Blueprints on the border: Germany’s Lithuania deployment may be Europe’s new template

Vilnius’s Cathedral Square provided the stage for a historical event on May 22: the activation ceremony of Armoured Brigade 45, Germany’s first permanent deployment abroad of a combat unit of such size since the Federal Republic’s founding in 1949. Civilian and military leaders from Lithuania and Germany attended, as did scores of Lithuanian onlookers and the 400 army personnel of the brigade headquarters already in country. By the end of 2027, they will grow to a 4,800-strong force tasked with deterring, and if necessary, defending against a Russian attack.

A mere two years ago, German and Lithuanian officials were arguing over the size of Germany’s commitment to Lithuania. Lithuanian leaders expected Germany to deploy the whole brigade—between 3,000 and 5,000 troops—to their country, but their German counterparts initially planned to send only its headquarters component and some combat troops. The rest of the brigade would have been held in reserve back home to reinforce the troops in Lithuania when needed. German defence minister Boris Pistorius’s decision at the end of June 2023 to send the full brigade to Lithuania came as a surprise, including to many in his own ministry. At the ceremony in Vilnius, Pistorius promised: “We stand by our friends. Always.”

The impact on Germany’s army

The brigade must overcome major challenges within thirty months to be fully ready by 2027. But shifting units to Lithuania also strains the rest of the German armed forces, the ‘Bundeswehr’, causing headaches for officials and military planners in Berlin.

To create Armoured Brigade 45, Berlin is reshuffling the Bundeswehr. Armoured Battalion 203, with about four dozen Leopard 2 tanks, will relocate from North Rhine-Westphalia to Lithuania, joined by Armoured Infantry Battalion 122 with its similar number of Puma armoured infantry fighting vehicles from Bavaria. The Bundeswehr-led Multinational Battlegroup Lithuania, including Dutch, Norwegian, and other allied troops, will complete the formation, becoming the first of the three combat units to attach to the brigade in early 2026. The others will follow as soon as Lithuania builds the necessary infrastructure—housing for troops and their families, exercise areas, storage for equipment and ammunition. Additional brigade elements will provide reconnaissance, sustainment, communications, engineering and artillery support.

The decision to largely draw on existing units rather than create new ones shortens the deployment timeline. But it also creates gaps in the two battalions’ home formations. Replacing them will take time: new soldiers must be recruited and trained, and new kit procured. Equipping the Lithuania brigade with the Bundeswehr’s most modern gear similarly means that other units will face temporary shortfalls when overall readiness is already poor. This is further exacerbated by German equipment donations to Ukraine that they have been slow to replace; in one instance, 18 Leopard 2 tanks were taken from a Bundeswehr unit and sent to Ukraine. To meet the Bundeswehr chief’s 2029 deadline for full combat-readiness across the force, orders for new military kit and weapons should have been placed “yesterday”, lest “temporary” become “indefinite”.

Two areas where there is little to draw on for the brigade, even from other parts of the Bundeswehr, are drones and short-range air defence. As the war in Ukraine demonstrates, both are essential to the survivability and effectiveness of land forces in modern large-scale combat operations. Consequently, the Bundeswehr leadership prioritises the acquisition and integration of surveillance and strike drones, and of systems to counter these and other airborne threats. The Lithuania brigade will be at the front of the queue to receive them. Yet this might well stretch beyond 2027.

More deployments to come

In due time, Armoured Brigade 45 will be the German army’s most capable unit, adding significant firepower to Lithuania’s defence forces. This aligns with NATO’s 2022 Madrid ambition to build robust, multinational forward defences along its eastern flank. Other leading NATO nations have also started to beef up their deployments, but they follow different models from Germany’s. For example, Canada and the United Kingdom have agreed with Latvia and Estonia, respectively, to assign high-readiness brigades to them, forward-store their brigades’ equipment, and regularly rehearse deployments to the Baltics instead of stationing the brigades there permanently in full force.

A much-expanded, and combat-experienced, military presence in Russia’s western regions might well require NATO to respond with larger deployments of forward-deployed formations on its northeastern flank

Three developments could force NATO leaders to further expand their forward land forces. First, Russia plans to reconstitute its pre-invasion force and expand it to a maximum of 1.5 million active-duty personnel. Meanwhile, it is building infrastructure across the border from Finland and the Baltics to house these troops—a sign that the Kremlin is expecting its war against Ukraine to wind down in Russia’s favour. A much-expanded, and combat-experienced, military presence in Russia’s western regions might well require NATO to respond with larger deployments of forward-deployed formations on its northeastern flank.

Second, the conditions under which Russia’s war against Ukraine concludes affect force requirements along NATO’s southeastern flank. If Ukraine loses and Russia occupies its territory, Russian troops would directly threaten three more NATO allies (Hungary, Slovakia, Romania). This would require much larger NATO deployments in southeastern Europe. However, Ukraine has managed to hold off Russia, and if it continues to do so, both sides might decide to agree to a ceasefire (for now, Russia is the holdout). Europeans are currently discussing how they could contribute to stabilising such a ceasefire by deploying some European troops to Ukraine. Even though this would strain European armies, it would be less of a military commitment than if NATO had to deploy forces to deter an immediate threat to three more allies.

Third, although the Trump administration is formally still evaluating US global military deployments, more and more breadcrumbs are pointing towards significant force reductions from Europe. In the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US rushed an additional 20,000 troops to Europe, primarily to allies on NATO’s eastern flank. Because these are rotational deployments, by and large, they are also easiest to remove and refocus on deterring China and protecting the “homeland”. But even long-standing US headquarters and combat formations in Europe might see reductions. Europe’s major military powers may have to step in to fill the deterrence and reassurance gaps along the eastern flank left by Trump administration withdrawals in the coming months and years.

Whether or not Germany’s Lithuania brigade becomes a template for others, permanent forward basing of combat-ready forces by Europe’s military heavyweights could soon become more common again. During the cold war, West Germans were the main beneficiaries of such deployments by their allies. Looking ahead, Germany will need to assume a larger-than-ever share of the responsibility to resolutely deter threats and reassure its allies. In the words of Pistorius, the brigade “is a symbol of trust—between nations, between people, between friends”.