Central Asia has become one of the most vulnerable regions of the world in terms of water security due to both natural conditions and historical interventions. The recently published U.N. World Water Development Report (2025) defines the region as “one of the landmasses feeling the impacts of climate change on water resources most intensely.”
According to the report, glaciers in high mountainous areas, considered to be the water towers of Central Asia, such as the God Mountains and the Altai, are melting at a rate much faster than global averages. For example, the Chungar Alatau glacier area in Kazakhstan has shrunk by nearly 50% since 1956, while the volume of glaciers feeding the Almaty and Balkhash basins has decreased by more than 30% since the 20th century. These rapid ice melts not only destabilize river flows seasonally, but also pose lasting risks to agriculture, energy, drinking water and ecosystem services.
U.N. officials emphasize that flow instability in the region is directly linked to climate change-induced glacier loss and snow cover change. If ongoing trends continue, more than 50% of the current volume of glaciers in the region could be lost by 2100.
The impact of climate change is exacerbated by Soviet water management policies that have historically marked the region. Massive irrigation projects were carried out, and infrastructure was built, such as the Karakum Canal, mega dams and large pumping systems, during the Soviet Union to increase cotton production irreversibly disrupted the region’s water cycle.
Excessive water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Sir Darya rivers resulted in their inability to reach the Aral Sea, which dried up by 92%, reduced its surface area by 88% and increased its salinity by 20 times. This problem is a trigger for mass migration, loss of livelihoods, soil salinisation and public health crises.
The rural communities of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan around the Aral have left the region en masse due to unproductive soils and polluted water sources. Drought, soil degradation and declining agricultural productivity are still among the main causes of internal migration and labour migration out of the region in many countries, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The centralized water management model established by the Soviets encouraged inefficient consumption rather than planned distribution of water, resulting in massive water losses, energy waste and environmental degeneration. The Central Asian states, which gained their independence in 1991, struggled to balance this inherited infrastructure system with their national development goals, and the lack of common water management mechanisms further increased regional fragility.
Today, climate change and the structural legacy of the post-Soviet era have combined to create a multilayered water crisis. Existing irrigation systems cause more than 50% water loss, 72% of water is overexploited in agriculture, and there are serious shortages in energy and drinking water supply. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and U.N. reports, up to 5 million people in Central Asia may be exposed to climate-induced internal migration movements by 2050.
Implications of water scarcity
Water resources in Central Asia have strategic importance in terms of both environmental sustainability and geopolitical competition. Water sharing among the countries in the region is mainly shaped by the differences in geographical location and economic needs. Upstream, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan utilize water for energy production and see these resources as indispensable for national development through hydroelectric power plants. In contrast, the downstream countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are vitally dependent on the same resources for food production and drinking water supply.
This asymmetrical dependence lends water resources geopolitical value, and the control of water can at times become a negotiating tool, economic leverage or security risk. Indeed, border-water disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which started in 2014, evolved into a military conflict in 2021 and a bloody security crisis in 2022, in which many people lost their lives. These incidents clearly show that water-based disputes can trigger regional fragilities and turn into severe security challenges.
Moreover, this situation is not limited to the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan line. A similar territorial water tension was also experienced between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2016. These cases reveal that regional countries’ demands for control over transboundary waters are fuelled not only by technical or environmental concerns, but also by the quest for national sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
Increasing water scarcity and the intensification of competition over these resources with climate change make Central Asia’s water geopolitics a security issue. Therefore, it has become imperative to adopt a comprehensive approach to ensure regional peace and economic stability. In this context, water is considered both an area of vulnerability that poses a risk of conflict and a strategic opportunity that can be transformed through deepened cooperation.
Sustainable water diplomacy
In Central Asia, the water issue is being redefined as an environmental, geopolitical, economic and social responsibility. In this context, the steps taken by the states in the region to transform their past competition and security-based approaches into diplomatic dialogue and cooperation-based frameworks constitute a promising ground for the future of water diplomacy.
In particular, the year 2025 stands out as a turning point where this transformation materializes. The trilateral border demarcation agreement signed between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and the “Declaration of Eternal Friendship (Hujand Declaration)” have been indicative of a consensus of understanding that covers not only border disputes but also fundamental issues such as sharing of water resources, access to hydroelectric infrastructures and management of energy-water balance.
These developments have demonstrated that water-based regional cooperation in Central Asia is evolving along the axis of post-conflict confidence-building and environmental peace diplomacy. However, the potential for regional cooperation to take on a permanent and institutionalized structure depends on the coordination of multilateral efforts. At this point, the EU-led “Team Europe Initiative,” the Asian Development Bank’s “From Glaciers to Farms” program and the World Bank-supported Kambarata-1 Hydroelectric Power Plant Project are important steps toward the integration of environmental governance and sustainable energy-water cycle at the international level.
However, three main structural challenges limit the effectiveness of this external support: lack of alignment of national strategic priorities, institutional capacity deficiencies, and data sharing and transparency issues. To overcome these challenges, the mandates of regional water management institutions (such as the International Centre for Water Cooperation) need to be expanded, inclusive representation models that integrate the energy and environment sectors need to be developed, and water diplomacy needs to be integrated with technical expertise. At the same time, harmonizing water policies in Central Asia with the EU’s Green Deal and Sustainable Water Investments strategy could facilitate the integration of the countries of the region into international norms.
