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Images of NCRI President-elect Maryam Rajavi displayed in broad daylight on a pedestrian bridge in Tehran, April 25, 2024
Three-minute read
After suffering significant military and symbolic losses during its recent 12-day conflict, including the confirmed deaths of over 40 IRGC commanders and at least 150 police personnel, the Iranian regime is now intensifying its domestic crackdown, particularly targeting the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), whom it increasingly portrays as its most potent internal threat. The coordinated messaging across regime institutions suggests an effort not only to deflect attention from battlefield setbacks, but to suppress rising discontent and forestall the possibility of organized dissent.
Eskandar Momeni, newly appointed Interior Minister and a senior IRGC figure, has been central to this pivot. In a nationally televised appearance, he admitted the regime’s deep concern over internal unrest, saying the enemy had “clearly calculated on domestic turmoil” by exploiting “resentful sectors of society.” Momeni emphasized that “security forces and police were deployed across the country immediately,” and added that because unrest was anticipated in prisons like Evin, “transfers were among the first steps taken.” His remarks acknowledged that discontent within the population was not only real but potentially combustible in the aftermath of military defeat.
Simultaneously, the regime’s media and clerical figures have intensified their warnings about the PMOI’s influence—both at home and abroad. The IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency labeled human rights concerns over the treatment of detainees “a coordinated campaign by anti-Iranian entities,” singling out the UN and rapporteurs like Mai Sato. “These are the same figures,” the report claimed, “who supported terrorists like the PMOI under the pretense of human rights.”
#Tehran’s Deep-Rooted Fear of the @Mojahedineng https://t.co/WcA9GUGo6j
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) June 2, 2025
This narrative dovetails with the inflammatory remarks of regime clerics. In Mashhad, Supreme Leader representative Ahmad Alamolhoda stated flatly, “There is no peace. The so-called ceasefire is not peace.” He framed the regime’s refusal to engage diplomatically as a matter of ideological principle, declaring, “Tehran must act only within the lines of the revolution and the Supreme Leader.” In Karaj, his counterpart echoed this rejectionism: “They do not want compromise on nuclear or missile programs. They want submission. But Iran is not a country that will surrender.”
The regime’s anxiety is perhaps most explicitly reflected in its renewed rhetoric about the PMOI’s domestic presence. Reza Nouri, Friday Prayer leader in Bojnourd, demanded immediate arrests: “These hypocrites are more wicked than the Zionists. We must use this opportunity to detain them all.” He further claimed, “Wherever they exist, there is insecurity. Like in 1981, their removal is a prerequisite for stability.”
Iran’s Top Officials Warn of PMOI Influence and Looming Revolt https://t.co/XDBP3GexVx
— M. S. Khansari (@khansari_m) April 19, 2025
Even official mourning ceremonies for slain security personnel—where Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei notably did not appear—became platforms for attacks on the PMOI and the IAEA. Judiciary head Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei blamed Rafael Grossi and the IAEA for “collaborating with the enemy” and facilitating intelligence leaks, an accusation likely aimed at deflecting from Tehran’s own security failures during the conflict.
Meanwhile on June 27, the former government spokesman Ali Bahadori Jahromi voiced alarm over the PMOI’s continued visibility, blaming “European and American support.” He noted, “Even when the national internet was cut off, their engagement didn’t drop,” suggesting the regime’s censorship efforts have failed to contain the group’s digital influence.
#IRGC-Linked Media Accuses @Mojahedineng of Targeting Youth Amid Growing Influencehttps://t.co/prg0rozDEV
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 3, 2025
This shift in tone and strategy also reflects fears of mounting international scrutiny. On June 2, UN Special Rapporteur Mai Sato issued a warning on social media about Iran’s escalating executions: “The use of capital punishment in drug-related cases, including at least four since the start of the war, violates international standards.”
Yet Tehran has chosen escalation over de-escalation. Nasir Hosseini, the Friday prayer leader from Yasuj declared, “Negotiation with criminal America no longer has meaning. They attacked us during talks. What’s the point of talking?” And in Arak, Dori Najafabadi lashed out at IAEA chief Grossi with personal vitriol: “He ate our rice, drank our tea, took our gifts, and betrayed us!”
NCRI Commentary | Questioning Iran’s Obsession: The MEK’s Rise as a National Movement
Why does the Iranian regime invest extensive time and resources against a supposedly “insignificant, fringe grouplet”? #FreeIran2024 #IranRevoIutionhttps://t.co/ECvlCkQGd3
— NCRI-U.S. Rep Office (@NCRIUS) March 31, 2024
Ultimately, this flurry of repressive messaging, aggressive fervor, and anti-PMOI propaganda reflects a regime reeling from defeat and desperately trying to control the political battlefield at home. Its attempt to reframe failure as defiance—while expanding crackdowns on dissent—suggests not strength but vulnerability.
As Momeni inadvertently admitted, the regime is not just confronting foreign threats but wrestling with its own fragility: “The public reported over 1.4 million suspicious activities in just a few days,” he said—an extraordinary figure that, far from reassuring, indicates the extent of fear, surveillance, and potential unrest now shaping life in the clerical dictatorship.