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Launch of a PAC-2 missile from a German Patriot battery.
Photo. Bundeswehr/Fischer
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Poland is the strongest NATO member on the Alliance’s Eastern flank, while Germany boasts the largest economy in NATO Europe. Both countries, however, are grappling with challenges in developing their defense capabilities. How do the Germans view Poland’s defence buildup?
Despite political disputes between the two states, cooperation is essential, as evidenced by Germany’s deployment of Patriots to support the logistics hub in Rzeszów on one hand, and Poland’s role in backing Lithuania, which hosts German troops under NATO auspices, on the other. It is worth emphasizing that although both nations have significant potential, each faces its own, and in some respects differing, problems in defence capability development.
An article recently published in Loyal, the journal of Germany’s reservists« association (with over 115,000 members), sheds light on Germany’s perception of Poland’s efforts. Titled „Zeitenwende auf Polnisch” („Epochal Change, Polish-Style”), it borrows the phrase used to describe post‑2022 Bundeswehr reforms—and the delays and issues attached to them. Its author, Björn Müller, is an experienced defence journalist.
He begins his discussion of Poland with a visit to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, symbolizing Poland’s historical experiences. He reminds readers that the Tomb consists of a surviving fragment of the Saxon Palace, the only part left standing after the Wehrmacht leveled Warsaw in 1944. Due to its history, Poland, though occupying a role similar to Germany’s during the Cold War, has chosen not to rely on mobile, flexible, armor‑based delaying tactics (as West Germany once did), but on a deep, layered defense incorporating extensive engineering works and very strong artillery, including rocket forces (eventually fielding some 800 launchers). This, Müller argues, is intended to prevent Russia from seizing ground in Poland. „Unlike in Germany, Poles do not fear war so much as a new Russian occupation,” he writes. Another difference he notes is that Poland is expanding the size of its armed forces far more dynamically than Germany, where troop levels have largely stagnated.
To explain how Poland is modernizing its military, the article extensively quotes Colonel Robert Frommholz, Deputy Head of Poland’s Armaments Agency (Agencja Uzbrojenia). Müller points out that the Agency’s headquarters is only a few minutes« walk from the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. According to Col. Frommholz, the key factor enabling Poland’s rapid modernization is the 2021 Homeland Defence Act—and the cross‑party consensus on the necessity of defense investment.
The Deputy Head of the Armament Agency also reminds readers that his body is managing roughly 450 contracts worth 550 billion PLN (about 128 billion EUR). He adds that the Agency’s biggest current challenge is staffing: it employs only around 600 people, despite the dramatic increase in its workload. Col. Frommholz also calls for greater understanding from auditors, since, in this high‑tempo environment, decisions must often be made quickly. By contrast, Müller notes, Germany’s procurement office for the Bundeswehr (also responsible for IT and support) has increased its staff from 9,000 to 11,800 in recent years.
The article addresses Poland’s accelerated purchases: necessary, for example, to replace equipment transferred to Ukraine, including tanks and artillery. Col. Frommholz also speaks of cooperation with Germany: he cites MTU engines used in Polish Jelcz vehicles, and suggests broader air‑defence collaboration. Poland could join Germany in acquiring Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T missiles through NATO’s NSPA agency, and could train German air-defense crews on the IBCS system, which will become a NATO standard. The largest joint programme, however, could be Poland’s Orka submarine project, though the General Staff is still debating whether the boats should be tactical torpedo‑armed submarines or more heavily armed cruise‑missile carriers. Col. Frommholz also highlights challenges in procuring drones—specifically, finding a procurement formula that avoids rapid technological obsolescence, which the standard acquisition cycle struggles to address.
The article includes a telling comparison of projected force-structure numbers for Poland, Germany, and France in 2035, based on open sources and analyses by France’s IFRI think tank. Warsaw is expected to field the largest inventory of land systems (1,600 tanks; 1,100 howitzers; 1,700 IFVs; and 850 MLRS launchers), whereas France and Germany would have, respectively, 415 and 200 tanks; 550 and 628 IFVs; 289 and 109 howitzers; and 76 and 26 rocket launchers. Unsurprisingly, the proportions shift for combat aircraft (160 in Poland; 178 in Germany; 225 in France) and transports (10 in Poland; 35 in France; 64 in Germany), as well as naval vessels. The article also warns that future defence force plans could be affected by disputes between Poland’s governing coalition and the incoming President, Karol Nawrocki.
Some Conclusions
A few comments are in order. First, this German‑language analysis is a valuable contribution to the Poland‑Germany defence cooperation debate. Despite political wrangling and differing priorities, NATO remains the bedrock of both nations« security, and joint efforts must continue. Second, the author has succinctly laid out Poland’s strategic imperatives and technical modernization paths. The equipment‑comparison table (excluding the details) suggests that Poland’s focus on land forces is in many ways complementary to France’s and Germany’s emphasis on air and naval domains. Notably, GEN Alex Grynkiewicz, soon to command NATO and U.S. forces in Europe, recently told Congress he would advise allies to avoid duplicating capabilities and instead build a complementary collective defence system. This points to potential for coordinated planning, without foregoing national requirements in given domains, but rather deciding where each should expand.
Homar‑K multiple‑rocket launcher during the Arcane Thunder 25 exercises in Ustka. Poland already has stronger artillery than Germany, while Germany will continue to field larger air and naval forces.
Photo. 16th Mechanized Division.
One aspect missing from Müller’s article is a deeper discussion of force‑generation challenges in Poland and Germany. True, Poland’s armed forces are growing far faster than Germany’s, and many more recruits undergo initial training.
But of the tens of thousands trained under Poland’s Voluntary Basic Military Service, only about 30 percent opt for specialized training, and there is no system to cultivate well‑trained reserves. Simply expanding the professional army will not solve this. Unlike Germany’s „Zeitsoldaten” contract soldiers, Poland lacks a comparable system to keep trained reservists „in the system.” One model worth examining is Germany’s Grundbeordnung (in force since 2021), which assigns each professional soldier leaving active service to a reserve role for six years: potentially producing 40–60 thousand well‑trained reservists. While this is modest given the demands of high‑intensity conflict, Poland’s post‑service mobilization assignments often do not match a veteran’s active‑duty specialty, limiting the effective use of their skills. Incidentally, Germany lost data on hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers after abolishing conscription, due in part to GDPR data deletions, but is now amending its regulations. Poland’s mobilization system exists on paper but functions poorly in practice.
Both in Poland and in Germany there is a debate about reintroducing a general obligation for military training. In Germany this is being discussed, more or less openly, by the Minister of Defense, the commanders of the armed forces, and one of the coalition parties (CDU/CSU).
The idea is less about copying the exact model of compulsory service that existed before and more about simply having the legal option to bring it back (in case volunteer recruitment falls short), rather than replicating previous structures. After all, the Bundeswehr does not, and in the near future will not, have the capacity to train, say, 50,000 young people. The coalition SPD is opposed to a universal training requirement (even though Defense Minister Boris Pistorius comes from its ranks, the majority of the party is against it). That is why, in practice, it will be difficult to implement.
Despite appearances, there is one major similarity in Poland: there is no political consensus in favor of compulsory training. Officially, both the military leadership and the Minister of Defence oppose it, arguing that it is unnecessary (and that there is no political will). Unofficially, however, many senior officers see advantages in certain forms of mandatory training, if only because you can demand more of participants when you don’t have to „prevent” dropouts or a lack of volunteers. In other words, should Poland introduce a training obligation, it would not be aimed at significantly increasing the number of people trained, but at systematizing and improving the quality of the training process. Yet, there is still no political agreement. Incidentally, more and more voices in the public debate are calling for compulsory training, but no decision has been made.
Paradoxically, then, it is not only Germany (as is widely noted on both sides of the Oder) but also Poland that is struggling with many challenges in building personnel capacity in their armed forces. In Germany, there are simply too few volunteers; in Poland, for various reasons, the level of training and the maintenance of reservist readiness is inadequate. In both countries, though for different reasons, there is a lack of bold decisions on personnel reserves. That said, their capabilities are complementary, and a mutual exchange of solutions could help fill gaps in each other’s potential. Consequently, cooperation, especially operational and training cooperation, should continue to be expanded, regardless of political upheavals.