In April 2025, the materials published by the PSCRP program covered a wide range of post-Soviet subregions, from Estonia to Central Asia.
Petr Oskolkov analyzed the potential consequences of the urgent changes in the Estonian constitution that abolish the voting rights of non-EU citizens in the country’s local/municipal elections. He concludes that, even though this measure might potentially solidify the demise of the moderate Center Party, for which many Russophone voters cast their votes, the effect might be contrary to the MPs’ expectations in the long run. Negatively affecting the voting rights of the country’s non-citizens, who have no official connection to Russia or Belarus (although the amendment’s goal was to diminish these countries’ influence on Estonia’s domestic affairs), the constitutional amendment might spur protest voting (for both moderate Centrists and radical populists) by those Russophones who have Estonian citizenship.
Alexander Shpunt focuses in his paper on the Russian influence on Armenia’s economy and geopolitical orientation. He underlines the enormous share of Armenia’s imports provided by Russia, Yerevan’s membership in the EAEU, and the “grassroots support” for maintaining strong ties with Moscow, largely absent in Georgia, caused by the households’ dependency on the income coming from Russia. Apart from this, Shpunt highlights the Russian business’s dominant position in the Armenian national economy and the extent to which Russia controls the country’s national infrastructure.
The paper by Velvl Chernin sheds light on the Islamist and Muslim actors opposing Russia’s central authorities. He points at the special role of Salafism, spread in the Chechen Republic (where its revival is tied to the Chechen returnees from Jordan) and Dagestan (where it is practiced mostly by Avars and Dargins), in resisting the influence of state-aligned Muslim structures. Since Russian serves as a lingua franca in Dagestan, Dagestani Salafi preachers may reach Muslims across the entire country. Chechen Salafis are one of the two mutually hostile groups that oppose the incumbent Kadyrov regime in Chechnya, together with the supporters of the “government of Ichkeria in exile.” The Salafis representing the radical organization “Hizb ut-Tahrir” have been freely operating among the Crimean Tatars before 2014. Afterwards, the Russian authorities started persecuting this group’s members in the peninsula, a move some actors view as political repression. The absence of Islamists is noteworthy among the League of Free Nations, which serves as the umbrella organization for oppositional separatist movements.
Further elaborating on the events in the North Caucasus, the PSCRP team has tackled the issue of potential succession in the Chechen Republic. The authors postulate that, possibly, the change of top political figures in this region of Russia might occur earlier than in the Kremlin. However, in the authors’ assessment, the children (both sons and daughters) of Ramzan Kadyrov, the incumbent personalist head of the Republic, even though they now occupy key positions in various domains, cannot be considered as potential successors (because of their gender, age, lack of experience, or unwillingness to embark on this path). Adam Delimkhanov, MP and a close ally of Kadyrov, can become a successor, but the central authorities might be afraid of his presumed connections in the criminal underworld. Despite Magomed Daudov’s professionalism in administrative tasks, Moscow claims he lacks influence among the siloviki. In his turn, while Apti Alaudinov is often considered the most feasible candidate for political succession in Grozny, he reportedly does not have a firm and well-established position within the Chechen elites. The authors conclude that, since “Kadyrov has no unconditional and universally recognized successor, it is possible that attempts will be made to build complex combinations based on a balance of interests among a number of key figures, with the federal center retaining the role of arbiter.”
The PSCRP team further provides an overview of Russia’s increasing efforts to anchor Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in its sphere of geopolitical influence. The authors cite the intensive developments in the spheres of energy transit and parallel import (leading to a huge trade deficit of these countries with Moscow), and stress that Tashkent and Astana provide “logistic corridors immune to Western naval power,” “hard currency from transit fees,” a “covert route for sanctioned technology,” and “political optics that Moscow is not internationally isolated.” The PSCRP team assumes that, if the West would wish to overpower Russia’s and China’s (which is also taking part in the race) influence in the region, it may undertake several steps, including “fast-track Global Gateway disbursements,” linking money and transparency, enforcement of “export-control intelligence sharing,” and signaling “political stakes.” However, the authors perceive this window of opportunities as relatively brief.
Last but not least, as usual, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly monitoring of analytical publications focused on post-Soviet conflicts. This initiative summarizes the five most interesting publications, in the author’s assessment, focused on politics and economy in the post-Soviet region.
Our Program is eager to further update you on the most recent and important developments in the post-Soviet space.