Is Norway edging towards a fresh EU membership bid?

John Erik Fossum considers the prospect of an EU membership bid in Norway. While public opinion is increasingly favourable to the idea of Norway becoming a member state in light of geopolitical uncertainty, he explains why the no vote still leads and why political parties will continue to treat the issue with caution.

A debate is emerging in Norway about whether the time is right for another referendum on EU membership. Norway has applied for EU membership four times, twice in the 1960s and then in 1972 and 1994. The two latter bids were both rejected in popular referenda organised after the membership negotiations had concluded. Both referenda were won by the ‘no’ side with respectively 53.5% and 52.2% of the popular vote. Norway is the only country that has experienced two negative EU popular referenda.

Nevertheless, what is also important to underline is that when Norwegians voted no to EU membership in 1994, Norway already had a foot inside the EU’s internal market through the EEA Agreement. This is understood as a political compromise between EU opponents seeking to retain national sovereignty and EU proponents seeking full EU membership, which enjoys considerable popular support. Norway as a small country with an open economy depends on assured market access and legally regulated international relations.

A fresh membership bid for Norway means moving out of a situation of ambiguous compromise. The question is what would set that off. Are there external circumstances that almost by nature compel Norway to send off a new membership bid? Or is the issue ultimately to be settled by domestic actors based on their political calculi? How much of a prompt does the altered geopolitical and geoeconomic context provide for change?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its militarisation of the Arctic are two related developments that have profoundly altered Norway’s geopolitical context. Norway has committed to a large-scale programme of military rearmament (an additional NOK 600bn over the next twelve years). Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO were a momentous change because it ruled out any notion of Nordic cooperation as a separate security actor. For Norway, and especially its EU-critical parties, this underlined the need for NATO, not the EU, to take the lead role in security and defence – even if Norway has also sought as close cooperation as possible with the EU.

Prior to Donald Trump’s re-entry into the White House in January 2025, for most actors in Norway, its NATO membership was the main pillar of external protection because the world was still governed by reciprocal trade agreements and a commitment to legally regulated international affairs in our corner of the world. Trump’s trade wars and undermining of a legally regulated international trade system has changed the economic situation from relatively tranquil to profoundly uncertain in a matter of few months. Economic security has become a pressing issue for the EU and Norway, and both face profound uncertainty regarding the nature and levels of U.S. tariffs. For Norway the situation is doubly precarious since it is not only a matter of being hit by U.S. tariffs but also of whether Norway will be protected by the EU or not.

Norway is not part of the EU’s customs union. Under fair international weather conditions that has provided the freedom to forge trade agreements with anyone in the world without EU interference. Norwegian analysts diverge over whether the EEA will prevent Norway from being treated as a third country by the EU and as such subject to the retaliatory measures the EU takes to prevent third countries dumping goods initially destined for the American market in Europe. Norwegian leaders have shuttled back and forth to Brussels to obtain such assurance. The EU has expressed support for Norway’s position and Commission President von der Leyen has recently noted that she is “keen to explore common solutions.” Is that a statement of good faith or an iron-clad guarantee?

The combination of military and economic insecurity has precipitated calls from a number of actors to initiate an EU membership process, but Prime Minister Støre from the Labour Party, which is divided over EU membership, is not interested in doing that. He and the main opposition leader Erna Solberg, from the pro-EU Conservative Party, want to retain the current situation of as close-an-EU-affiliation-as-possible, without formal membership. Both would wait for a more politically opportune future moment to apply for membership, which presumably would be a situation of consistent majority support for EU membership. One might ask whether such a situation can realistically come about without political leaders actively staking out such a course.

Opinion polls show that there has been an increase in popular support for EU membership, up 10% from 2013 to 37% in favour, 43% against and 18% undecided. The yes side is still trailing behind, but the margin has decreased considerably. Another recent opinion poll shows that 63% of Norwegians want an EU referendum. Nevertheless, leaders of the two main political parties prefer to exercise caution. Norwegian EU membership is the most contentious political issue of the post-war period and many still remember losing the referendum after a bitter campaign where the ‘no’ side showed how good it was in mobilising opposition.

For Prime Minister Støre the main issue at present is to ensure that Norway is not hit by EU retaliatory measures against US tariffs, and deal with the EU directives and regulations implementation backlog. His calculus appears to be that instituting a membership process will not have much effect on the EU, but other analysts think that such an initiative will be beneficial as a show of good faith.

How the EU considers affiliated non-members and whether it will continue to include them in policies and institutional arrangements will likely be an important factor in whether Norwegian political leaders initiate a new membership bid. If the EU refuses to include Norway in new initiatives, then life as an EU non-member will be less attractive. Another factor is changes in the EEA’s composition. The current Icelandic government has promised to hold an EU membership referendum by 2027. If Iceland joins the EU only Norway and Lichtenstein will be left in the EEA-EFTA. How the EU would relate to that remains an open question.

Bt John Erik Fossum, ARENA, University of Oslo.