Building a constructive relationship with Belarus would generate a substantial windfall for security and stability in Eastern Europe as the United States prioritizes Asia.
US policy in Eastern Europe has been subsumed for the past six months by the White House’s initiative to end the Ukraine war. But even as the peace process unfolds, this administration should remain keen on exploiting shorter-term opportunities to advance US interests in Eastern Europe. By far, the biggest such window is a potential normalization deal with Belarus, a critically positioned swing player between Russia and the West.
The “Belarusian balcony” is a key staging ground between NATO and Russia, making it a security actor of outsized importance in questions of conventional and nuclear force posture. Its location likewise allows it to act as a potentially significant economic hub between East and West.
The West’s approach to Belarus has been on autopilot since the 2020 presidential election when the United States joined European countries in imposing severe sanctions on the government of President Aleksandr Lukashenko over what officials and critics described as the Belarusian authorities’ rigging of the elections and crackdowns on anti-government protests. The sanctions and maximum pressure regime were greatly strengthened following Minsk’s decision to provide passage and support for Russian troops during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
This punitive approach yielded none of its desired results. Minsk shielded itself from the Western sanctions hammer by deepening its ties to Russia and pursuing wide-ranging relations with an array of other non-Western actors, most notably China. Years of aggressive Belarusian import substitution, sanctions mitigation schemes, and attempts to cultivate relations with non-Western trading partners have further insulated Belarus from Western pressure.
Worse still, by adopting an all-stick, no-carrot approach, the West has deprived itself of its most effective tools for influencing Belarus. The majority of Belarusians, while friendly to Russia, see themselves as Europeans and place high personal value on being part of a common Western commercial and cultural space. If given the choice, Belarusians would overwhelmingly opt to buy iPhones and drive Fords or, considering the striking popularity of EVs in Minsk, Teslas.
Under any other circumstance, this social outlook, which is immediately apparent to anyone who has been to Belarus, would be read as a clear invitation to American soft power. This was reflected in what President Lukashenko called his “multi-vector foreign policy,” which sought to preserve Belarusian sovereignty by maneuvering between East and West. This model of geopolitical arbitrage provides Washington with a ready-made model for engaging Belarus at low cost, with minimal risk, and the potential for immediate benefits.
Building a constructive relationship with Belarus, one of the few remaining regional swing players between Russia and the West, would generate a substantial windfall for security and stability in Eastern Europe at a time when the United States is seeking to prioritize its presence in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific. Belarus’ position makes it a potential staging ground and battleground in a Russia-NATO conflict. Promoting Minsk’s peaceful relations with its Western neighbors is a direct way of reducing the risks of future escalatory spirals between Russia and NATO. The re-entry of US and European companies into Belarusian markets, where China has become very well established, would help the country diversify its economy in ways that are beneficial for both Belarus and the West.
It is long past time to begin charting the outlines of a US-Belarus normalization deal. The particulars will have to be negotiated on the ground between American and Belarusian diplomats, but we can preview the components in broad brushstrokes. The United States would offer to commit to a concrete model for sanctions relief and open talks on investment opportunities for US companies, including in aviation, energy, and the car industry.
The White House would likewise provide assurances that it does not seek or support a forced change in government in Belarus. The latter has been a de facto reality for some time; putting it down on paper would go far in restoring bilateral trust. Additionally, the administration would offer itself as a mediator to help repair Belarus’ troubled relationship with its two western neighbors, Poland and Lithuania.
Belarus, in turn, would agree not to facilitate, enable, or engage in aggression, whether direct or hybrid, against its neighbors. This provision, which verification mechanisms would underpin, would not cover self-defense and, therefore, does not contradict Belarus’ treaty obligations to Russia. Belarus would likewise commit to doing its part to address sources of agitation in relations with its Western neighbors, including ongoing allegations over enabling irregular migrant inflows.
It is important here to recognize that conditioning normalization on Belarus’ cutting security ties with Russia is not only a sure way to stifle dialogue but also unnecessary for achieving core US security objectives. That objective is to support regional stability by foreclosing the possibility of armed aggression from Belarusian territory. There is no genuine, compelling US interest in saddling Belarus with a civilizational choice between Russia and the West. Forcing such a choice is unacceptable to Minsk, and if carried to its conclusion, it risks incurring a catastrophic Russian response.
On human rights, the goal should not be to condition the release of political prisoners on specific rewards, as that only serves to perpetuate an unconstructive tit-for-tat that neither side wants. Rather, the United States should aim to engage Belarusian authorities in the spirit of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, where Washington opened tracks for dialogue with the Soviets in which human rights was one of several “baskets,” with the others including economic cooperation and security issues.
It is not a good idea to tie a reset with Belarus to war termination in Ukraine, as it neither improves our posture with Belarus nor in the Ukraine talks. Rather, the United States has every reason to engage with Belarus on its own terms as a sovereign state seeking to improve its relations with the West. Nor is it beneficial at this stage to enter into a common front with the Europeans, who will naturally inject their own conditions and stipulations.
There is a creeping recognition among European diplomats that the maximum pressure strategy against Belarus has failed, but EU leaders remain bound by political inertia to the current approach. US action is needed to break the deadlock. A successful US-Belarus deal would render the EU maximum pressure policy increasingly untenable and give European leaders the political cover they need to pursue a reset of their own.
The Trump administration has rightly diagnosed that US policy toward Europe is in dire need of reform, and Belarus provides perhaps the clearest litmus test of US capacity for course correction. The established approach toward Belarus has unambiguously failed. A better course stands ripe for the taking, and a deal along these lines would mark a significant diplomatic achievement that can be clinched relatively quickly. All that remains is the political will to follow through.
About the Author: Mark Episkopos
Mark Episkopos is a research fellow in the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is also an Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University. Episkopos holds a PhD in history from American University and a master’s degree in international affairs from Boston University. His research focuses on great power competition and the international system, the transatlantic relationship, Russian foreign policy, military thought and capabilities, domestic politics, and issues in Eastern European security. Episkopos was previously the National Security Reporter for The National Interest, where he wrote widely on military and foreign affairs topics. Follow him on X: @MEpiskopos.
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