Germany’s new boss, Friedrich Merz, spent his first few days in office crisscrossing Europe, but left behind as many questions as answers about what Berlin’s new leadership will mean for European defence policy.
Since the Christian Democrats’ election victory in February, many have anticipated a quick Merz-led reversal in German defence policy. He spent election night urging European strategic independence from the US, calling it his “absolute priority”, and then cut a €1 trillion deal to free national military spending from the shackles of German debt rules.
That raised hopes he might break from German fiscal prudishness and do the same for EU-wide spending.
Merz further stoked those hopes with visits to Paris, Warsaw and Kyiv, and making a short stop at the EU and NATO chiefs in Brussels within days of being sworn in.
If Merz’s election brings a shift away from Germany’s close transatlantic ties, and a major embrace of the kind of strategic autonomy long pushed by Paris, European defence projects would receive a tremendous boost. But now that Merz is in power, and US President Donald Trump has become more concerned with trade deficits than casting doubt on NATO commitments, the German leader’s tone has become more cautious.
Although Merz is still clearly aiming for a European leadership role, he’s remained ambiguous on many defence matters – leaving his options open for a range of future commitments instead of clearly charting a bold new course.
More money or more problems?
Even as NATO mulls hiking defence spending targets to 3.5% of GDP, Merz disappointed some by refusing to commit on easing EU debt rules in order to unleash higher defence spending across Europe during his stop in Brussels on Friday.
He ruled out common European borrowing for defence, staying true to the long-lasting German rejection of joint EU debt. But he also didn’t close the door entirely, saying only that joint borrowing must remain the exception – giving him an out, should it be necessary.
He endorsed efforts to “build up a defence industry in Europe”, called for more efficiency in the defence industry, backed proposals for joint military procurement and urged greater European cooperation.
The only thing certain is that “2% will not be nearly enough for what we have promised each other”, he said.
Mon Macron
In the traditional first visit to Paris, Merz made clear his intention to strengthen arms cooperations with France and better coordinate aid to Ukraine.
The expansion of the common security council between the EU’s two traditional powerhouses, joint defence projects – such as a new generation of advanced fighter jets and tanks – will get a new institutionalised boost.
In line with the French practice of strategic ambiguity, Merz announced to keep future weapon deliveries out of the public eye – a move he sharply criticized as opposition leader while denouncing the way his predecessor, Olaf Scholz, handled Germany’s response to Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine.
A change on Ukraine?
In the meantime, initial hope in Kyiv that Germany would finally deliver long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine – something Scholz blocked, and Merz backed – seems to have vanished. A spokesperson for the defence ministry stated on Monday that “the topic is completely overrated” and that a potential delivery of the missiles will no longer be discussed publicly.
Similarly, Merz has remained ambiguous about the possibility of sending German troops to help secure any peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. Like Scholz before him, he has dismissed such questions as totally premature. Merz has insisted that efforts should remain focused for now on a potential ceasefire.
Merz campaigned as a prudent, careful set of hand to steer Germany on a cautious course through crisis – he is now eager to claim his European leadership role. But at the same time, he comes with no experience in executive office, even at the local level, and has a reputation in German politics for his rash – and sometimes ill-considered – declarations.
As Europe rushes to rebuild defences and struggles to adequately support Ukraine, they’ll have to wait to find out which version of Chancellor Merz they get.
(bts)