The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, has resulted in one of the largest and most protracted refugee crises of the 21st century. As of 2025, more than 6.8 million Syrians remain displaced outside their country, and over 3 million reside in Türkiye, which has become a key host and transit country. Recent political changes in Syria—most notably the collapse of the Ba’athist regime in December 2024 and the rise of the hardline Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—have added new urgency to the long-standing question: will Syrian refugees return to their homeland, or will they continue to seek long-term integration in Türkiye?
This article critically examines that question by applying the Conflict Model of Migration to the current context. It assesses the physical, political, legal, economic, and social conditions influencing Syrian refugees’ decisions to return or stay. We argue that refugees’ perceptions of human security—how safe, stable, and viable life feels both in Syria and Türkiye—play a more significant role than formal policy frameworks or international diplomacy. Ultimately, while repatriation remains a political priority for Türkiye, the evidence suggests that large-scale voluntary return remains highly unlikely in the near future.
The Conflict Model of Migration: Understanding the Decision to Stay or Return
The Conflict Model of Migration provides a useful analytical framework for understanding forced migration, particularly in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It outlines five key dimensions that shape a refugee’s mobility decisions: physical security, political stability, legal protection, economic opportunity, and social integration. Each dimension operates both in the country of origin and in the host country, and decisions to return are made through a complex comparison of the perceived risks and benefits in each setting.
In the case of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, this model helps to identify not only the structural barriers to return but also the emotional and psychological factors that influence decision-making. Even if security conditions appear to improve on paper, a widespread lack of trust in Syria’s new political order, combined with decades of trauma and displacement, can severely hinder any meaningful return process.
Post-Baathist Syria: A New Political Reality or New Insecurities?
The fall of the Ba’athist regime in December 2024 was a watershed moment in Syria’s history. Yet the vacuum it left has been filled not by inclusive democratic institutions, but by fragmented power centers and armed groups—most prominently HTS in the northwest. While the end of Assad’s rule brought hope for some, the consolidation of power by HTS has sparked new fears among displaced Syrians, many of whom have secular, minority, or moderate backgrounds.
Refugees who fled persecution, violence, or forced conscription under Assad are now reluctant to return to areas controlled by HTS, whose human rights record includes summary executions, gender-based restrictions, and the suppression of political dissent. Moreover, many regions of Syria continue to suffer from aerial bombardments, minefields, water scarcity, and destroyed infrastructure. In short, the perceived risk to personal safety remains unacceptably high for most refugees considering return.
Legal and Economic Realities in Türkiye: Stability Amid Exclusion
While life in Türkiye is not without challenges, it offers relative stability compared to war-torn Syria. Syrian refugees in Türkiye have access to temporary protection status, basic healthcare, education for their children, and—under certain conditions—legal employment. However, this legal protection is neither permanent nor uniform. Increasingly, refugees face bureaucratic hurdles, language barriers, limited job security, and rising xenophobia. Yet despite these difficulties, most Syrians still perceive Türkiye as a safer and more livable option than returning to Syria under HTS rule.
The Turkish government has taken a firmer stance on refugee return, citing economic burden and national security. Initiatives such as voluntary return programs and the construction of “safe zones” in northern Syria have been promoted. However, research indicates that these programs often lack sufficient guarantees of safety, dignity, and sustainability—key criteria under international law for voluntary repatriation. Economic push factors in Türkiye are real, but they are rarely stronger than the pull of stability and survival.
Social Integration and the Role of Human Security
Beyond the tangible factors of safety and livelihood, the concept of human security is central to understanding refugee behavior. Many Syrians in Türkiye have established lives over the past decade—raising children, learning the language, and building community networks. The longer displacement endures, the more people seek permanence and predictability. Even amid increasing societal tension, social bonds, educational opportunities, and familiarity with the Turkish system often outweigh the uncertainties of return.
In contrast, social fragmentation in Syria—ethnic divisions, sectarian violence, and the absence of basic services—makes return not just physically dangerous, but socially untenable. The lack of trust in local authorities, the fear of retribution, and the absence of inclusive governance deter many refugees from seeing Syria as a viable future home. Without comprehensive reconciliation processes and meaningful political transition, few Syrians feel they can “go home” in the full sense of the term.
Conclusion: Remaining in Türkiye Is a Rational, Not Temporary, Choice
While the political rhetoric in Türkiye and parts of Europe continues to push for the return of Syrian refugees, the evidence suggests that most refugees are not yet in a position to return safely, voluntarily, or sustainably. The presence of HTS, ongoing violence, economic collapse, and social fragmentation in Syria present overwhelming obstacles. Meanwhile, Türkiye, despite its own political and economic challenges, continues to offer relative human security and access to essential services.
In the short to medium term, the prospect of large-scale return appears more myth than reality. However, return dynamics may shift depending on future political developments in Syria, bilateral agreements, and international funding for reconstruction and reintegration. For now, the key policy focus should be on strengthening legal protections, promoting integration, and preparing for long-term inclusion of Syrian refugees in Türkiye and beyond. Only through a rights-based and humane approach can both host and refugee communities hope for a shared and stable future.
This article contributes to the wider discourse on migration, human security, and integration in conflict-affected regions, and underscores the importance of evidence-based policymaking in shaping the future of displaced populations.