Netanyahu Crosses Global Red Lines to Reshape Gaza and West Asia Order

“If we have to stand alone, we will stand alone. If we need to, we will fight with our fingernails,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted in May 2024. In the weeks prior, the Israeli premier faced global pressure to discontinue military operations in Gaza’s Rafah where over a million displaced Palestinian Gazans sheltered.

The then US President, Joe Biden, had threatened to stop arms deliveries to Israel should it proceed, and eight months into the war, which began in October 2023, negotiations for a ceasefire/hostage release between Israel and Hamas remained stalled. It is now eminently clear that in April/May of 2024, Netanyahu refrained from presenting a deal to his far-right coalition partners, which had the effect of preserving his government. As such, despite global pressure and President Biden’s stated red lines, Israel attacked Rafah on May 6, 2024.

In the 14 months since May 2024, Israel has fought a limited war with Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, conducted bombing campaigns in Yemen, and—more significantly—engaged in a direct 12-day war with Iran, its principal regional adversary, while Tehran was in the midst of talks on a nuclear deal with Washington. Israel’s unprecedented tactical military successes in the region, especially in Lebanon, also catalysed a watershed development in neighbouring Syria: a coalition of rebel and jihadist groups coordinated an offensive to end the Assad regime’s 48-year rule—an outcome that belligerents in Syria’s civil war had sought for 13 years, but which was achieved in the 12 days from November 27, 2024 to December 8, 2024.

In Gaza, the death toll from Israel’s grossly disproportionate response to the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack now stands at over 50,000, with the entirety of the Strip facing starvation as Israel blocks international aid deliveries—even killing Palestinians, including children and women, lining up for aid. The WHO estimates that about 94 per cent of Gaza’s medical infrastructure has been destroyed or damaged, and Israel presently faces the charge of genocide at the International Court of Justice.

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Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, has maintained since January 2024 that Israel’s actions in Gaza bear the characteristics of genocide. At no point in the past 20 months has Israel truly “fought with its fingernails”, with US military sales to Israel since October 2023 having crossed $20 billion.

Netanyahu’s gambit

In November 2022, Netanyahu stitched together a coalition of Israel’s extreme far-right parties—some of whom he himself had vehemently opposed in the past—to become Prime Minister for the third time. Outside of office, Netanyahu was facing a criminal trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. His premiership served as an influential cover, but it also meant that Netanyahu would now have to both align with and own far-right policy positions, especially pertaining to the occupied Palestinian territories, irrespective of the international cost.

Netanyahu’s penchant for adopting far-right objectives was tested less than a year later, when Hamas attacked southern Israel, across the border from Israel-controlled Gaza, killing 1,200 Israelis and taking 251 hostages. Far from bringing an end to his political career as many reasonably speculated, Netanyahu leveraged the war into an instrument of political convenience—entrenching Israel’s resolve to expand and prolong the war even in the face of international and domestic criticism.

Staying in office is crucial for Netanyahu to retain indirect influence over the the outcome of his trial. This, in turn, has implied an unwavering deference to his far-right partners, the likes of Bezalel Smotrich (Religious Zionist Party) and Itamar Ben-Gvir (Otzma Yehudit). Continuing the war also enables Netanyahu’s government to make a more forceful case against attempts to dissolve the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) and the calls for early elections.

In February 2024, as anti-government protests rocked Israel, Netanyahu spelled out his wartime reasoning: “The last thing we need right now are elections and dealing with elections, since it will immediately divide us.” Despite even larger protests and trade union strikes later in the year, Netanyahu’s reasoning remained and was reiterated afresh the day before Israel launched its war on Iran, when his government survived an opposition bid to dissolve the Knesset.

Almost all of Israel’s fresh wars, amid its bombardment of Gaza, have been initiated despite seeming US resistance. Similar to its Rafah operation in May 2024, both Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and its 12-day war with Iran in June 2025 were initiated against US warnings. But invariably, the US has ignored the boundaries it had previously set and has retroactively justified, defended, and owned Israel’s actions.

For instance, in January 2025, it was evident that President Donald Trump, Israel’s “best friend in the White House” in Netanyahu’s words, had put great store by his promise to implement a ceasefire in Gaza when elected. Netanyahu’s eventual acceptance of a three-phased ceasefire in January 2025 triggered immediate political risks for him, with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir leaving his government, and reducing Netanyahu’s parliamentary majority to an even thinner margin.

Just over a month later, however, the Israeli Prime Minister forced a change in the terms of the ceasefire, which was found unacceptable by Hamas—giving Israel an excuse to breach the agreement and resume fighting on March 18. Abroad, the US and major European states defended Israel’s actions, blaming Hamas for the ceasefire’s collapse, and at home, Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit party rejoined Netanyahu’s coalition on the same day.

Essentially then, the Israeli government has crafted an approach to ensure the sustenance of its war efforts under Netanyahu. It makes soft commitments to both the US and Europe under pressure, but Netanyahu weighs the risks of concessions internationally against domestic political costs, prioritises the latter, and undertakes military actions that ultimately test the West’s commitments to Israeli security—with these states eventually accepting the fait accompli presented by Israel.

While this approach strains the limits of Israel’s relationship with both the US, to a larger degree, and Europe, to a lesser degree, the domestic benefits for Netanyahu are great. More than just surviving, Netanyahu has gained support among Israelis as recent polls show. With a weak Israeli opposition, led by Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party, in the Knesset and parliamentary elections set to be held only by October 2026, the only real threat to Netanyahu remains the potential for far-right parties quitting his coalition, a domestic risk to avoid which he undertakes seemingly endless diplomatic adventurism. Already, Netanyahu’s government commands a wafer thin majority in the Knesset, with his ultra-orthodox partners, United Torah Judaism and Shas, having exited the government in protest against mandatory military conscription for Haredi Jews, with Shas in the coalition, but outside the government.

How the region has changed

Israel’s objectives in Palestine have only broadened in the past 20 months since it launched the war. While the Knesset voted last July against the possibility of allowing a Palestinian state to exist, the Israel Defense Forces (especially since March 2025) seem geared towards a permanent illegal occupation of the Gaza Strip. Several Israeli leaders also seek to restore Israeli settlements in Gaza, which were withdrawn by former Israeli premier Ariel Sharon in 2005—a move over which Netanyahu had quit Sharon’s government.

Netanyahu’s far-right allies have long sought a reversal of Sharon’s actions, and Israel’s ongoing military offensive allows them to press harder for this objective. In fact, the question over the “day after” in Gaza has long caused discord between Netanyahu’s far-right maximalist political objectives and the aims of the Israeli military establishment, which suspects their viability. But it has not sparked a civil-military dispute of any real substance thus far.

However, the more significant friction that has failed to ignite any spark is elsewhere: in Israel’s relationships with the Arab states. The Arab armies, which fought three full-scale wars with Israel in the past, have remained in their barracks throughout Israel’s destruction of Gaza. In fact, there has been no question of Arab military intervention against Israel’s actions in Palestine. Rather, in May 2024, as reported by The New York Times, Saudi Arabia was willing to normalise ties with Israel if it halted the Gaza war and agreed “in principle” to a Palestinian state (among other conditions). Saudi Arabia would have joined the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, which normalised their own relationships with Israel in 2020 as part of the Trump-brokered “Abraham Accords”.

The Arab states, led by the powerhouses of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, continue to desire regional stability, which can empower their bid for economic diversification and attract greater Western investments. In any case, since 2002, they have been willing to recognise Israel in return for the latter’s recognition of a Palestinian state based on its pre-1967 borders.

This effort was buoyed by the new leaderships in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which prioritise extricating their states from regional conflicts. This Arab reasoning has been further evident since March 2023, as most Gulf states eased their ties with Iran.

While this Arab-Iran rapprochement was severely tested in April 2024 (when the Gulf states aided Israel’s air defence against Iranian missiles), it was reinforced by a change in the Arab position on Gaza by late 2024. By then, the Arab states both accepted and amplified the characterisation of Israel’s actions in Gaza as a genocide and called for Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty. During the Israel-Iran 12-day war in June this year, the Arab states refrained from committing to either side, despite strong rhetorical support for Iran.

In fact, Israel’s targeting of Iranian nuclear sites only increased Arab unease, given their own push for civilian nuclear energy. Before 2023, the principal threat to Arab energy infrastructure came from Iran and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, whose civil war Saudi Arabia is now focussed on disengaging from. If Israel’s actions are normalised, its net effect on Arab long-term energy security will be negative.

Israel’s weakening of Iran’s conventional and nuclear capabilities (and decimating its senior military leadership) occurred on the back of Israel having already reordered the region through its military superiority over several months. While this should theoretically put the Arab nations at ease, it arguably does the opposite.

As Vali Nasr, Professor at Johns Hopkins University, indicates, West Asia today resembles Bismarckian Europe with multiple centres of power that coalesce to balance against any one centre that begins to dominate, as the system prefers balance. Despite Iran’s weakness, Israel’s unchecked military domination of the region is loaded with unanticipated risks for the Arab states. For them, unlike a decade ago when their relationship with Iran was at its nadir, Tehran today has already been weakened to a point where greater engagement is in mutual interest.

It is of no small consequence that despite an event that Iran’s leaders have forewarned against for decades since 1979—an Israeli and American attack on Iranian soil—Iran still leaves room for continued negotiations with the US, even if with a hardened bargaining posture. Apart from the weakness of its proxies, Iran’s abject economic conditions create an enduring imperative for sanctions relief, with the country’s leadership adopting “strategic patience” with Israel and the US.

More importantly for both Arab states and Israel, the new de facto government in Syria creates a fresh space to reduce Iran’s regional influence. There are few better indicators of Arab states prioritising their own economic interests than the fact that Ahmed al-Sharaa, a jihadist-leader turned Syrian President, looks to potentially normalise relations with Israel with Arab and Turkish backing.

That Israel’s near-complete elimination of Syria’s conventional military capabilities and its expanded occupation of Syrian territory, since December, has failed to trigger any criticism from al-Sharaa shows a new modus vivendi between the two hostile nations. Yet, Israel’s continued military aggression in Syria both hinders the latter’s path to stability and national consolidation, and is the same military dominance that fuels the anxieties of other Arab states and continues the instability in the Levant.

What now for Israel and West Asia

On the eve of October 2023, Israel was already in a favourable geopolitical environment, given its deepening ties with the Arab states; a larger geopolitical reward was also in the offing with the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which relies on the Israel-Jordan border as its cornerstone. Among other things, the corridor would theoretically displace Türkiye as the key bridge between Asia and Europe.

In Israel’s neighbourhood, Hezbollah, its most potent non-state adversary, was dealing with increasing domestic challenges, while Syria’s Bashar al-Assad was focussed more on his re-entry into the Arab fold, even risking irking Iran. The Islamic Republic itself was dealing with economic challenges, which Iran’s former hardliner President, Ebrahim Raisi, was failing to tackle.

But Hamas’ attack and Israel’s wars in multiple states since have led to a snowballing of tactical and strategic objectives that Israel sought to achieve—driven more by opportunity and a lack of restraint than long-term planning.

Notwithstanding the fresh tests in the Arab-Israel relationship, Israel has sought to secure gains for itself in situations that would otherwise present fresh challenges. In Syria, Israeli leaders had long preferred to tolerate the Assad regime over the jihadist groups spearheading the rebel camp during Syria’s civil war. With the latter having prevailed through a lightning offensive, Israel now looks to assert itself over Syria and remove Al-Sharaa’s room to manoeuvre.

In Lebanon, Israel has kept up its sustained violations of the ceasefire with Hezbollah, gaining an unprecedented advantage after eliminating Hezbollah’s senior leadership. With Iran’s supply routes to Hezbollah cut off, Israel is now likely to press the Lebanese leadership to rein in the resistance group further, while continuing its own attacks on Hezbollah targets.

Similarly, Israel’s war against Iran ended without the former meeting either of its two maximalist objectives: the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear enrichment infrastructure or “regime change”. However, these are long-term goals crucial to Israel’s vision of West Asia. In fact, achieving neither leaves room for Israel to undertake similar attacks in future, with a new dangerously tempting template of stand-off warfare now being in place.

Apart from President Trump’s strong and public push for a ceasefire, his preference for a nuclear deal with Iran remains. Iran itself seemingly wishes to keep the path to diplomacy open—a position it maintained even during the war with Israel (if Israel stood down). Notwithstanding Iran’s ultimate decision on resuming nuclear negotiations in future, its position revealed how strong the country’s economic imperatives are.

However, any kind of a deal, short of a “Libya-style” arrangement (in Netanyahu’s words) which strips Iran’s enrichment capabilities by force, would be unacceptable to Israel in the long term. While this leaves room for future Israeli strikes against the “head of the octopus”, it is Gaza where Israel’s immediate priorities lie. Israel’s expansion of settlements in the occupied territories and greater control over Gaza meets the larger goal of removing the physical space for a Palestinian state.

Israel’s “concession” (for lack of a better term) to the US on Iran has evidently created expectations of greater US support for Israel in Gaza. President Trump continues to press for a ceasefire deal in Gaza, even supplementing it with expressions of support for Netanyahu in Israel’s internal politics; in late June, Trump called Netanyahu’s corruption trial a “witch hunt”. But enforcing a fresh ceasefire in Gaza would be contingent on two contradictory aspects for Netanyahu’s far-right partners to accept it: the deal would have to ensure greater Israeli control of the Strip and more US support for Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian territories. But the opposite—an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, including from the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridors—would be necessary for Hamas to accept it.

The former is plausible. During his first term, Trump was responsible for unprecedented changes to US policy in Palestine: recognising undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the occupied Golan Heights as part of Israeli territory, moving the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and undoing legacy US policy of considering Israeli settlements in occupied territory illegal, among others.

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But pushing for greater Israeli control of Gaza makes it impossible for Hamas to accept the ceasefire, and a Hamas rejection would mean that Israel would continue its destructive military campaign. More importantly, the Arab states themselves remain unclear about their position on Hamas’ future. No party has found a middle path acceptable to both Israel and Hamas, both of whom call for the other’s total elimination from Gaza.

Arguably, Netanyahu hopes that Israel’s continuing war of attrition in Gaza will yield yet another fait accompli that the world will have to accept. In this case, the key yardstick to measure the success of Israel’s strategy would be less dependent on the US and Europe and more on the Arab states. Should Israeli and American diplomacy succeed in securing an agreement to normalise Israel-Saudi Arabia ties without recognising a Palestinian state, it would represent Netanyahu’s strongest victory yet—possibly even prolonging his political career post October 2026.

Israel presently looks to gain short-term peace through brute force and a decimation of the rules-based international order. However, the scale of Israel’s devastation in Gaza and its continued expansion of illegally occupied territory in Palestine and Syria will inevitably deepen the original fault lines of the region, which led to October 7, 2023—creating greater long-term threats for regional stability. 

Bashir Ali Abbas is a Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi, and a South Asia Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington, DC. The views expressed are strictly his own.