With his war on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has transformed strategic realities in Europe. Russia is once again a great power. The West should recognize this.
Tass via Imago
A new cold war has descended on Europe. Societies that are open and liberal, often to the point of naivety, are reverting to a friend-enemy mentality. Military spending is skyrocketing, with almost no one questioning whether the money could be put to better use.
For the first time since 1945, a country is challenging the post-World War II European order by engaging in an international war. Russia is redrawing borders by force of arms. This calls for a response, and so the spiral of confrontation continues.
However, Russia has already achieved one of its war aims. Since 1990, NATO has been expanding in only one direction: eastward. First the former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe joined, followed by the former Soviet republics in the Baltic region. At that point, membership for Ukraine and Georgia seemed conceivable.
The West called this a victory for freedom. To Moscow, it looked suspiciously like a quest for hegemony. The Ukraine war, however, definitively halted this process.
Why Washington ignored Moscow’s security interests
Today, NATO is anxiously wondering when Russia might attack. In five years? Or even in three? Meanwhile, Moscow continues to pressure Western Europe with acts of sabotage, arson and cyberattacks. Russia is on the offensive.
NATO has lost control of the situation. Indeed, the alliance will be lucky if it survives U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term intact. The fact that the new U.S. administration has concluded a minerals agreement with Kyiv and is again supplying armaments is seen as a sign of hope.
Putin doesn’t worry about the mounting casualty figures, nor does he care about the ongoing suffering. That means he can already count the war as a success. The questions of whether Russian troops advance a few more kilometers to the west, or whether Moscow can incorporate Crimea and the other occupied territories on a de jure basis or only de facto, are of secondary importance. The strategically decisive fact is Russia’s return to the circle of great powers.
Putin has made it unmistakably clear that Russia is once again a major player in Europe. The country is again taking the place it fought for with blood and iron on the battlefield of Poltava 300 years ago, when it defeated the forces of Swedish Empire and gained supremacy in Eastern Europe.
Russia came close to collapse three times in the last century, in 1917, 1941 and 1991. Each time, it was able to regain its position in Europe. Its size, population and resources, as well as its nuclear weapons, put the country in a position to help determine the continent’s fate.
When Russia suffers a period of political and military weakness like the last one, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is only temporary. The West ignored this lesson after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is now experiencing the return of history.
When U.S. President George H.W. Bush was confronted with the question of whether America should involve Moscow as a semi-equal partner in shaping the post-Cold War European order, he exclaimed: «To hell with that.»
At that time, Washington was faced with a dilemma. The security interests of the Eastern European states and those of Russia were diametrically opposed. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were pushing for NATO accession. After their experience of Soviet oppression, they had every moral and political right to self-determination.
Moscow, on the other hand, was already trying to prevent NATO from expanding into the territory of the former East Germany – not to mention Eastern Europe. However, it needed Western financial aid, and therefore reluctantly gave in.
In the so-called Two Plus Four Agreement on Germany’s future, Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev accepted that a reunified Germany would be a NATO member. West Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl sweetened this provision by providing 12 billion marks in aid, as well as loans with generous terms. But it was clear that Moscow would never fully reconcile itself to the alliance’s enlargement.
America put all its eggs in the Eastern European basket. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright coolly declared: «We do not need Russia to agree to enlargement.» This was plausible insofar as NATO membership brought stability to a notoriously unstable area. The middle-sized states that had formerly felt such pressure from both Moscow and Berlin developed into prosperous democracies.
But what was right at that earlier time is no longer necessarily appropriate today. The situation has fundamentally changed in three decades. Russia is once again a powerful entity that cannot be fobbed off with a few billions in aid. And it is both a rogue state and an aggressor.
NATO has reached a crossroads today, much as it did in the early 1990s. It must decide whether to try to contain the rogue state, using any means necessary, or whether instead to accept Russia as a great power and try to integrate it into a European security order.
Trump’s motives in Ukraine talks remain unclear
Confrontation or cooperation: This basic decision will also shape how the West supports Ukraine in the future. After the invasion, the United States, like the Europeans, rushed to Kyiv’s aid. This was in their own interests, and it was done out of a sense of justice. But this support was never unconditional.
The West always left itself a back door. Even before Trump’s involvement, a Ukraine accession to NATO was not on the table, and arms deliveries never exceeded a certain level. As a nuclear power, Russia was not to be pushed too far, went the thinking.
The war is now in its fourth year. It cannot go on indefinitely. The time for ambivalence is coming to an end. Trump has recognized this, and is calling for a negotiated solution, even if his motives remain unclear. At first he seemed to want to give up Ukraine. He is now taking a tougher stance toward Moscow.
It is unlikely that NATO will go all-in to provide Ukraine with whatever support is needed to inflict the defeat Putin deserves. This is not just because of the boat-rocker in the White House.
Some European governments have their own reasons in this regard. This includes the usual suspects such as Hungary and Spain, but also Germany as well. In Germany’s new coalition government between the center-right Christian Democrats and the center-left Social Democratic Party, there are a number of figures who are sympathetic to or would prefer closer relations with Russia. This is true even beyond the Social Democrats.
Thus, if it is no more than an illusion to believe that a strategy of containment can succeed, it makes sense to seek an understanding with the perpetual troublemaker. This would include a formal guarantee not to expand NATO any further. This in turn would implicitly mean the recognition of spheres of influence, a step to which Moscow attaches great importance.
Within this construct, Ukraine would be a buffer state. But that does not mean it would be altogether defenselessness. Modern Switzerland and Belgium owe their existence to the desire of the great powers to create buffer states around postrevolutionary France. This happened in the first third of the 19th century, and both states still exist today.
A balance can be achieved only if all parties involved see their interests being protected. No state should be given a reason to seek a revision of the status quo, as the German Reich and the Soviet Union did following the Treaty of Versailles that came at the end of World War I.
If this condition is met, such an order would protect smaller states better than a «frozen conflict» that has been fought to the point of exhaustion.
Moscow would probably demand that its forcible annexations be formally accepted. In return, Ukraine could be offered the prospect of admission to the EU. The Europeans should arm themselves and station enough troops in Ukraine’s neighboring states to deter Russia. Such a solution would be neither cheap nor convenient, as it would require constant vigilance.
The chapter of eastward enlargement would finally be closed, and Russia’s need for security would receive belated recognition. The price would undoubtedly be high: The war of aggression and the many crimes committed since then would remain unpunished. If necessary, the West and Russia would have to come to an agreement over the heads of the Ukrainians.
It is impossible to predict whether Putin would agree to such a deal. But it would be worth a try. It would turn the Ukraine debate on its head. Currently the debate is stuck, revolving around tactical questions such as whether it was wise for Trump to make concessions at the start of talks, or to flatter Putin and insult Zelenskyy, which have all been discussed in epic detail. But those are questions of tactics and manners. What is important is the overall strategy.
If the West lacks the will or the capability to defeat Russia, it is now time to seek a balance instead.
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