> When Ben Wallace claimed that Britain was taking a leading role in aiding Ukraine’s war effort, it was not just post-Brexit boosterism the UK defence secretary was voicing.
> Volodymyr Zelensky has singled out the UK as one of the western allies doing most to help his country fight Russia — be that the thousands of anti-tank missiles London sent to Ukraine, or the training provided to the country’s armed forces by the British military since 2015.
> “Britain is definitely on our side,” the Ukrainian president said in a recent interview. “Britain wants Ukraine to win and Russia to lose.”
> Less clear cut, though, is what Russia’s invasion of Ukraine means for British security policy, as laid out in last year’s integrated review. This major strategy document sought to shape post-Brexit defence policy by tilting the UK away from Europe and towards Asia to counter China’s growing military assertiveness.
> Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has posed an early test of the review and led some government and military officials to re-examine assumptions held when it was published last March.
> “The world, especially Europe looks very different now,” said Tobias Ellwood, chair of the House of Commons’ defence select committee. “The type, scale and enduring characteristics of the threat requires a review of our entire defence posture — especially if we have any intentions to play a leading role in shaping Europe’s collective security strategy.”
> In some ways, the review called it right, analysts and defence officials said, even if parts may require reinterpretation. The head of Britain’s armed forces, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, and the government’s main civilian adviser on defence, David Williams, will discuss UK defence priorities at a seminar on Thursday.
> The review correctly identified Russia as Europe’s most acute security threat, even if as part of the Indo-Pacific tilt London’s participation in the Aukus nuclear submarine pact with Australia alienated France, traditionally a close defence partner.
> “The world has completely changed,” said Lord Peter Ricketts, the UK’s former national security adviser. “The focus of the review was on new relationships, new networks and new horizons, not European security and for that reason it does need to be reviewed.”
> The document’s emphasis on Washington as “an indispensable” ally and the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network, which includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, was also vindicated by British and US intelligence gathering that predicted Russian president Vladimir Putin’s subsequent actions.
> Also prescient was the review’s focus on the “high north”, covering the Arctic and Scandinavia, a key area of Russian operations.
> More open to question is the review’s emphasis on the navy, including the almost £8bn spent on two new aircraft carriers — plus the F-35 stealth aircraft that operate off their decks, costing £90mn each — at the expense of capabilities needed to fight the kind of land-based conventional warfare launched by Moscow.
> The army is set to lose its entire fleet of more than 700 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles earlier than planned and a third of its Challenger II main battle tanks. Operationally, British land forces are now their smallest since the 18th century, with just 72,500 regular soldiers.
> “We can achieve mass, but it will always be alongside other forces and we may have to look at that,” a senior defence official conceded.
> What does need to change is the review’s “frankly insulting indifference to European partners and . . . the necessity, and opportunity, of playing a much better game on European security,” said Professor Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think-tank.
> The invasion of Ukraine means European security has “crossed a perceptual threshold” that transcends any issues brought up by Brexit, Clarke added.
> That is especially so given Germany’s planned increase in defence spending to 2 per cent of gross domestic product. That means Berlin’s defence budget will soon reach £62bn a year compared with Britain’s £45bn, which would knock the UK out of second place as Nato’s highest military spender after the US.
> That points to the UK’s biggest defence challenge, which is to match spending with the review’s more lofty goals. These include Wallace’s stated aim that UK armed forces would “become a more present and active force around the world” and the review’s pledge to “work with our international partners to maintain secure global oil supplies, particularly in the Middle East”.
> Furthermore, the UK last year reversed a two-decade policy pursuing nuclear non-proliferation when it said it would substantially lift its self-imposed cap on its nuclear weapons stockpile. It has also committed to build four new submarines to carry the deterrent at a cost of £31bn, a decision that will weigh heavily on the defence budget.
> Yet Rishi Sunak, the UK chancellor, last week resisted growing pressure to increase the defence budget in the Spring Statement, despite rising inflation. As a result Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI’s deputy-director general, said defence spending would decline in real terms over the next three years.
> “With the costs of equipment set to grow as a result of increased labour and material costs, this will put extra strain on the procurement budget . . . Given increased inflation and a more acute Russian threat, the Ministry of Defence is likely to have a strong case for increased funding in this year’s autumn Budget,” he added.
> The most urgent need is for more funding to replenish stocks of weapons supplied to Ukraine, more surveillance aircraft and more attention to numbers of personnel, analysts said.
> Efficiencies also need to be squeezed from the procurement budget out to 2030. Even before Russia’s assault on Ukraine, this faced a shortfall of more than £7bn, according to the National Audit Office, the government spending watchdog. By comparison, that amount is roughly twice Ukraine’s 2021 defence budget.
> “We need a new model for organising and equipping our forces,” one UK defence adviser said. “Increasing defence spending is clearly desirable, but it will be futile if we do not first change the way our defence budgets are spent so as to get much better value.”
John Paul Rathbone, Laura Hughes and Sylvia Pfeifer
Not really, given the shocking state of the Russian military I would put money on the UK being in Moscow within a week if they put their mind to it.
Imagine getting involved in a war and there not being a health system that helps the returned service personnel. It’s easy enough to war, how hard is it to health afterwards? Once we’ve reconsidered our defence strategy can we refocus on the citizens’ health, or can they just go get fucked, along with all the returned service personnel?
100%…Their defence of the Conservative Government ever getting into power again!
4 comments
> When Ben Wallace claimed that Britain was taking a leading role in aiding Ukraine’s war effort, it was not just post-Brexit boosterism the UK defence secretary was voicing.
> Volodymyr Zelensky has singled out the UK as one of the western allies doing most to help his country fight Russia — be that the thousands of anti-tank missiles London sent to Ukraine, or the training provided to the country’s armed forces by the British military since 2015.
> “Britain is definitely on our side,” the Ukrainian president said in a recent interview. “Britain wants Ukraine to win and Russia to lose.”
> Less clear cut, though, is what Russia’s invasion of Ukraine means for British security policy, as laid out in last year’s integrated review. This major strategy document sought to shape post-Brexit defence policy by tilting the UK away from Europe and towards Asia to counter China’s growing military assertiveness.
> Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has posed an early test of the review and led some government and military officials to re-examine assumptions held when it was published last March.
> “The world, especially Europe looks very different now,” said Tobias Ellwood, chair of the House of Commons’ defence select committee. “The type, scale and enduring characteristics of the threat requires a review of our entire defence posture — especially if we have any intentions to play a leading role in shaping Europe’s collective security strategy.”
> In some ways, the review called it right, analysts and defence officials said, even if parts may require reinterpretation. The head of Britain’s armed forces, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, and the government’s main civilian adviser on defence, David Williams, will discuss UK defence priorities at a seminar on Thursday.
> The review correctly identified Russia as Europe’s most acute security threat, even if as part of the Indo-Pacific tilt London’s participation in the Aukus nuclear submarine pact with Australia alienated France, traditionally a close defence partner.
> “The world has completely changed,” said Lord Peter Ricketts, the UK’s former national security adviser. “The focus of the review was on new relationships, new networks and new horizons, not European security and for that reason it does need to be reviewed.”
> The document’s emphasis on Washington as “an indispensable” ally and the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network, which includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, was also vindicated by British and US intelligence gathering that predicted Russian president Vladimir Putin’s subsequent actions.
> Also prescient was the review’s focus on the “high north”, covering the Arctic and Scandinavia, a key area of Russian operations.
> More open to question is the review’s emphasis on the navy, including the almost £8bn spent on two new aircraft carriers — plus the F-35 stealth aircraft that operate off their decks, costing £90mn each — at the expense of capabilities needed to fight the kind of land-based conventional warfare launched by Moscow.
> The army is set to lose its entire fleet of more than 700 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles earlier than planned and a third of its Challenger II main battle tanks. Operationally, British land forces are now their smallest since the 18th century, with just 72,500 regular soldiers.
> “We can achieve mass, but it will always be alongside other forces and we may have to look at that,” a senior defence official conceded.
> What does need to change is the review’s “frankly insulting indifference to European partners and . . . the necessity, and opportunity, of playing a much better game on European security,” said Professor Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think-tank.
> The invasion of Ukraine means European security has “crossed a perceptual threshold” that transcends any issues brought up by Brexit, Clarke added.
> That is especially so given Germany’s planned increase in defence spending to 2 per cent of gross domestic product. That means Berlin’s defence budget will soon reach £62bn a year compared with Britain’s £45bn, which would knock the UK out of second place as Nato’s highest military spender after the US.
> That points to the UK’s biggest defence challenge, which is to match spending with the review’s more lofty goals. These include Wallace’s stated aim that UK armed forces would “become a more present and active force around the world” and the review’s pledge to “work with our international partners to maintain secure global oil supplies, particularly in the Middle East”.
> Furthermore, the UK last year reversed a two-decade policy pursuing nuclear non-proliferation when it said it would substantially lift its self-imposed cap on its nuclear weapons stockpile. It has also committed to build four new submarines to carry the deterrent at a cost of £31bn, a decision that will weigh heavily on the defence budget.
> Yet Rishi Sunak, the UK chancellor, last week resisted growing pressure to increase the defence budget in the Spring Statement, despite rising inflation. As a result Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI’s deputy-director general, said defence spending would decline in real terms over the next three years.
> “With the costs of equipment set to grow as a result of increased labour and material costs, this will put extra strain on the procurement budget . . . Given increased inflation and a more acute Russian threat, the Ministry of Defence is likely to have a strong case for increased funding in this year’s autumn Budget,” he added.
> The most urgent need is for more funding to replenish stocks of weapons supplied to Ukraine, more surveillance aircraft and more attention to numbers of personnel, analysts said.
> Efficiencies also need to be squeezed from the procurement budget out to 2030. Even before Russia’s assault on Ukraine, this faced a shortfall of more than £7bn, according to the National Audit Office, the government spending watchdog. By comparison, that amount is roughly twice Ukraine’s 2021 defence budget.
> “We need a new model for organising and equipping our forces,” one UK defence adviser said. “Increasing defence spending is clearly desirable, but it will be futile if we do not first change the way our defence budgets are spent so as to get much better value.”
John Paul Rathbone, Laura Hughes and Sylvia Pfeifer
Not really, given the shocking state of the Russian military I would put money on the UK being in Moscow within a week if they put their mind to it.
Imagine getting involved in a war and there not being a health system that helps the returned service personnel. It’s easy enough to war, how hard is it to health afterwards? Once we’ve reconsidered our defence strategy can we refocus on the citizens’ health, or can they just go get fucked, along with all the returned service personnel?
100%…Their defence of the Conservative Government ever getting into power again!