While the reverberations of Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel have reshaped the strategic calculus across the Middle East, the crisis has also reaffirmed the urgency of regional partnerships based on democratic values and shared security interests for Cyprus and Greece.
At the Middle East Forum in Washington, top foreign policy officials from Athens and Nicosia explained how the war in Gaza signifies a significant turning point for the region and emphasized the growing importance of the trilateral relationship between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, alongside the United States in the “3+1” format.
“Let me take you back five weeks before that horrific day,” said Andrea Petranyi, director of Middle East affairs at the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “We were hosting the 10th Trilateral Summit between Cyprus, Greece, and Israel.” Prime Minister Netanyahu was there. Prime Minister Mitsotakis was there. We had so many promising initiatives in the pipeline: energy, defense, and security. It was a great day, full of forward-looking momentum. And then,” she added, “just five weeks later, we woke up to devastation. So, yes, for us, there is very much a ‘before and after.’”
Foivos Georgakakis, the director of Middle East affairs at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasized that, although the regional environment has changed dramatically, Greece and Cyprus’s strategic vision remains steady.
“The regional dynamics have undoubtedly shifted since October 7,” said Georgakakis, “but the strategic orientation of Greece and Cyprus has not changed. What has changed is the sense of urgency and the complexity of the environment.”
“Fundamentally, our vision is unchanged,” he added. “Greece and Cyprus are part of a broader East Med axis of stability, security, and connectivity that extends from Europe through the Middle East to India. In fact, that vision has been reinforced.”
Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and moderator of the discussion, asked how Israel’s current strategic challenges—Iran, Hamas, and Turkey—appear from Athens and Nicosia.
“They’re not very different,”Petranyi responded. “For Cyprus especially, we are physically nestled in this region. Realistically, our closest stable democratic neighbor is Israel. In terms of proximity and shared values, Israel is absolutely vital to our security outlook.”
“There’s a natural and growing reliance—a real partnership, not just on paper or in diplomatic declarations—but a tangible alliance built on mutual trust,” she added. “When we look at our immediate neighborhood, it’s clear that it’s not a peaceful or predictable environment. Yes, we’re part of the European Union, but we’re quite far from the core geographically. Greece is our closest European ally, but we’re still on the edge and seek deeper anchoring with like-minded partners.”
This search for deeper anchoring is precisely why the “3+1” format, which brings together Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States, is so important, according to both officials.
However, Georgakakis admitted, “October 7 had a kind of ‘braking effect’ on this format, understandably, a pause. However, we are convinced that this partnership is now more necessary than ever.”
Just last week, the foreign ministers of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel sent a joint letter to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, urging the reactivation of the “3+1” and proposing a new ministerial-level meeting.
“This partnership is about more than just high-level political dialogue,” said Georgakakis. “It’s also about counterterrorism cooperation, energy infrastructure, and shared values. We are four countries with the same strategic interests and democratic values, and that’s not something to take lightly, especially in this region.”
He added that the East Med alignment also dovetails with broader geoeconomic trends. “If I may add,” he continued, “the ‘3+1’ is not an isolated initiative. It aligns naturally with broader connectivity strategies, such as the IMEC, which was announced in New Delhi just weeks before October 7.”
“That corridor is about trade, energy, and connectivity, but it’s also about shared principles. In that sense, the ‘3+1’ is the East Med nexus to the IMEC corridor. Both are integral pillars of this wider vision.”
As geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean intensifies, both Petranyi and Georgakakis expressed confidence that democratic partnerships, rather than energy interests or maritime boundaries, would be the deciding factor in maintaining regional stability.
In that sense, October 7 was not just a turning point, but a test. Greece and Cyprus are determined to face it alongside their closest partners, not alone.
Michael Rubin challenged his interlocutors with a dose of Washington realism: “I’ve been around this town for 25 years,” he said. “I’ve seen maps of grand pipeline projects, trade corridors, and memoranda of understanding, but only a fraction of them have materialized. So let’s take IMEC. It was announced at the G20 in New Delhi in September 2023 with much fanfare. Why haven’t we seen any meaningful progress?”
Georgakakis acknowledged the gap between vision and implementation. “There are both practical and bureaucratic issues,” he said. “For example, there are logistical complications and bureaucratic bottlenecks that can slow everything down. These are real issues, and they reflect the complicated realities on the ground. But there’s a second layer here, a strategic one. We must acknowledge that October 7th changed the regional calculus. Frankly, one of Hamas’s main goals in attacking Israel was to disrupt normalization with Saudi Arabia, and unfortunately, they’ve succeeded.”
“They may have lost commanders and suffered military setbacks,” he added, “but strategically, they managed to stall the momentum toward Saudi-Israeli normalization.” From our perspective, we are continuing to build a strong strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia.
I’ve heard directly from Saudi leaders, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, that he truly wants normalization. He won’t always say that publicly, but he is determined. That said, given the current environment, he simply can’t move forward with it yet.”
“But that just means now is the time to prepare,” Georgakakis continued. “We need to lay the groundwork and line up the infrastructure because, when the moment comes, we need to be ready to move quickly.”
Petranyi added that the IMEC should be understood not only as infrastructure, but also as part of a broader political realignment. “For us, the IMEC is more than just infrastructure,” she said. “It’s a natural extension of the Abraham Accords. Most, if not all, of the countries involved in those accords would also play a role in IMEC.”
“Crucially, we don’t think of IMEC as a single corridor with a single entry point into Europe,” she added. It should have multiple entry points. We don’t exclude other partners. Morocco, for example, could easily be incorporated into the corridor architecture. We envision a model in which geopolitics and commerce mutually reinforce each other, and that’s when these projects actually take off and become a reality.”
Rubin then mentioned a “mixed signal” he received from Washington. “What kind of message does it send,” he asked, “that the U.S. State Department announced it would close its consulate in Thessaloniki?”
Georgakakis did not hide his disappointment. “Look, there are going to be multiple entry points to Europe for IMEC. One possible route is through France, via the port of Marseille. Another is Greece, and in that context, Thessaloniki and Volos are key nodes.”
“Thessaloniki is Greece’s second-largest port,” he added. “If you consider that IMEC is being positioned as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, then having Thessaloniki as a potential European gateway becomes strategically significant.” So, yes, the discussion to close the US consulate there sends a mixed signal. It risks undermining the perception of U.S. commitment to the corridor and northern Greece’s role in it.”
The conversation turned to Turkey’s growing role as a spoiler in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly through its expansive and provocative “Blue Homeland” doctrine. Rubin characterized Turkey’s behavior as “imperial” and pointed out its occupations in Cyprus, Iraq, and Syria. He suggested that, if unchecked, Ankara might project power into Armenia via its ally, Azerbaijan.
This maritime revisionism is not hypothetical, Petranyi said. “Turkey has actively blocked exploration and drilling in Cypriot waters, even in areas not in dispute, between Cyprus and Egypt,” she noted.
“When smaller energy companies, such as Italy’s ENI, attempted to operate there, Turkish naval forces intervened. However, when larger Western companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron arrived, Turkey backed off. There’s a pattern here: Turkey tests limits based on perceived weakness.”
And what lies beneath those waters? “Not Qatar-level reserves but significant enough to matter economically and geopolitically,” she said Cyprus has served as a quiet mediator between neighbors like Israel, Egypt, and even Lebanon—countries whose energy claims sometimes intersect and whose political relationships are often fraught. “One day the Israeli energy minister is in Nicosia; the next day, the Lebanese minister. That’s not a coincidence.”
Georgakakis explained how the Great Sea Interconnector would transform the region economically and strategically. “It would finally connect Cyprus to the European grid, help Israel overcome its energy isolation, and open the possibility of a future link to Saudi Arabia. That is precisely why Turkey seeks to block it.”
He said that this would happen “through legal fictions and maritime distortion. In 2019, Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya in an attempt to claim a maritime border between the two countries. The problem? Turkey and Libya are not neighbors.”
Georgakakis noted that Turkey wants every infrastructure project from Israel or Egypt to Europe to require its permission. “But acknowledging that would legitimize their claims. We can’t do that.”
The Turkey-Libya MOU violates international maritime law and supports Ankara’s ‘Blue Homeland’ initiative, which aims to assert dominance across the Eastern Mediterranean. “If allowed to stand,” Petranyi warned, “it would allow Ankara to block not just gas pipelines but also electricity cables, crippling regional cooperation. Cyprus just wants the basic rights of any EU member. But Turkey is using maritime imperialism—yes, that’s the right term—to strangle our connectivity and block our future.”
“When US is clear in the Eastern Mediterranean, it gets results,” Georgakakis said. “When it hesitates, Turkey becomes more aggressive.” He specifically pointed to the Interconnector project, which lacks clear U.S. backing, as an example of where Turkish interference thrives. In contrast, Turkey kept silent when US energy giants like Chevron secured tenders south of Crete. “That’s the deterrent effect of US engagement.”
Meanwhile, speakers noted that Crete remains a cornerstone of American strategy. Georgakakis reminded that Souda Bay is the only US naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. “It’s critical to CENTCOM and US operations in the Middle East. Turkey knows not to test it.”
Michael Rubin praised Cyprus’s foreign minister, Constantinos Kombos: “If I were a betting man, I’d keep an eye on him. The foreign minister of Cyprus might one day win the Nobel Peace Prize. Cyprus may be small, but the diplomacy coming out of Nicosia is punching well above its weight.”