On May 16th, 2025, the New York Times published an article on the upcoming presidential election in Romania by Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a Lecturer at St. John’s College, Oxford. A link to the article and to Dr. Bortun’s bio at St. John’s can be found in the notes below. (0)
Various friends and family forwarded the article to me, asking if Romania was truly in as bad shape as the article claimed, and if it was accurate in its warning that Romania was going the way of the the USA and Hungary. Of course, as everyone now knows, the article’s titular premise was proven wrong two days later when a majority of Romanian voters repudiated George Simion, a far-right Trump lookalike, by choosing Nicuşor Dan as their next president. However, the underlying thesis of the article — that the rise of the extreme right in Romania is due to the mistaken economic policies of successive Romanian governments — was not proven wrong by what was a fairly close election… and my friends and family remained concerned. I suspect others are too… hence this response.
So, let’s start with some of the article’s factual inaccuracies and misleading statements:
o “…decades of economic failure…” This is simply not true. Romania was the second poorest country in Europe when it joined the EU in 2007… in the meantime it has surpassed Greece, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary and has in several recent years been the fastest growing country in Europe. On apples-to-apples terms (i.e. PPP) GDP is now at 85% of Spain, whereas in 2007 it was at 51%. Does this sound like decades of economic failure? (1)
o “…chronic underdevelopment, widespread insecurity, and mass emigration…” Romania has been investing hugely in infrastructure (see note (4) below), is growing rapidly and has low unemployment (5.5%, less than the EU average of 5.8%), so Bortun’s first two points are wrong: Romania is developing rapidly and there are jobs for most who want them. There has been mass emigration — ca. 3 million Romanians live and work in Western Europe vs 19 million who live in Romania… but this was inevitable given EU freedom of movement and, while Romania was particularly poor, the fact that many people could earn much more abroad than at home. No realistic government policies could have avoided this… other than not joining the EU. As Romania has become richer, net emigration has slowed: in 2023, 82,000 more Romanians returned to Romania than left. Mass emigration is therefore not indicative of economic failure over the past two decades. Bortun is misleading his readers to say so. (2)
o “Even now, traditional mainstream parties have little to say about the broken economic model that has brought us to this point. That dereliction has spurred the country’s disastrous slide to the far right.” Since Romania’s economic model is not broken, the rise of the far right must have its roots elsewhere. One could just as well say that the US economic model is broken, since Trump and MAGA now rule… but in the US as in Romania, although economic factors always play a role in electoral politics, they are not the reason why most people vote as they do. Do you think, for example, that most Republican voters are suffering economically, while most Democratic voters are not? I’ll leave you to do your own research to see that this is not the case. So, Bortun is once again wrong.
o “Romania … consistently performs among the worst in the European Union on many key social indicators, with 28 percent of the population at risk of poverty and a further 17 percent living in severe material deprivation.” If you click on Bortun’s link to the source for his first figure, you will see that 28% is not the % at risk of poverty, but the % “at risk of poverty or social exclusion”. Why would Bortun misrepresent his source? Well, one reason might be that Romania has almost 2 million Roma who are definitely socially excluded (as they are in every other European country… but there are more in Romania than elsewhere)… which leaves Romania looking particularly bad by this measure. A definition of poverty that does not also include social exclusion shows that in Romania ca. 22% of the population is below the poverty line… while in Italy it is 30% and in Germany 17%. Not so bad, eh? Last point: Bortun says that “a further 17%” of Romanians live in severe material deprivation…”. Once again the source refers to both material and social deprivation, and moreover does not say that this 17% is in addition to the 28% at risk of poverty, a cumulation which Bortun implies. Bottom line: Bortun is either incredibly incompetent or intentionally misleading his readers. (3)
o “the median wage is barely over five euros an hour, about one-third the European Union average.” One is reminded of the old line about lies, damn lies, and statistics. Things such as food, land, and services in Romania are much cheaper than on average elsewhere in the EU… which is why one should always consider whether comparing PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) figures, which adjust for such price differences, would be more informative. In fact, the link Bortun provides gives both nominal and PPP-adjusted figures. Guess which one Bortun uses? If one instead uses the PPP figures, then Romania is at €10 / hour… ⅔ of the EU average of €15, which is about where you would expect it to be given its overall level of prosperity. Bortun misleads again.
o “…strikingly low taxes, which stand at 16 percent for corporations and 10 percent on all personal income. This low-tax nirvana, … comes hand in hand with the European Union’s largest budget deficit and a growing debt pile.” So, this is true… but does it support Bortun’s thesis that Romania’s poor economic policies have led to support for the far right? It does not. Consider: would one expect that low taxes and a fiscal stimulus would lead to voter dissatisfaction? One would not. Also, in 2024 pensions increased dramatically (by 17%), as did public sector salaries (24%) and purchases of goods and services (21% — most of which would have been from Romanian firms)… all things one would expect would lead to increased voter satisfaction, not a surge in far-right support. Economists are usually unhappy with fiscally irresponsible government spending; voters who benefit from that spending are not. So, this also does not explain the far right surge and by suggesting that it does, Bortun misleads again. (4)
o “the second-highest rate of in-work poverty and one of the lowest shares of G.D.P. spent on welfare in the European Union.” First, if you click on the links Bortun provides, you will see that both figures are about where you would expect them to be given Romania’s relatively low level of affluence. Second, if Romania is not to remain poor, it needs economic growth, and it is natural to focus more on economic growth than welfare. So, lower welfare spending than is the case in rich countries is a problem… but not one with a short-term solution, nor specific to Romania, nor new. And it is worth noting that rich countries with much higher levels of welfare spending are also experiencing far right surges, a fact that Bortun conveniently omits to note. (5)
o “Of the country’s 47 electoral districts, 36 went Mr. Simion’s way, proof of his widespread appeal…” Misleading. Electoral districts are not of equal population. As in the USA, where there are many more small rural states than large urban ones, Romania has many low-population rural districts and relatively few high population urban ones. As the saying goes: land doesn’t vote… and neither do districts. Simion clearly does have wide-spread support, as proven by his winning 46% of the votes in the second round of the election… but by focussing on electoral districts Bortun is misleading his readers into thinking that this support is much higher than it actually is. (6)
o “ support was strongest among groups most affected by the country’s lack of opportunities. Rural areas backed him and more than 60 percent of the diaspora, which is one of the largest in Europe, voted for him. This is what the focus on the role of Russian interference and unregulated social media misses. Behind the far right’s rise, as elsewhere, is economic insecurity.” First, a country with a low unemployment rate and a rapidly growing economy is not a country with a lack of opportunities — Bortun is just plain wrong. Second, there is increasing evidence from many countries that the rise of the far right is more closely connected with socio-cultural issues than economic ones, and even the source that Bortun links to in support of his claim says “…economic insecurity explained around one-third of recent surges in populism.” So, once again Bortun misrepresents a source.
Conclusion: despite Bortun’s attempts to convince his readers otherwise, Romania is not doing badly economically, it does not appear as if economic factors are primarily responsible for the rise of the far right, and Romania is not unavoidably fated to follow the Hungary and the USA’s descent into authoritarianism.
So what is really going on here? Given all of the factual inaccuracies and misleading statements detailed above, it is clear that a neutral observer would reach a very different conclusion: namely that Simion’s popularity is not primarily due to economic causes. Why then has Bortun resorted to the sort of misleading rhetoric that one would expect from a politician rather than from a lecturer at Oxford University to try to convince his readers otherwise? The answer can be found in his last paragraph:
o “The kind of party that could represent them is still missing in Romania, despite overwhelming support for an agenda of state-led job creation, better-funded public services, poverty reduction measures and public housing programs. Such a political project, one that can offer a genuine alternative to the status quo, is more urgently needed in Romania than ever.”
This is why Bortun has been twisting and misrepresenting data and sources throughout his article: what he really cares about are social-welfare issues… which he seems to believe are not a high priority for any of Romania’s political parties, including the far right AUR party that Simion heads (as Bortun acknowledges: “That’s not to say that far-right populists offer a truly different economic model.”). What Bortun is doing is trying to use the rise of the far right as a lever to advance his favored social-welfare policies.
Increasing social-welfare in Romania is a worthy goal, but Bortun’s way of pursuing it is intellectually dishonest (7). He should be ashamed, as should Oxford University to employ someone who strays so far from the ideals of academic honesty and integrity, and the New York Times for providing a platform for such a flawed opinion piece. The ends do not justify the means.
I should note that I do not know Dr. Bortun personally, had never heard of him prior to reading his article, and have no animosity towards him other than that engendered by the article. There is far too much intellectual dishonesty in the world today, and, especially when it is amplified by the borrowed reputations of institutions like Oxford University and the New York Times, sometimes one just has to speak out.
Guy Bradley