Recently, an international expert remarked at a conference that although only six months have passed since U.S. President Donald Trump’s second inauguration, it feels like six years. Since Trump’s election for a second term, the rest of the world has struggled to adapt to the rapid and sometimes unpredictable shifts in his administration’s foreign policy initiatives and actions.
There were proposals, genuine or facetious, to annex Greenland and Canada. There were demands for Europe to boost defense spending and pressure on Ukraine and Russia to negotiate a peace settlement. There have been trade negotiations accompanied by threats to increase “reciprocal tariffs.” Finally, the Trump administration has intervened militarily in the Middle East, launching air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Now, six months into Trump’s second term, multiple countries are likely anticipating — with apprehension as well as hope — the continued progression of Trump’s foreign policies and their long-term geopolitical impacts.
The Trump administration’s challenge is to balance multiple complex foreign policy issues and crises. Although the administration may express ambition to achieve all its foreign policy objectives, it will eventually be compelled to prioritize certain agendas. For example, Trump may need to calculate whether prioritizing immigration or trade policy will yield greater domestic political advantages in the upcoming U.S. midterm elections. Similarly, the administration may assess the likelihood of diplomatic success in mediating security conflicts in Europe or the Middle East, prioritizing the more achievable foreign policy “wins.”
For South Korea, this dilemma centers on whether it should hope the Korean Peninsula becomes a foreign policy priority for the Trump administration. Trump reportedly sent letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and expressed intentions to negotiate with South Korea over defense burden-sharing. However, security crises in Europe and the Middle East have thus far received greater attention and intervention. Should conflicts in other regions persist without resolution, the Korean Peninsula may be sidelined by the Trump administration. However, some analysts predict that foreign policy challenges elsewhere could incentivize Trump to seek diplomatic success by shifting his focus toward Northeast Asia.
South Korea has experienced frustration with past U.S. presidents like Obama and Biden, whose restrained policies toward North Korea have allowed it to continue expanding its nuclear capabilities and escalating hostilities toward regional neighbors. For some South Koreans, Trump’s assertiveness in diplomatic engagement with North Korea is perceived as a critical opportunity for a breakthrough in the geopolitical gridlock. With his characteristic risk-taking overtures (which may combine concessions and pressures on regional actors), Trump could be the “game changer” who transforms regional security dynamics.
For others, however, Trump’s potential intervention poses too great a risk. Trump may advance a deal with North Korea that could be disadvantageous to South Korea’s security and weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Alternatively, Trump’s confrontational measures toward a recalcitrant North Korea could exacerbate the regional crisis. Probably the biggest reservation is that the Trump administration could implement policies with North Korea (whether confrontational or conciliatory) without sufficient consultation with U.S. allies.
The Trump administration’s preoccupation with other international crises may be preferable for some South Koreans, as it could dissuade Trump from risking changes to the geopolitical status quo in another global region. Paradoxically, some South Koreans may prefer “strategic patience” toward the United States, waiting for a post-Trump presidency to resolve the Korean Peninsula’s security matters.
South Korea’s challenge is that it has limited leverage to influence Trump’s foreign policy. As experienced during Trump’s first term, even if the South Korean government succeeds in persuading the administration to resume proactive diplomacy with North Korea, sustaining that momentum will be difficult — not only due the nature of negotiations with North Korea but also because other international and domestic crises could divert Trump’s attention.
Conversely, some South Korean policymakers’ hopes for a relatively stable status quo on the Korean Peninsula could be disrupted if either Trump chooses to make the Korean Peninsula his foreign policy priority or North Korea’s heightened provocations force intervention.
These uncertainties, however, should not deter South Korea from strategizing its responses to the Trump administration’s potential reengagement with Korean Peninsula geopolitics. Specifically, South Korean politics must face its own domestic debate regarding the extent of geopolitical change it is willing to risk in collaboration with Trump’s foreign policy. Paradoxically, it is South Korea that may encounter a choice between a “big deal” or a “small deal” with the Trump administration.
The “small deal” would largely maintain the current security framework of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and continued commitment to North Korea’s eventual denuclearization. South Korea would likely make concessions on trade and defense spending, but would preserve a geopolitical environment with familiar security reassurances and vulnerabilities. In contrast, the “big deal” may require South Korea’s acquiescence to more drastic security transformations, including restructuring of the bilateral alliance and diplomatic normalization with nuclear-armed North Korea.
What the Trump administration will or should do in the Korean Peninsula is a relevant, yet at times frustrating question for South Koreans, who find it difficult to predict or influence the U.S. president. However, South Koreans can address the question, “How shall we respond?” Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea, successive South Korean governments have engaged in spirited, even contentious bargaining with their U.S. counterparts, shaping the trajectory of contemporary South Korean history. Though Korea may struggle to determine its geopolitical destiny on its own, I express a sober yet reassuring observation that Korea’s destiny also can’t be determined in the absence of Korean involvement.
Lee Jong-eun is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.