Europe to now show that there is a clear return on this outlay by stepping up and stepping in. 

Because if an alliance can be broken (as some in Europe bemoan) in a few short months by a new administration, then how much of an alliance was it in the first place?  

Dr. Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as the Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Comprehensive Report

By CEPA International Leadership Council

CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.

February 10, 2025

Learn More