Thai and Cambodian soldiers clashed on May 25, 2025, along the northeastern border of Thailand in the Chong Bok area, which resulted in one death on the Cambodian side. The reopening of the long-running border dispute has unleashed forces that have destabilized the Thai government and soured relations between Cambodia and Thailand, pushing to the fore two long-running and needed conjunctures in Thai politics. The future of the Shinawatra political dynasty and the dire need for reform of Thai politics.
Phone Calls and Betrayal: The Downfall of the Shinawatra Political Dynasty
On June 18, four days after both sides met in Phnom Penh in the Joint Border Committee, Senate President, former PM, and longtime statesman Hun Sen released a secretly recorded phone call between himself and Thai PM Paethongtarn Shinawatra. The phone conversation, while not necessarily incriminating, sparked deep controversy in the Thai body politic. The current conflict and mood are set to take down the 3rd Shinawatra Prime Minister and likely the Shinawatra political dynasty.
Immediately after the release of the secret recording, there were calls for the Thai PM to step down. Within 24 hours, the Bhumjaitai party, the second largest party in the coalition government, exited the coalition with its 69 MPs. A deft and politically savvy move on the part of party leader Anutin Charnveerakul. This left Puea Thai with a slim coalition majority of only 15 MPs. However, this was only the beginning of Thaksin and Puea Thai’s problems; an avalanche of worsening news was coming.
Hun Sen, over the next two weeks, continued posting on Facebook and X pictures of him and Paethongtarn and taking to social media to continue burning Thaksin to the ground. Following up on Hun Sen’s provocation, 36 senators filed allegations of breach of ethics and treason with the Constitutional Court. The court, in a unanimous decision, agreed to take up the case, and by a 7-2 majority, ordered the PM suspended from her duties as prime minister.
Thaksin and Puea Thai worked quickly to cobble together a new interim government, which was submitted to the king for endorsement. However, on the first day Parliament reconvened after the phone call, Parliament failed to reconvene due to lack of quorum.
The Crisis Spirals out of Control
In the aftermath of the parliamentary fiasco, events have moved at lightning speed to put Paethongtarn out of her purgatory and misery. Leaders of the People’s Party and Bhumjaithai met to discuss ways to avert a full-blown constitutional crisis. An unlikely deal may be on the horizon. The deal is unlikely in the sense that these two parties are diametrically opposed to one another in terms of philosophy, practice, and ideology. However, when interests converge, unlikely coalitions are possible.
The deal allegedly involves holding a vote of no confidence against the Puea Thai government or PM, installing Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnveerakul as interim prime minister for a period of 6 months to pass the already approved budget while carrying out constitutional reforms to be put to a referendum, after which fresh elections are to be held. It must be noted that at the time of writing, these are preliminary movements without confirmed and publicly accepted substance from any official parties.
Pathways Forward
It is highly unlikely that Thaksin will give up without being forced out. This is true for two reasons. Thaksin Shinawatra still has a royal defamation case over his head; Hun Sen openly stated Thaksin faked his illness to avoid jail after being allowed to return from exile.
Thaksin faces charges of royal defamation, Article 112, or lèse-majesté for alleged comments made to a reporter in 2015. Hun Sen on June 26 took to the stage and social media to allege that when he met Thaksin at his home after his triumphant return from exile, he faked his injuries. The first of these is the most serious and dangerous, as nearly no one emerges not convicted of 112. Furthermore, the issue of Thaksin faking his injuries to avoid jail, while an open secret, touches on royal insult, as he was granted a royal pardon to avoid serious jail time upon his return. Hun Sen, in the run-up to his June 26 speech, intimated that he had evidence of Thaksin disrespecting the Thai monarch. If this is true and he releases any evidence, Thaksin will not be safe, period. However, the truthfulness of the allegation and rumor is only that—rumors. Being in power is Thaksin’s only shield, and once this is gone, he is fully exposed to legal and political recourse.
Paethongtarn is the last Shinawatra who will assume high office. None of Thaksin’s children are interested in politics. Paethongtarn seems an unwitting participant in a larger political game of her father’s making, who never really intended for her to take the PM job. This only came about after Srettha Thavisin’s removal from office by the Constitutional Court for similar ethics violations one year previous. If his daughter is removed, which is highly likely, the future looks grim for Thaksin and Puea Thai.
At this point, Puea Thai is the head of an unruly coalition, and Thaksin is hostage to his own legal problems, greedy coalition partners, and a conservative elite that is again turning on him. The clock is ticking fast for the downfall of the Shinawatra dynasty.
Peeking Around the Corner
Thai politics is set for a major shakeup if Thaksin and his daughter are taken down. Puea Thai without Thaksin has no major backer with deep enough pockets and influence. Only Suriya Jungrungreungkit has the funds to continue funding the party. At present, Puea Thai’ popularity has plummeted to below 10%. In the next election, Puea Thai, due to its lack of performance and connivance to form a government in 2023, will face a serious backlash from voters and likely fall to a medium-sized party similar to Bhumjaithai currently or smaller.
Bhumjaitai is the only party of the right that is growing in influence and will benefit handsomely from Puea Thai’s demise. Anutin and Newin, Bhunjaithai’s leaders, are crafty politicians with a talent for ‘old style’ politics, which is still strong in Thai electoral politics. This is evidenced by Bhumjaitai sweeping the Senate election and excellent performance in local elections in 2024.
The two former generals’s parties are fading quickly and likely to disappear at the next polls or be relegated to inconsequence. Two large parties will emerge from the dust: Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party. Depending on the outcome of the next election and how well the People’s Party fares, the case against 44 MPs could be reactivated by the Constitutional Court to disqualify and overturn a People’s Party overperformance. Either way, Thai politics is set for turmoil and instability. But a new political landscape will emerge if and after Puea Thai’s fall from grace.
Conclusions
All of Thaksin’s enemies and persons he’s stabbed in the back, such as Khunying Sudarat Kedyurapan, have their knives out and are looking for final payback on the Boss. Current trends indicate a conservative push to deal Thaksin a final blow with possible reforms on the horizon. While Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party have seemed to agree in principle to midwife an orderly end to Thaksin and usher in some reforms, this analyst is highly skeptical of the depth and substance of any reform.
The Thai political elite over the previous 20 years have repeatedly hunkered down, doubling and tripling down on their losing tactics and policies. By making a deal with the devil, Thaksin, after the 2023 elections to keep the Move Forward party out of power, they only served to further discredit themselves and set the stage for another political crisis. They inadvertently ushered in the likely death march of their hated enemy, Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin, through his own actions, has now frittered away the usefulness that allowed his return.
Calls for reform are currently listened to and possibly allowed to avert a broader crisis and are welcome. I, for one, have zero faith, after watching and analyzing Thai politics, that the Thai elite can or would allow reforms that threaten their influence and power. Nonetheless, the immediate future will continue to deteriorate as Thaksin will not give up power. It is his last chance, only two years after his return from 15 years in exile. His daughter will have to be removed from office in disgrace. The only question here is, will they go into exile and join Yingluck or be allowed to stay under an agreement to finally stay out of politics? If past is precedent, the former will be true, and Thaksin will join his sister and daughter in disgraced exile.
The bigger questions that affect some 70 million Thais are, will Thailand finally embark on critically needed reforms of its political, economic, and bureaucratic systems, or will Thailand continue into its 3rd lost decade due to elite failure and intransigence? Having watched and analyzed Thai politics for the better part of two decades, one cannot help but be cynical and prep for another decade of stagnation. For all Thais, I hope to be proven wrong.