According to information published by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) on May 23, 2025, North Korea continues to intensify the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions and international de-escalation efforts. A combination of missile tests, military parades, and official statements from Pyongyang indicates that the regime is working to build a credible nuclear warfighting capability, designed in particular to evade regional missile defense systems. This posture aligns with an offensive deterrence strategy that may undermine regional and international crisis stability.
A photo taken on November 18, 2022, shows North Korea’s new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-17, positioned for launch at Pyongyang International Airport (Picture source: KCNA )
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un consistently rejects any denuclearization initiative, asserting that nuclear weapons are essential to the survival of his regime. This position, reaffirmed in the 2025 annual threat assessment from the U.S. intelligence community, has led to a continuous strengthening of the country’s nuclear capabilities, contributing to instability on the Korean Peninsula. In response, the United States and South Korea have reinforced their military coordination, notably through the Nuclear Consultative Group, aimed at enhancing extended deterrence. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that any North Korean nuclear attack would result in the end of the regime.
Doctrinally, Kim stated in 2016 that nuclear weapons could only be used under his direct order, but since 2022, domestic legislation has expanded the conditions for use to include preemptive strikes in the event of an existential threat. At the 8th Workers’ Party Congress in 2021, a five-year defense plan was announced with goals including the development of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical nuclear weapons, and a nuclear-armed submarine. In January 2023, Kim confirmed mass production of tactical nuclear weapons, further committing to military expansion. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment confirmed the display of a tactical nuclear warhead that North Korea claims is compatible with eight delivery systems, including cruise missiles and unmanned underwater vehicles.
Experts estimate that North Korea may possess enough fissile material to produce up to 90 nuclear warheads, though only about 50 may be assembled. The regime is also working to miniaturize warheads for deployment on a range of missiles, from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to ICBMs. This miniaturization effort, combined with diversification of delivery platforms, reflects a strategic objective to create a modular and flexible nuclear force.
The pace of ballistic missile testing has increased significantly since 2022, in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang continues to develop systems capable of bypassing missile defense networks such as Patriot, Aegis BMD, and THAAD. Since 2017, ICBM tests have demonstrated North Korea’s capability to reach the continental United States, notably with the Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17. In 2023, three tests of the solid-fueled Hwasong-18 were recorded, followed in October 2024 by a test of the Hwasong-19, reportedly equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), enabling one missile to strike multiple targets.
According to a report published by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on May 13, 2025, North Korea could possess up to 50 ICBMs by 2035, a development that would severely challenge current U.S. missile defense capabilities. The regime currently operates approximately 17 ICBM launch platforms across models ranging from Hwasong-14 to Hwasong-18, with the Hwasong-19 under development. The shift to solid-propellant ICBMs like the Hwasong-18 and -19 marks a significant evolution: these systems require less launch preparation time, are more mobile, and are harder to detect, complicating interception efforts.
North Korea’s diversification also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), specifically the Pukguksong-3 through -6. The Pukguksong-6, unveiled in 2022, is reportedly solid-fueled and MIRV-capable. Although not officially counted in DIA inventories, these systems provide additional launch options from dispersed maritime platforms that are more difficult to track. In 2023, North Korea revealed a submarine designed to launch ballistic missiles, further enhancing its strategic flexibility.
At short and medium ranges, North Korea has improved its SRBM and MRBM capabilities by integrating solid propellants and satellite guidance. Systems such as the KN-23, KN-24, and KN-25 are designed to be launched from mobile platforms, making them less vulnerable to preemptive strikes. Some of these missiles can be launched in salvos intended to overwhelm missile defenses. These technical advances are part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening the credibility of North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent.
Despite decades of economic sanctions and growing diplomatic isolation, North Korea continues to make progress in developing its strategic capabilities. Ongoing efforts to diversify delivery systems, improve warhead miniaturization, and incorporate new launch platforms indicate a fundamental transformation in the regime’s military architecture. This strategy, combined with increasing international cooperation with countries such as Russia, presents a significant challenge to the United States and its allies, who must rapidly adapt their technological and operational postures to counter an evolving, multi-faceted threat.