MIDD is a state security institution under the aegis of the defence minister that carries out military counterintelligence, intelligence and other tasks as defined by the Law on State Security Institutions, as well as by other laws and regulations. Since 2002, the director of MIDD has been Indulis Krēķis.
In addition to MIDD, Latvia has the State Security Service (VDD) and the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB).
“The tasks of reconnaissance-sabotage groups include monitoring (detection of activities, reconnaissance) of critical infrastructure and military facilities, military units (and other state law enforcement structures), carrying out subversive actions (occupation, destruction, paralyzing of facilities), eliminating socially significant individuals (murders), studying the position of the target country’s society and inciting unrest directed against the existing government,” expained MIDD by way of preamble.
It then moves on to offer a few tips on how to spot saboteurs and spies, some of which may surprise.
“Some of the most important identification features of reconnaissance-sabotage groups are:
•appearance – paramilitary, sports or tourist clothing with separate equipment elements (backpacks, harnesses, specialized medical bags), mutually similar clothing elements and a short haircut, slovenly, unkempt appearance and insufficient hygiene, athletic physique; carrying documents of an aggressor state (possibly several passports) or currency;
• equipment – elements of equipment and type of food carried indicate survival in unusual conditions or specific needs (radio equipment elements, maps, navigation equipment, special means); possibly armed;
• places of residence – groups stay in remote places, forests and near bodies of water, although their clothing and equipment carried do not indicate recreational activities; accommodation in abandoned buildings, groves (hiding overnight places), with lone or socially asocial people;
• behaviour in public places – not oriented or poorly oriented in the local area; movement following a military pattern and exploration/observation of the area; questioning locals about their political position, calls for unrest; knowledge of the target country’s language for only one of the group’s representatives; lack of knowledge of the local dialect (accent, phraseology); purchase of food products in larger quantities that are subject to reduced spoilage, ready-made products; possible impersonation of representatives of the UN, Red Cross, OSCE or other humanitarian organizations;
• execution of tasks – increased interest in critical or basic infrastructure facilities, law enforcement agencies and armed forces – monitoring them, questioning locals, attempts to enter places that do not belong to them.”
However, the MIDD does add the caveat that: “The Ukrainian experience shows that Russian special services are able to adapt to the environment and circumstances in which reconnaissance-saboteur groups are used, namely, their members may not visually correspond to the classic reconnaissance-saboteur profile. Therefore, the above-mentioned indicators must be evaluated in the context of the environment and circumstances in which suspicious individuals or activities are observed.”
The advice to some extent echoes similar spy-spotting tips issued by the State Security Service previously, but is not identical.
If you do think you might have spotted a sabotage group on Latvian soil, MIDD does not recommend tackling them yourself. Instead report your suspicions to the State Police, special services, or the nearest armed forces unit.
MIDD’s full annual overview (in Latvian) can be read here.
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