China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war

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1. Full text:

   Even before Donald Trump’s tariff turmoil, it was hard to discern a clear China strategy. With decisions depending largely on presidential whim, his foreign-policy advisers seemed to have split into warring tribes. To use a shorthand common in Washington, the “primacists” seek to re-establish America’s dominance in the world, taking on all threats; the “prioritisers” think America can handle only China and should abandon Ukraine; and the “restrainers” want to focus on only the homeland, avoiding future wars. Since April 2nd Mr Trump’s trade war has sown further confusion. But whatever his own views, one thing seems increasingly clear: conventional China hawks, whether primacists or prioritisers, are losing ground in the battle for influence.

   Though overshadowed by the trade drama, among the strongest indications of this trend was the firing or reassignment of six National Security Council (nsc) officials, which became public on April 3rd. That was apparently prompted by Laura Loomer, a right-wing conspiracy theorist who met Mr Trump a day earlier. Ms Loomer said the officials were “disloyal people” who helped to sabotage Mr Trump. Yet her demands seem to align closely with those of the restrainers (including Donald Trump junior) who want to root out “neocons” bent on provoking war with China.

   One of those sacked was David Feith, the nsc’s senior director for technology. He was in some ways a symbolic target. His father, Douglas, was one of the original neocons. As a Pentagon official, he helped to plan the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But the younger Mr Feith was also among the White House’s most experienced China specialists, having worked in the State Department through Mr Trump’s first term and helped to create his Indo-Pacific Strategy, which advocated upgrading American alliances. As a think-tanker after that, he argued for tougher China policies.

   On the nsc he handled issues that included American tech exports to China and the proposed sale of TikTok to a non-Chinese owner. In that role he appears to have built on many Biden-era initiatives, while also taking up new ones, including the America First Investment Policy. This identified Russia and China as “adversaries” and broadened curbs on investment in China. Whether his views on policy contributed to his sacking is unclear but, former colleagues say, it is a win for the isolationists and a loss of China expertise.

   The future of two other China hawks—Ivan Kanapathy, the nsc’s senior director for Asia, and Alex Wong, the deputy national security adviser—is also now in doubt. Ms Loomer accused Mr Kanapathy of working previously with Trump critics, and attacked Mr Wong and his wife over their Chinese heritage and her previous work as a lawyer. Although both officials have kept their jobs, they have been weakened by the broadside and by the waning authority of their boss, Mike Waltz, the national security adviser (another wing-clipped China hawk).

   Officials in China and Taiwan will be watching Mr Kanapathy closely, as he is seen as one of the island’s staunchest supporters in the White House. He served as military attaché to America’s representative office in Taiwan from 2014 to 2017, and contributed to a book on Taiwan’s defence in 2024 that was edited by Matt Pottinger, the nsc’s Asia chief in Mr Trump’s first term. Mr Kanapathy met Taiwan’s president last year with Mr Pottinger, who resigned over the attack on the Capitol on January 6th 2021 and has since called for policies aimed at encouraging political change in China.

   How this affects America’s dealings with China is unclear. Mr Trump has not expressed his preferences beyond trade, and may be unaware of the battles over policy among his staff. But one potential consequence is that it gets harder for China hawks to push things through without him noticing, as they did in his first term. Some see their fingerprints on recent changes, including firmer joint statements with allies opposing Chinese coercion of Taiwan and the removal from the State Department’s website of a commitment not to support the island’s independence.

2. It seems to me that the ‘pivot to asia’ isn’t happening and the second Trump adminstration is becoming more and more isolationist

3. I wonder how much of this is just a result of how much the balance of military power around Taiwan has shifted to China since 2016. They now have two more carriers, dozens more destroyers and frigates, hundreds of 5th Gen aircraft and a flying 6th Gen prototype, and the new landing barges. My bet is a lot of fence-riding hawks have just been having a reality check the past 5-10 years that any war with China is not going to be a Gulf War 2.0, and there’s a real chance we could lose it, and in that case it’d be better to avoid a war and work out some deal instead.

4. If China and Russia are partners without limits then did anyone truly expect a Trump administration to clash with Russia’s closest ally?

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