I aim to explore the possibility of North Korea’s denuclearization during Mr. Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president. I argue that, if a comprehensive package deal ensuring regime survival is offered, North Korea may denuclearize. This is because North Korea’s nuclear program is not the goal itself, but the means of survival.

North Korea’s Survival

In order to discuss denuclearization, one needs to understand why nuclear weapons are of utmost importance to North Korea. The country’s priority has been regime survival. This term “survival” refers to more than just a continuation of the regime. It also means sustained economic development and prosperity in general. North Korea experienced an existential crisis in the mid-1990s, known as the Arduous March, marked by widespread famine and severe natural disasters. More fundamentally, because of the ongoing Korean War, which began in 1950 and ended with a ceasefire only in 1953, from North Korea’s point of view, it has been constantly threatened by South Korea and the U.S. South Korea, with an economy 60 times larger than North Korea’s and the fifth–strongest military in the world, has often expressed its intention of absorbing its Northern neighbor in the past. The U.S. still has 28,500 troops in South Korea. It even deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea for 33 years, from 1958 to 1991.

North Korea’s nuclear policy represents the country’s decisiveness to deal with its security and economic crisis that threaten the regime’s survival. The country will not give up its nuclear program unless its survival is ensured, and unless it is offered something that could compensate for all losses following denuclearization. North Korea’s nuclear program has several features: military (a powerful deterrent and spearhead for countering military imbalance), political (a key source of legitimacy and product of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s byungjin policy), and international values (a means to pursue a hostile foreign policy and decisive bargaining chip). Most importantly, it holds significant military value. 

Strategic Implications of Nuclear Weapons

A deterrent against potential attacks from the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear weapons have immense significance. Chairman Kim’s father and predecessor, then-Chairman Kim Jong-il, declared on 10 February 2005 that North Korea had acquired nuclear weapons. North Korea then conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the test was “entirely due to the U.S. nuclear threat and sanctions pressure.” Following the second test on 25 May 2009, North Korea described “the imperialist U.S.’ preemptive nuclear attack threat” as the reason for its test. On 21 April 2010, North Korea released its “Memorandum on the Korean Peninsula and Nuclear Weapons,” which clearly stated that the objective of nuclear weapons is to “deter invasions and attacks.” According to Chan Young Bang, an esteemed expert on North Korea, the country’s nuclear weapons serve exclusively as a measure of deterrence. They cannot work as a means of attacking the U.S. or conquering South Korea. The offensive use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, or any other country, is full of uncertainties. This observation is supported by others. For example, Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen state that North Korea would only use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against aggression from the U.S. and South Korea. Georgy Toloraya suggests that North Korea’s actual use of nuclear weapons is improbable. The only exception would be an all-out war, and this war has been deterred by the country’s nuclear program.

This logic has continued under Chairman Kim Jong-un. Following the third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that “responding to a nuclear threat [from the U.S.] with nuclear deterrence is an extremely natural self-defense measure.” Following the fourth test on 6 January 2016, North Korea used the phrase “the strongest nuclear deterrent.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then described “the U.S.’ nuclear threat and blackmail” as the reason for the country’s fifth test on 9 September 2016. Following its sixth test on 3 September 2017, North Korea declared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, “We have acquired the strongest nuclear deterrent capable of resolutely repelling any aggressor force anywhere on earth.”

Limitations of Conventional Weapons

A spearhead for countering military imbalance with the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear weapons work as a significant strategic asset. According to Los Alamos National Laboratory, the U.S. government organization established in 1943 with the single aim of creating atomic bombs, “nuclear weapons are cheaper to develop and to maintain than very large conventional force structures.” Therefore, when a country with a small economy and military disadvantage has security concerns, nuclear weapons can be the cheapest way to address them. A nuclear weapons program, by nature, is the most effective strategy for a weaker state to offset inferior military power against much stronger adversaries. For North Korea, it can be a cost-effective way to balance South Korea’s military power. James R. Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, shared this view when he testified to the Senate: “Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces […] its nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence.”

North Korea has been far behind the U.S. and South Korea in terms of overall military capabilities. As of 1990, North Korea was investing around 20 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) in the military sector, while its Southern neighbor was investing only 6 percent. In practice, however, South Korea’s economy grew rapidly from the 1970s to 1990s, allowing it to acquire superior weapons, with the U.S. continuously providing military aid to the country. Moreover, the First Gulf War in 1990-1991 demonstrated the U.S.’ high-tech military power and the weakness of North Korea’s military potential, with its old Soviet era weapons. It is reasonable to say that waning military capabilities led North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. In this 21st century, the imbalance of military power between North and South Korea (with the U.S.) has become much clearer. The U.S. is the strongest military power in the world, and South Korea is the fifth, while North Korea is the 34th. Thus, the strategic importance of North Korea’s nuclear program cannot be overstated.

Possibility of North Korea’s Denuclearization

North Korea cannot easily give up its nuclear weapons, which have the aforementioned military significance. Only when this significance is compensated for would the country be able to consider denuclearization.

At the first summit between the U.S. and North Korea, Chairman Kim reconfirmed his commitment to complete denuclearization, provided that President Trump committed to security guarantees for North Korea. Looking further back to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to cease its nuclear programs, provided that the U.S. and North Korea would move toward full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations. Thus, there are clear incentives that can be offered to Pyongyang, such as solid security guarantees and reciprocal economic measures. That means there is a possibility that North Korea could denuclearize if a comprehensive package deal ensuring regime survival is offered.

President Trump has indicated several times this year that he is willing to see Chairman Kim again: on the first day of his second presidency, three days later in January, in February, and in March. With the launch of the second Trump administration, collective wisdom from the relevant parties is needed to resolve the Korean conflict.

[Header image: Chairman Kim Jong-Un meets President Donald Trump in Singapore, June 12, 2018. Credit: Shealeah Craighead, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons]

The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the author.