The Gendered Roots of South Korea's Fertility Decline

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South Korea is grappling with the world’s most severe demographic crisis, with the government officially declaring it a ‘national emergency’ last year. The country’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) dropped to a record low of 0.75 in 2024, which remains far below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population. At this rate, it is estimated that South Korea could lose up to 70 percent of its population by the end of this century, having profound implications for its economy and its national security. While a declining fertility rate is a common trend seen across high-income nations globally, what sets South Korea apart is the distinctly gendered nature of the crisis.

The country’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) dropped to a record low of 0.75 in 2024, which remains far below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population.

Understanding the Gendered Impacts of the Demographic Slump

South Korea was ranked 94th out of 146 countries by the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, with a gender gap score of 0.7, indicating a gender gap of at least 30 percent exists. This gap manifests in both public and private life. In 2024, labour force participation was 72.9 percent for men and 56.3 percent for women, well below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. But what is even more striking is that the country has the highest gender wage gap among OECD nations, standing at nearly 32 percent.

Underlying these stats lies South Korea’s infamous hypercompetitive and overworked labour culture. Though the government has begun to address this by reducing labour hours, employees still clocked an average of 1,901 hours in 2024, which is 149 hours more than the stipulated OECD average. Within such an environment, having children becomes an overwhelming challenge, compounded by strong social stigma against taking maternity or paternity leave. Though at the beginning of this year, the maternity and paternity leaves were expanded, offering three months and up to 20 days, respectively. What happens is that employers are reluctant to rehire women with breaks in their resumes, or are otherwise rehired with lower pay or unstable positions. This motherhood penalty reinforces the perception that having a child comes with a high professional cost, making it an unattractive option.

The economic burden of raising children adds another layer of deterrence. The cost of private education hit an all-time high in 2023, averaging US$330 per student. Parents are also expected to spend heavily on private tutoring, which is valued at US $ 20.6 billion, up 4.5 percent from the previous year. Furthermore, housing costs present yet another barrier, as property prices in South Korea are 10 times higher than the average household income, making home ownership increasingly out of reach.

The country has the highest gender disparities in unpaid domestic labour, where women spend 12.4 percent of their time on unpaid care and domestic work, compared to the 3.6 percent spent by men.

These financial pressures intersect with gender norms. The country has the highest gender disparities in unpaid domestic labour, where women spend 12.4 percent of their time on unpaid care and domestic work, compared to the 3.6 percent spent by men. This dual burden of paid and unpaid labour reduces women’s economic autonomy and limits long-term professional investment.

The challenges are even more pronounced for non-traditional or unconventional families. South Korea prevents single mothers or same-sex couples (‘those without a husband’) from accessing assisted reproductive technology. On the other hand, adoption rates have plummeted from 2,464 in 2011 to just 492 in 2020, as adoptive parents face various legal and societal barriers. These exclusions limit reproductive autonomy and restrict alternative pathways to parenthood, further contributing to the demographic slump.

The 4B Movement and Changing Societal Attitudes

In this climate of gendered inequality and economic insecurity, it is therefore not surprising that many South Korean women are opting out of marriage and motherhood altogether. A 2023 report found that 65 percent of women did not want children, and 42 percent did not want to get married. Alarmingly, over 80 percent of those women cited domestic violence as a key factor behind their decisions.

This growing disillusionment has fueled the rise of the 4B movement, which derives its name from four Korean words starting with ‘bi’ (meaning ‘no’): bihon (no marriage), bichulsan (no childbirth), biyeonae (no dating), and bisekseu (no sex). Through this movement, they seek to redefine their lives outside the traditional gender roles. More than an expression of individual choice, this signals a broader response to persistent gender-based violence, economic insecurity, and labour market constraints.

What began in the mid-2010s as a growing awareness of gender-based violence has gained significant momentum over the past decade, driven by a series of harrowing incidents. Stalking, in particular, has emerged as a widespread concern, exemplified by a tragic case in which a woman was murdered by a man who claimed she had merely ‘ignored’ him. Alongside this, there has been a steep increase in digital sex crimes, where 33,437 cases of digital sex crimes were reported in 2023 alone, averaging 91.6 cases per day. Such risks, whether online or offline, have reshaped women’s risk calculus around intimacy, partnership, and reproduction.

The word ‘feminism’ itself is associated with radicalism or misandry, and has fuelled a wave of online harassment towards activists of the 4B movement.

However, the movement has gathered significant backlash, where the ‘feminists’ are often scapegoated for the country’s demographic decline. The word ‘feminism’ itself is associated with radicalism or misandry, and has fuelled a wave of online harassment towards activists of the 4B movement. An especially disturbing case was the murder of a woman by a man who believed she was a feminist, based solely on the fact that she had short hair.

Institutional responses have done little to address women’s concerns. In fact, under the administration of former President Yoon Suk-Yeol (impeached in December 2024, he campaigned in 2022 on a promise to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, arguing that it treated men as ‘potential sex criminals.’

Therefore, the 4B movement reflects a rejection of not just family per se but also the broader structural gender inequalities that are plaguing South Korean society.

The way forward?

In response to the fertility crisis, the South Korean government has poured over US$  200 billion over the past 16 years. These were injected in the form of pro-natalist polices such as child benefits for up to US$ 22,100, state-sponsored dating events, expanding maternity, paternity and childcare leaves, reducing working hours, and even exemption from military conscription for men. Yet the fertility rates continue to plummet.

While pro-natalist policies are shown to moderately increase fertility in certain countries, South Korea’s approach falls short by failing to recognise the gendered nature of its demographic crisis. The government’s focus remains on incentivising parenthood, but it neglects the broader factors shaping these decisions, such as the double burden of unpaid domestic labour and paid work, economic insecurity, lack of support for non-traditional families, and growing concerns about women’s safety.

A more effective response would require embedding gender-sensitive reforms at the heart of their demographic strategy. Addressing these structural issues goes beyond being a moral imperative, but also an economic and national security imperative.

Sharon Sarah Thawaney is the Executive Assistant to the Director of ORF Kolkata and CNED, Nilanjan Ghosh.

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