The EU Reset Summit, the Defence Pact and NATO

Since coming into office Labour has made much of the fact that, while they say they are not going to overturn Brexit, they are committed to developing a much more positive relationship with the EU than their predecessors. In this context they have long spoken of their desire to pursue ‘an EU Reset’. On 3rd December 2024 the Council of Europe responded, publishing a document with a series of proposals for drawing the UK further into the orbit of the EU. To this end there is to be a much-anticipated UK – EU summit on 19 May at which the UK Government has indicated it plans to reconnect with the EU on a whole series of bases, including defence.

If the proposals involve becoming part of the European Defence Fund, and or PESCO (EU Permanent Structured Co-operation) and or the European Defence Agency, they will mean embracing a high degree of defence integration that is tightly defined and regulated by EU law. This would necessarily impact UK freedom in relation to both foreign and defence policy. Given that the UK voted to leave the EU, it would plainly be completely disingenuous to pretend that it is appropriate to now become part of what is the defence dimension of their ‘ever closer union’ project, the project we voted to leave. This would be particularly the case for a government with the smallest share of the vote in modern times (approaching just half that of Brexit and nearly 2 million less than the minority Labour Government of Feb 1974), to instead of seeking defence co-operation with EU member states, draw us into EU defence integration.

The key point that the UK made repeatedly as an EU member state whenever defence integration was raised – and why we gained a reputation for seeking to limit the development of an EU defence role – was the that our defence interests were upheld in and through NATO. There was, and should remain, a very real concern about involving countries that are for the most part already in NATO, in an alternative defence alliance that will inevitably address many of the same presenting difficulties as NATO. This would seem to be a dangerous recipe for duplication, inefficiency, tension and confusion. Not surprisingly our concerns were shared by some other member states. However, the EU wanted to proceed with defence integration and so it sought to address the difficulty through the following treaty provisions.

First, the second limb of Article 42 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty which states: ‘The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.’

Second, the recital in Protocol Number 10 to the Treaty of Lisbon (the PESCO Protocol): ‘RECALLING that the common security and defence policy of the Union respects the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty of those Member States which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, and is compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework’

It is the purpose of this extended essay to unpack three arguments, explaining why these commitments are not credible and the implications arising from this not just for the UK but the USA an all NATO member states. Its contention is that while we should work closely with all EU members states within NATO, and co-operate with the small number that are not, we should not engage in EU defence integration.

The Means to Another End

In the first instance, whereas NATO exists for one purpose, it is a means to the end of the defence of NATO member states, and is not a means to some other end, the same cannot be said of EU defence integration. Defence in an EU context is ultimately implicated in another greater project, building a European polity. It is, therefore, to a least some degree, a means to another end rather than simply concerned with the end of upholding the defence of EU member states, and the defence of any other country that chooses to become part of the EU defence integration project. In this context it is difficult to see how the EU could readily conduct its pursuit of defence integration as a means to an end conceived apart from its wider project, which is what would be required by way of affording priority to NATO, necessitating it ultimately making its defence role a means to ends set by NATO rather than itself.

In this regard, it is interesting to reflect on the comments of Nathalie Tocci, the chief advisor to Federica Mogherini, when she served as the EU’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her book, Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World. While Tocci is clearly very concerned about the future of the EU and does not put great confidence in the idea that a foreign and defence policy, and the existence of the long-term goal of a ‘common defence’, will re-energise the struggling process of European integration, she does reflect on this possibility in the concluding page of her book. She writes: ‘Paradoxically, the dire predicament that Europeans find themselves in could galvanise the necessary political will towards common action. It is precisely the gravity of the external threats and challenges the Union faces and the painful awareness that no one – read the United States – will save us from them that may make foreign policy the one area in which well-known divisions are abated.’[1] Tocci then makes a qualification lest anyone should think she is putting too much faith in foreign and defence as an engine for European integration, stating: ‘This is not to say that the European project will be saved by foreign policy’[2] and then: ‘EU foreign policy, and the EUGS as a key case of it, can at best represent a small contribution to keeping the Union alive in the meantime.’[3] However, the concluding of her book on this point, does underline the fact that for believers in European integration, no policy area can simply be understood as an end in itself. Everything is assessed in terms of the ultimate objective of creating the EU polity. In this context the question inevitably arises, do we want our defence energies to be drawn into, and appropriated by, other wider policy goals that we do not share?

Strategic Autonomy

The EU has espoused the concept of strategic autonomy since 2013. As the European Parliament Research Service observes in a document entitled: ‘EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023 From concept to capacity’: ‘…the first official EU document containing the expression ‘strategic autonomy’ appears to be the European Council conclusions on EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) of December 2013. This describes the need for a ‘European defence technological and industrial base’ that can ‘enhance its strategic autonomy and its ability to act with partners’ [author’s emphasis]. The 2016 EU Global Strategy uses the expression strategic autonomy four times, 3 mainly in relation to security and defence. Since then, the term has occurred regularly, featuring in several sets of Council conclusions and documents….’[4]

Anyone who is committed to peace through NATO cannot but fail to be concerned by the fact that the EU is not only seeking to develop its own military alliance with many NATO states but also aspires that it should have ‘strategic autonomy’. There is no rationale for an EU defence alliance to seek strategic autonomy with respect to the NATO alliance, with which it largely overlaps, if it is to afford priority to NATO. How can the EU credibly state what it says about NATO in Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, and in the recitals to the PESCO Protocol and then, having done so, claim to seek the strategic autonomy of its own defence alliance which embraces multiple NATO member states?? Nonetheless this is what the EU seeks.

The EU Global Strategy (published just days after the Brexit vote in June 2016) actually locates the quest for EU strategic autonomy in the context of a wider EU autonomy objective, albeit apparently in order that it should become a better and more co-operative partner. It aspires:

‘To progress in this direction, the EU must become more autonomous, including in strategic terms, as well as and in order to be ever more cooperative. A more autonomous EU is one which is more able to act, together with its partners wherever possible, but alone when necessary.’[5]

Interestingly the European Strategic Compass is also very clear about the EU aspiration for its own decision-making autonomy/strategic autonomy but again sets this alongside statements of commitment to NATO, as if to generate the impression that, far from opening up potential tension and contradiction, the two are mutually reinforcing.

‘A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. The transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation, in full respect of the principles set out in the treaties and those agreed by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU, are key to our overall security.’[6]

And then:

‘This Strategic Compass will enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests. A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. These two go hand in hand.’ (Emphasis added).[7]

And then again:

‘The EU’s strategic partnership with NATO is essential for our Euro-Atlantic security as demonstrated again in the context of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The EU remains fully committed to further enhancing this key partnership also to foster the transatlantic bond. Building on the unprecedented progress made on strengthening cooperation with NATO since 2016, further ambitious and concrete steps need to be taken to develop shared answers to existing and new threats and common challenges. The Joint Declarations signed in 2016 and 2018 are the key pillars of this cooperation. In the spirit of these Joint Declarations and based on the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity, openness and transparency, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, we will continue our close and mutually beneficial cooperation.’ (Emphasis added).[8]

Quite why the development of two military alliances should be regarded as a good thing when they both aspire to separate decision-making autonomy, even though they substantially overlap and will, as such, inevitably be confronted with the same issues, is less than clear. Surely it would be much better to take the energy and resource invested in the development of EU defence integration, and to instead invest it in strengthening the Europe side of NATO, rather than laying the foundation for tensions and disagreements between EU and NATO?

There are two possible ways to try and make sense of this development and crucially they could both be true.

The first, takes us back to the initial argument that we should not place any weight on EU treaty assurances regarding NATO. What is going on makes sense if something other than defence concerns are in play, if the EU regards defence integration as a very useful tool towards European integration. While the prevailing political environment for EU integration hitherto has been such that it has grown most efficiently through economic integration, could it be that in the new and uncertain times in which we find ourselves, defence integration becomes the more critical element in the construction of the European project? In this context, even if there are costly tensions between overlapping NATO the EU alliances, committed believers in ‘ever closer union’ would regard this as a price worth paying to secure their greater prize.

At the same time, it is also possible that there is another dynamic in play as far as France is concerned. In this it is important to remember that European integration was always a French idea. Economic integration (starting with coal and steel) was proposed in 1950 by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, which succeeded, while defence integration was also proposed in the same year by the French Prime Minister, Pleven, and failed in 1954, ironically because of French opposition. In that sense while France always risked losing sovereignty through European integration to a supranational EU structure (something that concerned de Gaulle), there is still an argument that they continue to approach the EU with the mentality of a Great Power seeking to shape the history of Europe through the deployment of a process that they initiated and still strive to control.

In order to really understand this French perspective, however, we must move from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic and confront de Gaulle’s stand against US-Anglo-Saxon hegemony, in his assertion of both France and the French language and withdrawing from NATO’s Integrated Command in 1966. Although France remained a member of NATO, it did not rejoin NATO’s integrated military command, for over forty years until 2009. Moreover, the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, stated that France’s nuclear forces were completely independent and that it would stay outside of the NATO nuclear planning group.

In this regard the EU Scream podcast of 9 November 2020, entitled, ‘Europe on a Power Trip’, makes particularly interesting listening. The episode began with James Kanter interviewing Nathalie Tocci about the notion of strategic autonomy. He introduced the interview thus:

‘Strategic autonomy. It’s become the mantra for European union officials. It started as a broadly French idea: that Europe needs sufficient military power to promote peace and security independent of the United States. But the scope of the mantra has expanded. Nowadays, the term also covers the trade and tech power Europe is seeking to avoid getting squeezed by China and America.’[9]

In the interview Tocci acknowledges two important facts:

First, that the term was included in the 2013 Council of Ministers statement very much as a French initiative and they subsequently sought to push it.

Second, alluding to the strong focus on developing procurement interdependence she observed: ‘…perhaps even more pertinent is the sort of defense industrial dimension of strategic autonomy and the prominence of French defense industry. In Europe, sort of underpinning the idea of strategic autonomy, if read through this lens, is basically buy French and buy less American. I mean, I’m slightly caricaturing here the sort of French interest in this concept.’[10]

The fact that France, the nuclear power that has never been fully committed to NATO, should be the author of the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ greatly compounds the grounds for nervousness about it and further calls into question the credibility of juxtaposing declarations of loyalty to NATO alongside promoting the notion of EU strategic autonomy. Interestingly there is now talk of Europe sheltering under France’s nuclear deterrent.[11]

The EU’s Track Record: Once Bitten Twice Shy

Finally, in seeking to assess the robustness of EU recognition of the priority of NATO for the majority of EU member states, it is important to consider their track record when it comes to providing similar kinds of reassurance. There have been other cases when the EU has sought a particular outcome, in line with the requirements of European integration, which has caused alarm and in relation to which assurances have been given by Brussels to persuade those concerned that they have nothing to fear. If the EU had made good on these assurances, then that might give ground for trusting the undertakings given concerning NATO.

A very relevant series of undertakings in this regard pertain to the EU’s treatment of the United Kingdom and specifically Northern Ireland. In the same way that people have expressed real concerns that the European integration imperative will inevitably prioritise an EU defence project over NATO, which could cause confusion and duplication, concern was also expressed that the Northern Ireland Protocol would undermine the integrity of the United Kingdom. The fear was that tying Northern Ireland into the EU single market for goods, subjecting the province to European integration and the demands of the EU Single Market, while the rest of the UK left the EU Single Market, would undermine the integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The EU sought to allay this fear by providing assurances with respect to the essential state functions and territorial integrity of the UK.

As with the NATO assurance in Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, the assurances about the essential state functions and territorial integrity of the UK were similarly set out in treaty form through the Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework. Moreover, the importance of these protections was laboured by the fact they were afforded foundational status in being addressed in the very first Article of the treaty, ahead of all its other provisions. Article 1 (2) of the Protocol/Windsor Framework boldly states: ‘This Protocol respects the essential State functions and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom.’

Rather than protecting against the feared outcome, the provision of these reassurances in the body of a treaty, existing as mere words divorced from any delivery mechanism to make good on their solemn undertakings, have proved to be completely worthless. The only practical service that they have provided was to the EU in helping persuade some reluctant MPs that it was safe to vote for the Northern Ireland Protocol. In what follows this essay will consider the impact of both aspects of its Article 1 (2) pledge:

Essential State Functions

One of the most basic and essential functions of the state is the provision of security for its citizens. However, the Windsor Framework has had the effect of taking this responsibility from the UK Government in relation to a key aspect of the security of Northern Ireland, its biosecurity. This has been demonstrated very graphically this year in the context of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in Germany.

On 15 January the Minister for Food Security and Rural Affairs, Danile Zeichner told the House of Commons: ‘The Government have taken decisive and immediate action. The import of cattle, pigs and sheep from Germany has been stopped to protect farmers and their livelihoods. We will not hesitate to add additional countries to the list if the disease spreads.’[12]

However, when challenged he went on to concede that he was only talking about Great Britain.

‘In Northern Ireland, the controls will apply to meat and live animals moving from a 3 km protection zone and a 10 km surveillance zone surrounding the affected premises in Germany. Those products cannot be moved to Northern Ireland.’[13]

This rather implied that not only was NI now subject to different and much weaker biosecurity protections than GB, but that the authority discharging this essential biosecurity function in Northern Ireland was no longer the UK Government, but the EU. This point was made to the Minister in the House of Lords, Baroness Hayman, on 29 January who readily admitted that this was indeed the case. The Minister said:

‘Northern Ireland continues to be protected under the biosecurity regime of the EU, in line with the Windsor Framework. Under this regime, Northern Ireland implements official controls and additional protections in response to risks, such as measures related to pest-free areas, traceability and additional notification requirements for the highest-risk goods to maintain the biosecurity of the island of Ireland.’

‘I want to stress that the EU takes its biosecurity responsibilities for something like foot and mouth extremely seriously. There had not been a foot and mouth outbreak in Germany since 1988, so this is very significant for them.’[14]

Territorial Integrity

The way in which countries respect the territorial integrity of other countries is by recognising their right to exist, their borders and their exclusive prerogative to make the laws governing life within those borders. Notwithstanding Article 1 (2) of the Windsor Framework, the practical outworking of the Protocol has had the polar opposite effect. The EU has not only assumed the right to make laws for part of the territory of the UK in 300 different areas, through a legislature in which the relevant part of the UK is not represented. It has also insisted on dividing the UK into two through the imposition of an international Sanitary-Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Border and customs border which legally has the effect of making Great Britain a ‘third country’ that is a ‘foreign country’ in relation to Northern Ireland for economic purposes. It is hard to conceive of a more dramatic refutation of the territorial integrity of the UK and one that could have been avoided either by a default (no deal) departure from the EU or through a deal involving Mutual Enforcement.

Conclusion

Thus, the solemn undertakings by the EU in Article 1 (2) with respect to both essential state functions and territorial integrity have proven to be meaningless. In this context, the fear about the implications of European integration in relation to which reassurances had been sought, was entirely validated. Notwithstanding Article 1 (2) of the Protocol/Windsor Framework, the operation of the Framework as a whole has affected the most dramatic refutation of everything to which Article 1 (2) solemnly pledges itself, and the continued presence of Article 1 (2) has now been deemed to have no protective value whatsoever, such that some argue that the meaning of the words it contains must be read as consistent with the rest of the Protocol of which it is a part.

There is in the Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework experience a salutary lesson for the UK, the United States and indeed all NATO member states. We see from it that when confronted with something that it wants, the EU is quite prepared to provide assurances to persuade those otherwise disposed to say no, to say yes, even when those assurances are completely meaningless. (In fact, this extends beyond the assurances regarding essential state functions and territorial integrity in Article 1 (2) of the Protocol/Windsor Framework, to the other parts of Article 1 which made even more dramatic declarations of submission to the Good Friday Agreement. While it would require another extended article to explain why, the point must be noted in passing that here again the practical impact of the Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework has had quite the opposite effect, completely undermining the Good Friday Agreement consent, cross community consent and democracy protections.)

It is impossible for anyone who has lived through the trauma of the Northern Ireland Protocol to read the EU Global Strategy document, Security Compass and, most importantly Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty and the recitals to the PESCO Protocol, without being seized by a profound sense of déjà vu. While the Northern Ireland Protocol/Windsor Framework presents us with the EU trying to square a circle by, on the one hand, seeking to undermine the territorial integrity of the UK, and yet simultaneously endeavouring to neutralise fears concerning this process by pledging itself to the territorial integrity of the UK, European defence integration similarly seeks to square a circle. At the same time as drawing states that are in NATO into a European integration process with the goal of creating a common EU defence structure to obtain strategic autonomy – generating fears of inter-alliance disagreements, duplications and inefficiencies – the EU seeks to assuage these concerns through declarations about the priority of NATO for EU member states in NATO. We should now learn the lesson from our painful EU- Northern Ireland experience and so too should other NATO member states.

In all this what must never be forgotten is that for the EU, efforts to address any policy challenge, including defence, are never just a means to the end of addressing that policy challenge but rather also a means to the end of developing what on 23 June 2016 we voted to leave, the ever-closer union EU polity. Rather than seeking to further undermine Brexit by agreeing to become part of EU defence integration, in the context of spurious assurances about NATO, we should instead seek greater defence co-operation with EU member states by strengthening NATO and co-operating closer with the small number of EU member states that are not in NATO. We should also call time on the Protocol/Windsor Framework assurances and insist that, going forward, the EU respect the territorial integrity of the UK. This can only happen if the EU and UK revisit the Windsor Framework to replace the Irish Sea border with Mutual Enforcement so the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland can properly leave the EU.

Dr Dan Boucher

[1] Tocci, Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, p. 99.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] EU Strategic Autonomy Monitor https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733589/EPRS_BRI(2022)733589_EN.pdf

[5] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf

[6] Executive Summary: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf

[7] Ibid., p. 13.

[8] Ibid., p. 39.

[9] https://euscream.com/europe-on-a-power-trip-transcript/

[10] Ibid.

[11] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/20/poland-france-nuclear-weapons-trump-europe-defense/