Former US deputy national security adviser Victoria Coates, who served in the first Donald Trump administration, does not rule out the possibility that Washington will revive the EastMed pipeline project.
In an interview with Kathimerini, she says that circumstances have changed and the Biden administration’s restrictions on fossil fuel infrastructure projects have now been rescinded. Therefore, any US company interested in the project can seek support from the administration.
‘[The Turks] just have a way of looking at the map of the Mediterranean and drawing whatever they want. What they did with the Libya memorandum? I’m sorry, but where’s Crete on this map?’
Dr Coates, who currently serves as vice president of the Heritage Foundation – arguably the most influential think tank in Washington at the moment – says that natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean, even if more expensive, is essential in the emerging reality of heightened global energy demand.
She also talks about her recent report on the future of the US-Israel relationship. She explains how it can be transformed into a truly strategic partnership and why she is advising President Trump to gradually end military financing to Israel.
In your report, you argue that for the US-Israel relationship to evolve into a true strategic partnership, one essential step is the gradual phaseout of Israel’s reliance on US military financing. Can you explain the logic behind this recommendation?
This recommendation is based on what [Israeli] Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu suggested before Congress in 1996: That assistance should end. Back then he committed to implementing policies – which, to his credit, he did – that would expand Israel’s economy to the point where such aid would no longer be necessary. We are now proposing a similar process with regard to foreign military financing. The idea is to phase it out gradually over the next 20 years. In the immediate four to five years, financing would actually be increased to allow Israel time to prepare for the transition. Crucially, this period would also be used to further expand Israel’s economy through regional integration, trade and technological cooperation with the United States. We don’t want to cut off Israel, as DC media have reported. On the contrary, we want a stronger, more resilient Israel, one that can be an even more powerful partner to the United States.
So, less dependency would mean more strategic autonomy. What does Israel think about that?
I think there’s been a lot of interest in it. Just recently, Prime Minister Netanyahu, during a Security Cabinet meeting, said that it’s time for Israel to begin discussing the phaseout of US security assistance. He pointed to Israel’s experience during the past year, when the Biden administration tried to use security assistance as a bludgeon to shape Israeli policy.
A stronger Israel can be very useful for the US in the region, correct?
Correct. What we’re trying to say is that we are entering a new kind of Cold War, this time with China. The US will need to focus its strategic attention there and the idea is to build up capable partners and allies who can take responsibility for their own regions.
So Washington can walk away?
We are not saying we’re going to walk away entirely. There are certain capabilities only the United States has and I think we would want to continue to deploy those in the Middle East, in Europe, in Latin America, as well as in Asia. But at the same time, exactly because we have to be active in all of these theaters, we can’t be the only ones acting in all of them.
Under this new model, would the US continue to uphold Israel’s qualitative military edge?
We have to. The QME is actually Cold War doctrine. It’s what we originally came up with in NATO to deal with the Soviets, who were always going to have overwhelming numerical superiority. A great example of how that works was Operation Spiderweb that the Ukrainians just pulled off. That is literally the QME in action. You’re showing a superior capability and technology that the other party doesn’t have and can’t defend against. So QME remains critical for Israel and is very much what we propose in the report.
You talked about regional integration. How optimistic are you about the possibility of expanding the Abraham Accords and the relationship with the Saudis?
I’m very optimistic. And you know, there are various considerations – domestic political considerations, all sorts of diplomatic niceties – but I think the decision’s already been made. So it’s a question of when is a good time. Because right now, there’s not a particular urgency to it. There are a lot of other things that might seem more urgent at this moment.
But when it happens, it would completely unlock the IMEC project, correct?
Exactly. That will be the practical outcome when the Saudis no longer have a boycott against Israel. IMEC is a wonderful initiative that links India – which I think will be emerging as one of America’s key partners in the second half of the 21st century – not only with the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, but then through to Haifa and up to Europe. So this is a physical manifestation of the kind of regional integration we’re talking about here.
And since you mentioned Haifa, that brings me to the EastMed. How do you evaluate Greece and Cyprus’ role in this project and what do you think about the 3+1 framework?
I think it can be extremely useful. I was talking with [US] Ambassador [Geoffrey] Pyatt this morning about that dynamic and how important it’s going to be to get the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas assets coordinated and then figure out what the market is for them, ideally Europe. We’ve talked about the pipeline till we’re blue in the face. We got the Energy Department people to change the wording of our assessment of the pipeline. At the time, they said we did not assess it to be viable because the cost of the pipeline would make the gas prohibitively expensive in comparison to Russian imports. Now, many things have changed. And what we got them to say is “it’s not viable yet.”
So, should we expect developments on that front? Maybe the revival of the EastMed pipeline project?
Right. So even if Eastern Med gas is a little bit more expensive, you don’t want to put your energy security in Putin’s hands. That hasn’t proven to be a terrific concept. You might be willing to pay a little bit more – same thing as American natural gas, which they’re buying up hand over fist, even though it’s more expensive. So I think it’s possible, yes. We’re looking at a massive Moroccan pipeline around the western horn of Africa. If that pipeline could be viable – and we’re doing work on that – then I think we should revisit this.
That sounds extremely significant because under the Biden administration, this project was abandoned.
The Biden administration had a formal prohibition on any government support for fossil fuel projects overseas, so you couldn’t get counselor support, you couldn’t get support from the Commerce Department, it just was prohibited. That’s been rescinded. So if there are American companies that would want to work on that project and would need any kind of support from the government, they are now free to ask.
Are the electricity interconnections equally important to this administration?
That’s what they traded off. I think it is less important, but still important. The power we are going to need to generate – and that we will be consuming – in our new AI data center world is going to be off the charts. And that’s why we need the natural gas to feed the generators to provide the electricity. But I’m more concerned about that than I am about the electricity interconnectors. One of the problems with the previous administration’s approach is that they just assumed there was some magical source of electricity with zero emissions. They really didn’t make very much progress. They continued to burn more oil, coal and gas every year than the previous year, but they kind of pretended they weren’t. They said they were going to phase that out, and somehow the electricity fairy would show up and there would be all this electricity. That’s why they focused on t those interconnectors. I think this administration is much more practical, focusing on where is that electricity going to come from? That’s the correct point.
But all these energy projects, gas or electrical, will face resistance from Turkey.
They just have a way of looking at the map of the Mediterranean and drawing whatever they want. What they did, for example, with the Libya memorandum? I’m sorry, but where’s Crete on this map? It’s like it doesn’t exist. It’s Greek territory, you know? So that is a problem because, again, Greece is also a fellow NATO member. And going back as far as 1974, it’s been a huge strain on the Alliance at a time when none of us want that, except possibly the Turks. So it will be a balancing act to figure out how we’re going to manage it.
But going back to this new framework of cooperation that we were discussing earlier, where does Turkey fit into it?
Turkey is a challenge right now. They’re doing a lot of very disruptive things. They’re saying a lot of things I don’t like. What’s happening, for example, with Hagia Sophia is horrible. Hagia Sophia is on the verge of collapse, one of the great wonders of the ancient world, and since it was turned into a mosque, it stopped getting the kind of conservation and protection it used to get. I’ve heard very alarming reports that it’s becoming deeply unstable. If that dome collapses, what then? That’s a hundred times worse than Notre Dame. So I’m very worried. That’s just an example that’s close to my heart. I’m also not entirely sure what they’re doing in Syria, or how productive they are there. And their very menacing actions toward Israel are utterly unhelpful.
How do you see this relationship with Israel playing out?
It can be fine, but I don’t think under [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan it’s going to be good. Now, that could change, leadership could change in Turkey. It will, at some point, change.
But for as long as Erdogan is there, things are going to remain the same?
I think it’s going to remain full of friction. It’s a huge challenge because they are a fellow NATO member. We have an important base there. They can be a terrific partner and ally – and they have been a terrific partner and ally in the past – but they aren’t right now. And there’s no way to sugarcoat that. I’m also interested to see the role of [US Ambassador to Turkey] Tom Barrack. He’s very active.