Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s June 2025 visit to Türkiye marks a watershed moment in the protracted and often turbulent history of Turkish-Armenian relations. For the first time, an Armenian leader is engaging in direct, high-level talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, signaling a willingness on both sides to move beyond entrenched grievances and explore a pragmatic path forward.
The backdrop to this visit is a rapidly shifting regional landscape. Since the 2020 Karabakh war and Azerbaijan’s subsequent consolidation of control over the region, Armenia has found itself in a period of deep introspection and strategic recalibration. Pashinyan’s government, facing both domestic turbulence and external pressure, has sought to redefine Armenia’s foreign policy priorities.
This includes a measured distancing from Russia, which has been traditionally Armenia’s primary security patron, and a parallel effort to engage with Western actors and regional neighbors, most notably Türkiye. The normalization process, which formally began in 2022 with the appointment of special envoys and the resumption of direct flights, has gradually gained momentum, though significant obstacles remain.
The Armenian leadership frames normalization with Türkiye as a strategic necessity, both to mitigate the risk of renewed conflict with Azerbaijan and to open new avenues for economic development and international engagement.
The visit follows closely on the heels of a high-profile meeting between Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, underscoring the interconnectedness of the Turkish-Armenian and Armenian-Azerbaijani tracks. Notably, the prospect of a comprehensive peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains a central issue, with Türkiye maintaining that full normalization is contingent upon progress on this front.
What distinguishes this moment from previous failed attempts is the convergence of internal and external pressures compelling both Ankara and Yerevan to reconsider their longstanding positions. For Türkiye, normalization offers the prospect of regional stability, enhanced connectivity and economic gains, while reinforcing its leadership role in the South Caucasus. For Armenia, it represents a chance to break out of regional isolation and recalibrate its foreign policy in line with new realities. Ankara’s calibrated statecraft – balancing historic solidarity with Azerbaijan against new economic opportunities with Armenia – exemplifies its evolving regional leadership.
Armenia’s transformation
Armenia’s evolving domestic landscape is inextricably linked to its recalibrated approach to Türkiye and the broader region. Since the 2020 Karabakh war, Pashinyan’s administration has faced mounting pressure to deliver both security and reform in a society marked by political polarization and historical trauma. Yet, these reforms have been met with skepticism at home, with critics questioning their transparency and strategic coherence, particularly as public engagement in the process has been limited, and opposition parties have voiced strong reservations.
Domestic transformation is not limited to institutional reform. Pashinyan’s government has also sought to reposition Armenia’s foreign policy, moving away from the country’s long-standing dependence on Russia. This pivot has been catalyzed by a sense of betrayal during the recent conflicts, where Russian security guarantees proved unreliable, and by Moscow’s subsequent disengagement from Armenian borders.
The withdrawal of Russian border guards from key checkpoints in 2025 and Armenia’s assumption of greater control over its own frontiers are unprecedented steps, symbolizing a new era of sovereignty and a deliberate distancing from Moscow’s orbit. At the same time, Armenia has intensified its engagement with Western actors, signing a strategic partnership charter with the United States and drafting new EU-oriented legislation, while also deepening defense ties with France and India.
These internal and external recalibrations are closely linked to Armenia’s approach to Türkiye. For Yerevan, normalization with Ankara is now viewed less as a historical reckoning and more as a pragmatic necessity for economic revival, regional integration and security diversification. Pashinyan’s government has adopted a “no preconditions” policy, signaling a willingness to decouple the normalization process from contentious issues such as the recognition of the so-called “Armenian genocide” or the unresolved status of Nagorno-Karabakh. This shift has enabled a more focused, bilateral dialogue, even as nationalist opposition and diaspora groups remain wary of rapid rapprochement.
The peace process with Azerbaijan remains the linchpin of Armenia’s regional strategy. Pashinyan’s administration has publicly accepted Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and promoted the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, aiming to transform Armenia from a landlocked state into a regional transit hub. However, the durability of these efforts is threatened by Baku’s insistence on the Zangezur Corridor (per the 2024 Almaty Declaration) as a non-negotiable transit route and constitutional amendments, which are deeply controversial within Armenian society and would require a national referendum. The outcome of these negotiations will not only shape Armenia’s relationship with Türkiye but also determine the Pashinyan government’s political survival ahead of the 2026 elections.
Can relations get better?
Realistically, expectations for a rapid and comprehensive breakthrough should be tempered by the depth of historical grievances and the persistence of mutual mistrust. Both Ankara and Yerevan face powerful domestic constituencies – nationalists, diaspora groups and political opposition – who remain skeptical, if not openly hostile, to reconciliation. In Armenia, the government’s bold reforms and westward pivot have triggered fierce debates about national identity and security, while in Türkiye, public opinion remains cautious, shaped by memories of past disappointments and the ongoing imperative to prioritize Azerbaijan’s interests.
Nevertheless, incremental progress is possible and, indeed, already visible. The limited opening of border crossings for third-country nationals, the resumption of direct flights and the establishment of humanitarian and technical working groups all signal a willingness to build trust through concrete, low-risk steps. These measures, while modest, lay the groundwork for more substantive cooperation in the future, particularly in the fields of trade, energy and regional connectivity, where both countries stand to benefit.
For a realistic road map to emerge, several conditions must be met. First, the normalization process must remain insulated from maximalist demands and historical preconditions that have derailed past efforts. The “no preconditions” approach, adopted by both sides, should be preserved and strengthened, allowing for focused, technical dialogue on mutually beneficial issues. Second, the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process must advance in parallel, as Türkiye has made clear that full normalization is contingent on a stable and comprehensive settlement in the South Caucasus. Third, external actors, particularly the European Union and the United States, should play a constructive, supportive role, encouraging transparency and providing incentives for sustained engagement without imposing rigid templates.
From a Turkish perspective, a stable, outward-looking Armenia is not only a diplomatic achievement but also a strategic asset. It would facilitate regional trade corridors, reinforce Türkiye’s leadership in the South Caucasus, and contribute to the long-term vision of a peaceful, interconnected Eurasia. For Armenia, normalization offers a path out of regional isolation and an opportunity to redefine its role in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
While the risks are real and the process remains vulnerable to setbacks, the current moment is arguably the most promising in decades. Transforming symbolic gestures into lasting peace will require patience, political courage, and a commitment to incrementalism over maximalism. If both sides can maintain this delicate balance, the Turkish-Armenian normalization process may finally deliver on its long-elusive promise – not only for Ankara and Yerevan, but also for the broader region, which seeks stability and prosperity.
