The Group of Seven (G-7) summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, from June 15 to 17 is over. Several analyses in major media outlets in all participating countries have appeared assessing the outcome and relevance of such summits. This analysis dwells on the performance of South Korea as an invitee, especially of the newly elected President Lee Jae-myung, for whom it was a high-stake debut in multilateral diplomacy.
The challenges abound for the newly elected leader as Korea was returning to international diplomacy after a state of emergency declared on 3 December 2024 by the former President Yoon Suk-yeol and thus a foreign policy challenge for Lee. This was for the third time in the past decade, South Korea took part in a summit of the G-7 nations, underscoring the country’s growing presence on the global stage.
Missing the Moment with Trump
The biggest disappointment for Lee and Korea’s diplomacy was that the US President Donald Trump did not hold a bilateral on the sidelines, as he prematurely returned to the US a day early without informing the Korean leader. After Lee assumed office, there were worries that he might downplay the alliance relationship with the US, and lean more towards China, and seek normalisation with North Korea. His perceived anti-Japanese stance also raised additional apprehensions. Though Trump and Lee held their first telephone call after the latter assumed office, describing it as “friendly and candid”, and agreed to closely cooperate for the development of the Korea-US alliance, the significance of the departure from the practice of calling immediately upon inauguration or election coming after considerable delay could not be missed. The fact that Lee missed the first in-person encounter with Trump as Trump abruptly left a day before the scheduled departure without informing Lee’s office reflected poorly on the alliance relationship. Whether it was a snub by Trump because of Lee’s alleged leaning towards China and hostility towards Japan was left to interpretations. This was the first sign of fracture in the alliance relationship with significant impact on East Asia’s security matrix.
A brief exchange in the sidelines between Trump and Lee could have carried considerable significance. Key issues like tariffs, defence cost sharing and the strategic flexibility of US Forces in Korea could have been discussed. However, the absence of a bilateral meeting underscored the unfulfilled aspiration of Lee to build a ‘bromance’ with Trump and establish himself as a trustworthy ally.
Trump is notorious to be known as an impetuous leader and his first impression on a foreign leader can have significant implications in shaping relations and policies. During the telephone call with Trump, Lee shifted his position on tariffs and stressed for an early agreement on tariff negotiations and aim to achieve tangible results in working-level talks. This contrasted with Trump’s push for fast negotiations. Trump could not have overlooked or ignored noticing Lee’s remarks on a televised debate on May 18 wherein he observed on Trump’s tariff policy thus: “If the United States continues to erode trust and reliability like this, it won’t last long” and added, “we shouldn’t be the first to rushing into an early deal.”
Meeting with Ishiba
The G-7 summit marked Lee’s first face-to-face encounter with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba as Korea and Japan approached the 60th anniversary of diplomatic normalisation on June 22. Prior to the meeting, during a commemorative event Lee had emphasised the progress made over the past 60 years in economic, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, calling Korea and Japan “important partners” in navigating today’s shifting international landscape. It may be recalled that the two Asian powers, rivals and neighbours, have often had little to celebrate as much of their rancour linked to Japan’s brutal colonial rule of Korea in the early 20th century. But relations got better in recent years amid political uncertainty and growing unease. The underlying factor behind this positivity was their common alliance relationship with the US. That healthy relationship is now under cloud to be undone and retreat to the past as perspectives by the new dispensation in Korea is likely to see the relations differently.
While Lee’s policies are going to be sharply different from his disgraced predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol, relations with Japan could be pragmatic and cautiously different. The conservative former president tried to repair relations with Japan and tried to tighten the countries’ three-way security cooperation with the US to counter North Korean nuclear threats. One would expect a review of this policy under Lee administration. Such a possibility does not discount the import of Lee’s remarks that he will bolster South Korea’s ties with the US and Japan and pursue talks with North Korea.
No matter whether a conservative or liberal becomes the President of South Korea, the shadow of history continues to haunt in some form or other. In 2023, Yoon announced a South Korean-funded compensation plan for colonial era forced labourers and comfort women. That decision caused considerable backlash from victims and their supporters, who had demanded direct payments from Japanese companies and a fresh apology from Tokyo. Though Yoon’s outreach boosted tourism and business ties, there still remains lingering resentment in South Korea that Japan failed to reciprocate Seoul’s diplomatic concession by addressing historical grievances more sincerely. The thrust of Lee’s emphasis of foreign policy could be different. While seeking problem-solving foreign policy as a pragmatist, his criticism of Japan for clinging to its imperialist past and hurting cooperation between the two countries, does not appear a healthy sign of better strategy.
August 15 would be the anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule at the end of World War II. Lee is going to address the nation’s painful history with Japan that day. That day, Lee’s intended policies towards Japan would be tested. Lee’s supporters at home expect Ishida should mark the anniversary with a stronger statement of remorse over Japan’s wartime past to put bilateral ties on firmer ground.
Japan has already atoned its past innumerable times. One fails to understand what new language Japan should use to express remorse for the deeds of past leaders that would satisfy Korea. Since the experience by Korea is more emotive devoid of any reason, no finality can be expected for this aberration in history. The wartime history will always linger in the background of Japan-Korea relations. Lee needs to realise that Ishiba is sincere to improve ties with Korea and has acknowledged Japan’s wartime aggression and shown empathy to Asian victims than his recent predecessors.
Both Japan and Korea must move beyond historical grievances and resist the tendency to continuously adopt a victim narrative. Instead, they should focus on pressing shared concerns, such as rising U.S. tariffs and the broader implications of America-first trade policies. Both need to collaborate on a joint response to Trump’s policies as his proposed tariffs on automobiles pose similar threats to both countries’ trade-dependent economies.
It was indeed encouraging that when Lee and Ishiba met at the G-7 summit in Canada, both likened the two countries to “neighbours sharing the same front yard” and called for building a future-oriented relationship that moves beyond their “small differences and disagreements”. Both agreed to closely communicate and cooperate on a range of issues, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile development.
Japan has always argued that all compensation issues were settled when the two countries normalised relations in 1965. It may be recalled that the Treaty on Basic Relations was signed between Japan and Korea on 22 June 1965 and ratified with the exchange of instruments on 18 December the same year that normalised relations after decades of colonial history from 1910 to 1945. That time, Japan provided $500 million in economic assistance to South Korea, saying all wartime compensation issues were settled. Unfortunately, historical issues including forced labour and sexual abuse of Korean women during the war, euphemistically called comfort women, have disrupted ties over the decades. The assertion in South Korea has become fiercer after it emerged as a major Asian power and a rival to Japan. This also coincided with late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure during which he promoted revisionist views.
While older generations in their 40s and 50s, who did not directly experience Japanese colonial rule but inherited its historical trauma from parents and grandparents, tend to view Japan critically due to unresolved historical issues, younger Koreans in their 20s and 30s are increasingly expressing a more favourable view of Japan. This generational change is reflected in cultural exchanges, social media trends, and increasing interest in Japanese pop culture, language, and technology. A significant indicator of this warming sentiment is the record-breaking number of mutual visitors between the two countries -over 12 million last year – the highest in history. This deepening people-to-people engagement reflects a growing sense of solidarity that transcends historical tensions. Nurturing and sustaining this trend will be crucial for building a forward-looking bilateral relationship rooted in mutual understanding and shared regional interests.
Despite such differences and with a view to maintain cordial relations, Japan offered atonement money twice for comfort women, an earlier semi-private fund and a second one unilaterally dissolved by former South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s liberal government. Since Lee is a liberal, it is but obvious that Japan is watching if he sticks with his conservative predecessor’s conciliatory diplomacy or return to the confrontation that marked previous liberal governments. In fact, bilateral relations significantly deteriorated when the Korean Supreme Court ruled in 2008 saying Japanese companies are liable for wartime forced labour during Japan’s colonial rule. Relations started to improve in 2023 when the conservative Yoon administration proposed compensation solution funded by domestic foundations. Lee’s election initially raised concerns that bilateral ties might sour again, given the past criticism of conservative administrations’ approach to Tokyo. It is welcome as it transpired from Lee’s meeting with Ishiba that the former defined Japan as an “important partner for cooperation” and pledged to separate historical disputes from future-oriented collaboration.
It thus transpires that notwithstanding Lee’s past criticism of Japan’s attitude on historical issues, invisibly weighing heavily on Lee administration’s Japan policy, Lee announced that he would maintain the comfort women agreement reached by the Park Geun-hye administration and the third-party compensation plan for wartime labourers adopted under Yoon Suk-yeol.
In the given situation, what is most desirable that both countries need to cooperate more closely to address the shared problems such as worsening regional security and Trump’s tariffs that have shaken the free trade system.
Position of China
For all practical purposes, China continues to remain the elephant in the room. Beijing is wary of the Japan-US-Korea trilateral summit and security cooperation, which it perceives as a counterweight to China. Though China was not at the Alberta summit, it transpired that G-7 has increasingly positioned itself as a counterbalance to Beijing- a development that makes China uncomfortable.
In April 2025, the G-7 foreign ministers expressed “deep concern over China’s provocative actions, including large-scale military exercises around Taiwan”. The finance ministers too indirectly criticised China, referring to “nonmarket policies and practices that cause trade imbalances”. Some analysts had feared that Lee’s brand of “pragmatic diplomacy” could be misunderstood as “equidistance diplomacy” between the US and China. The G-7 summit dissipated such apprehensions.
There was consternation in Washington when during the campaign trail Lee had distanced himself from any development in Taiwan and that Korea would be unlikely to get involved in a conflict if it breaks out between the US and China on Taiwan. Maintaining the status quo was the preferred option for Lee.
Overall, it transpired that Lee’s participation in the G-7 summit was a welcome prospect for the betterment of ties with the US and dissipated the fears of a return to hostility with the neighbouring Japan. As indicated, Lee’s foreign policy is going to be more pragmatic than it was initially feared. More details could be known as Lee settles down and crafts his own style of foreign policy and diplomacy.
About the authors:
Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at PMML, Ministry of Culture, New Delhi. Earlier, he was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA, Minister of Defence, Lok Sabha Research Fellow, and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan
Ms. Upasha Kumari is an Education and Public Policy Specialist. She currently works with the Delhi Public School Ghaziabad Society, where she contributes to academic excellence and curricular governance across eight DPSG schools. Her work focuses on the intersections of education, political science, and peace-building.