IN BRIEF: Disinformation in the Netherlands
Dominant narratives: related to the war in Ukraine (justifying the Russian invasion, „pro-peace” narratives), heath, climate, agriculture, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shootdown in 2014
Main disinformation spreaders: domestic far-right actors (e.g. the PVV party with its leader Geert Wilders), Russia, countries with large diasporas in the Netherlands (e.g. Turkey, Iran)
Most common fake news: Ukraine should relinquish territory to achieve peace, halting military aid would lead to an end to the war, migrants contribute to higher crime rates or place a strain on the welfare system, NATO’s posture incites Russian aggression, the expansion of nitrogen reduction policies being a manifestation of globalism, with the ultimate goal of controlling global food output
Combating disinformation: fostering media literacy, information campaigns, EU legal efforts, launching strategic communication offices within the government, improving access to quality journalism
In this episode, we examine the Dutch disinformation landscape with Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: The Netherlands is a country where information flows freely, but misleading narratives can still take root. What are the dominant disinformation narratives circulating in the Netherlands?
Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld: I think I can name four dominant narratives. One is related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. There are also many disinformation narratives centered around migration, EU skepticism, and issues related to health, climate, and agriculture.
To start with Russia’s war against Ukraine—these narratives often seek to justify the invasion. For example, they echo Russian claims. Recently, there has been a spread of statements suggesting that Ukraine should concede territory to end the war or that stopping military support would bring peace. These types of narratives are being circulated.
We identify these as disinformation narratives because they are not constant—they peak around specific political developments and then subside. In the regular opinion polls and sociological research we conduct at the Institute, we observe that public responses to perceived security threats vary over time. This fluctuation reflects how these narratives influence perception depending on the broader political context.
When it comes to migration, the narratives often play on fears of overpopulation in the Netherlands and promote false claims that migrants increase crime rates or abuse the welfare system. While this is only partly connected to refugees and displaced persons from Ukraine, there’s strong evidence that they have integrated quite well into Dutch society. There is generally no strong need to debunk these claims one by one, because Dutch society is quite well-informed.
Regarding EU skepticism, this is a more traditional narrative track. It’s sometimes difficult to determine whether a message qualifies strictly as disinformation or if it’s simply a reflection of existing societal fault lines—issues that are already widely discussed and therefore more susceptible to being weaponised to polarise public opinion. The origins are hard to trace and can only be understood over a longer period.
You mentioned the Russian war on Ukraine and that the disinformation narratives are aimed at justifying the invasion. You also referred to the pacifist movement—do you see it as an idealistically pacifist movement, or is it also influenced by pro-Russian disinformation?
There is indeed a pacifist movement in the Netherlands, which used to be larger. It dates back to the 1970s and stems partly from criticism of U.S. actions in various parts of the world, such as the Iraq War—so its roots are tied to very different issues.
However, some disinformation narratives are now targeting this group, seeking to expand its influence. These messages claim that NATO is provoking Russian aggression and that military support only escalates violence. This type of messaging resonates particularly with this group and is being actively spread.
There is this kind of disinformative population replacement theory that was born in France, but then spread also in, for example, the United States. Do you see a kind of phenomenon of the migration of populist disinformation narratives around the world?
I would say yes. This also is, in my view, connected to climate change, and especially in the Western world and Europe specifically, to the growing necessity of energy transition and the cost that it brings. But for the European Union specifically, the issue of migration has been very urgent for years because of the ring of wars and conflicts around Europe, starting from North Africa and now spreading to Eastern Europe.
Yeah, this is certainly a trend. But also, what I see—you mentioned the start of this theory in France—since the beginning of the large-scale invasion in Ukraine, we see that most of the disinformation and narratives are coming from the United Kingdom, France, or Germany.
They are not targeted directly at the Netherlands, with some exceptions, but they do have this second wave of influence. So they’re influencing certain perceptions.
They are accelerating the social divisions already existing in society. And they appeal very much to certain beliefs—ideological beliefs related to capitalism and socialism and different political tendencies. They are particularly successful in areas where there is little knowledge among society.
How effective is this trust erosion?
When there is a cyberattack or sabotage on critical infrastructure, like an electricity blackout, it takes time to find out who is responsible for that. As we’ve seen in the Netherlands, there was a large-scale cyberattack on the national police at the beginning of the year.
In such situations, the population usually would turn to its own national institutions and place blame on them for not protecting things. And that increases the issue of trust in institutions. Then there is a growing polarisation, or the thinking that policies—such as, for example, NATO.
There is also a big discussion in the Netherlands related to agriculture and farmers—that the increase of nitrogen reduction policies is being seen as globalist and connected to global control of food production. This type of narrative tends to put extra pressure on the government.
But I have to say, up until now, the Netherlands has been working quite effectively on countering disinformation and also maintaining a high level of trust in its institutions.
And how do you think the rise of the far-right extremist right is related to disinformation? In the polls, I see that the Freedom Party (PVV), which is now a part of the government, is a kind of anti-establishment grouping, while at the same time its leader, Geert Wilders, has been in politics for around 30 years. How do these two rises come together? How is disinformation related to the far-right?
Far-right actors use narratives that can increase their support. These are usually topics that are very controversial in society. You often see that they take over or promote the same narratives.
There’s also a specific and new tendency in the last few years—on TikTok and social media, the relatively young population is being targeted. While it’s possible to develop certain policies for national communication and established media, it is very difficult to influence the information being spread on TikTok and other social media.
So I would say that, in relation to gaining new supporters, far-right parties have been successful in reaching young people with these kinds of narratives.
In the Netherlands, you mentioned the PVV party of Geert Wilders. His main talking points relate to migration in the Netherlands. We saw during coalition formation that he made some compromises on his support to Ukraine. And, of course, there is EU skepticism.
But there is another party that is very much taking over some of the Russian talking points from Russian state TV. What we also see is that, due to pressure on journalism and the principle of showing all sides of the story, sometimes Russian state media is being used as a legitimate source of information. And it’s not being clearly stated that the information comes from there.
Is there any disinformative narrative that is most widespread at the moment. Some top, novel fake news?
Well, if I may use an example from my personal life: a family member of mine who is poor approached me to say that she thinks what is happening with the war against Ukraine is very bad, but if Ukraine would just give a little bit of its land and resources to Russia, the war would stop.
This implies the narrative that Ukraine is at fault for prolonging the war, that it is the one not wanting peace. I would say this is one such widespread narrative. Another is about Crimea, the status of Crimea, and the principle of territorial integrity.
So, as far as I hear from you, the topic of Russia’s war against Ukraine is still very important in the Netherlands, despite the geographical distance?
Yes. Absolutely. Especially in relation to increased defense spending for national security. The Netherlands has been one of the leading supporters of Ukraine in both military and financial terms. This is a very important question—how to address the challenges to Ukraine and to European security. The Netherlands also values the transatlantic bond with the United States. So this further elevates the relevance of the topic in the Netherlands.
Which actors, which countries, which politicians stand behind the spread of disinformation?
Disinformation in general can come from state actors—foreign state actors. And for the Netherlands, it’s not only countries like Russia. There are others as well, such as countries with a considerable diaspora in the Netherlands, like Turkey or Iran, influencing certain narratives through their diaspora.
Also in relation to Russia’s war in Ukraine, expert communities are being influenced—their thinking shaped by a previous history of constructive relations with Russia, such as participation in Russian security forums in Moscow. This can lead to unconscious channeling of Russian talking points.
But there are also experts who perhaps do it consciously. Media is very open and values professionalism, aiming to be as objective as possible. But due to time constraints, certain Russian narratives can get included and later turn out to be manipulated or not objective.
And how does disinformation influence the Dutch people and the Dutch institutions in the longer term?
I would say that still the majority of the population is unaware that they are being subjected to disinformation. An example is that last year, during the European Parliament elections, a lot of effort was made by the EU and Dutch government to counter and pre-bunk disinformation narratives. A center was established to check fake news, etc.
But in general, the perception in the Netherlands was that there was no disinformation targeting the EP elections. And in the end, after all the warnings about manipulation and voter interference, none of that appeared to be the case.
This was due to a very successful literacy and information campaign. But this is exactly the challenge—when a campaign is successful, you cannot prove that there was an incident that was prevented.
Now I would like to ask you about your definition or description of the specificity—the unique character—of disinformation in the Netherlands. Is there anything that is typical just to your country?
That’s a good question. I would have to come back to that, I think. But maybe the main trend is—if I compare it to Ukraine, where I work a lot—there is a different level of detail. For example, in a certain event, you have different interpretations of what actually happened being spread.
But yes, in the Netherlands, a very specific instance and topic is MH17. That’s the Malaysian Airlines flight that was downed over Ukraine by a Russian missile, and a lot of Dutch citizens were on that flight. After this incident, the Netherlands launched investigations. And during that process, Dutch society was heavily targeted by disinformation narratives around this specific issue.
I think this created more awareness and a realisation of how Russia can act. That also partly explains the overwhelming support from the Netherlands at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
So I understand that this kind of disinformation involved placing the blame on Ukraine for the crash, yes?
Exactly, yes. Fascinating. Thank you for that. Finally, so that we can end on a positive note—what is being done to counter disinformation in the Netherlands, and what more would you recommend?
One of the most basic and widespread measures—ones that don’t require much funding—are media literacy campaigns. These aim at better informing society about issues that might be targeted. It’s a kind of „pre-bunking”—doing it before the disinformation is actually spread.
The European Union has developed a number of policies and fact-checking facilities for journalists and media. On the legislative level, they are continuously expanding the instrumentarium around disinformation. But countries also need to implement these directives at the national level. The Netherlands has implemented most of them—for example, the Digital Services Act.
There are also more initiatives being implemented at different levels, such as setting up strategic communication departments across the government. These help track narratives and understand which threats—including cybersecurity threats—are emerging.
This is monitored very closely. Especially in relation to MH17, the Netherlands has developed quite an advanced system for identifying disinformation narratives and threats coming from foreign state actors.
That sounds optimistic. Still, are there any concrete suggestions you would propose?
Yes, of course, there are many more. Interestingly, some solutions used in countries further east in the EU—or in Ukraine—would not be applicable in Western countries.
The important difference is that in countries that experienced Russian occupation or influence, governments find it easier to generate public support for certain measures. In countries without that history, it’s much harder to explain to the public. So any form of censoring public information, regulating media, or even establishing strategic communication departments is received much less positively in countries like the Netherlands than in Lithuania, Estonia, or Ukraine.
That’s a difference to take into account. But also, increasing access to high-quality media sources is key. Educating people by making good information more available helps. It allows for more targeted policies, for example regarding social media like TikTok, to better protect the most vulnerable segments of the population
You can learn more about the disinformation landscape in the Netherlands here.
