The Russian Template: How Moscow Packages Authoritarianism as Civilization

4 comments

1. I’ve received feedback on my [previous post](https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/1lqvtdy/the_template_war_why_ukraine_invasion_is_about/), and figured I’d glossed over the russian template. This essay is my attempt to expand on the way I understand russian political structure works, how and why it challenges existing world order. The core argument is that this isn’t just authoritarianism, but a specific, old, exportable template competing globally against liberal democratic models.

2. “The power vertical is not primarily an administrative structure, but a vertically integrated system of wealth extraction.”

   This is aptly put. Kudos.

3. the article is a very close description of what think in Kremlin, and it’s excellent, because no one combined observable Kremlin ideas in such straight a way.

   But if to get outside view on this as an actual phenomenon, few points.

   Ilyin and  Dugin are used by Putin, but Putin uses [Golden billion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_billion) concept far more often (started from 2004, just after Ukraine revolution via lectures to orginized by kremlin Nashi movement, and now, from 2019 used dozens of times, also Foreign Ministry is tasked to spread concept), in fact it’s even more revealing about resources, because Putin urges to defend resources. So Ilyin and  Dugin are not so central (and there are quite a few critical works on their actual influence)

   The whole story feels too deterministic in respect to ideas of rulers. Consider, for example growth of share for electric vehicles. There is high probability, new batteries (even cheaper, than now, and now cheapest are at $51 kWh – already competentive with gasoline) will eat a great share of oil use and also will be used more for storage of renewable energy in near future. There is somewhat less probable, still with high probability appearance in coming years of stable tandem silicon-perovskite solar cells with half the current price per kWh. if both tech revolutions indeed occure in 5-10 years, that will force Kremlin to change what is says and does. Or in the past – relatively isolated country with fur trade providing significant share of income (see wrong, but insightful Alexander Etkind book Internal colonisation on Russia trade with fur as a basis for historical russian authoritarianism) had some ‘material’ basis for what was observed in history, besides ideas.

   so while ideas really matter, they still not determine in full details russian history or even current russian rules actions. and a side note – not an imagenary ‘civilization’ is not only affected by oil/natural resources in general,but also by what is observed by sociologists ( [World values survey](https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp) ) – while each country has it’s own trajectory of change of values, they more or less move to common destination, so even if we assume, that batteries/solar panels won’t destroy current narrative in near future, in a long run (much shorter, than a time from Ivan the Terrible to now), changing culture of russians will undermine Kremlin narrative

4. IMO, insufficient attention is paid by both analysts and the broader press to the continuity of Russian quasi-feudalism over time. There’s a direct line from the Russian Empire’s system of administration (literal feudalism) to the USSR’s (quasi-feudalism; the Party took the place of the Emperor, but loyalty was still maintained by giving benefices and autonomy to powerful local administrators) to today’s Russia (essentially a return to feudalism writ large; see Kadyrov in Chechnya).

   In all feudal systems the social compact is essentially this: the authorities are out for their own self-aggrandizement, which is to be tolerated provided that they protect the locals from outside incursion. The locals are expected to submit, but generally aren’t asked to do all that much on behalf of the authorities other than defend the country if attacked. (But that’s usually in their own interests, anyway).

   What today’s Russia calls “civilization” is just repackaged feudalism. The alternative to feudalism is the return of the Tatar Yoke; the Russian state has never come close to a democratic or truly representative form of government that took public opinion into account. The real trick Putin and the authoritarians that came before him played is convincing Russians that there are only two options: authoritarian feudalism, or anarchy and the inevitable dismemberment of the state.

   That said, props for focusing on the historical aspect of it. Many analyses forget that the USSR did not fundamentally alter the social contract between the state and the people. Russia likes to pretend it possesses a unique national character forged as a result of it crossing the continents, but in reality this uniqueness is just a medieval throwback that has never been purged as it has everywhere else on the planet.

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