Strategic convergence between South Korea and Australia is accelerating, but defence industrial cooperation remains underdeveloped. In an era of geoeconomic fragmentation, supply chain vulnerabilities and rising strategic uncertainty, Seoul and Canberra have both the capacity and the imperative to build a resilient, complementary defence industrial partnership.
South Korea has rapidly matured into one of the world’s leading arms exporters, backed by a highly capable manufacturing base, proven platforms and a track record of delivering on time and at scale. Australia, for its part, is pursuing a generational defence transformation. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review emphasised the need for greater self-reliance, advanced capabilities and regional deterrence. Those goals that cannot be achieved without strong industrial partnerships.
This is where South Korea fits in. Its defence equipment, including the K9 self-propelled howitzer already being assembled in Geelong, offer proven performance, interoperability with Western systems and cost-effectiveness. More importantly, Seoul has demonstrated willingness to localise production, transfer technology and support customers’ domestic capability development. These principles align with Canberra’s defence industrial ambitions.
But cooperation should not be limited to acquisitions. Australia and South Korea can and should move towards joint research and development, co-production of critical components (particularly in guided weapons and explosive ordnance) and collaborative innovation in emerging technologies such as autonomous systems, cyber defence and space-based capabilities.
Closer cooperation would also serve broader strategic ends. Both countries are middle powers committed to a rules-based regional order and increasingly exposed to the pressures of great-power competition. By strengthening bilateral defence industrial ties, they can reduce dependence on single suppliers, enhance supply chain resilience and increase strategic autonomy without undermining existing ties such as AUKUS or the US alliance system.
This matters not just for capability but for deterrence. A defence partnership underpinned by industrial cooperation enhances not only military preparedness but also political signalling. It demonstrates that South Korea and Australia are prepared to invest in regional security through tangible, long-term commitments, not just joint statements or episodic exercises. It also provides a foundation for deeper operational cooperation across the maritime domain, for example through joint patrols or logistics support and naval maintenance.
There are, of course, obstacles. Regulatory hurdles, intellectual property sensitivities and differing export control regimes need to be addressed. Coordinating with third parties—especially the United States—on technology transfer and integration will require careful diplomacy. But these are manageable challenges if political will aligns.
Encouragingly, the signs are positive. The Hanwha-led K9 program in Australia has shown that South Korean companies are willing to invest locally, and that Canberra is open to deep industrial integration with partners beyond its traditional allies. As Australia considers options to expand its missile and munitions production under the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, South Korean firms such as LIG Nex1 and Hanwha could become key partners—and not just as suppliers, but as co-developers.
There’s also scope to expand cooperation in warships. South Korea’s shipbuilding capacity, including its Aegis destroyers and next-generation frigates, could support Australia’s naval buildup—especially as domestic programs face cost and schedule pressures. At a minimum, South Korea could serve as a regional maintenance, repair and overhaul hub for allied fleets operating in northeast and Southeast Asia.
As both countries seek to shape the regional order, defence industrial cooperation can serve as a foundation for long-term strategic alignment. It would help operationalise the comprehensive strategic partnership, signed in 2021, add economic depth to the security relationship, and reinforce a networked approach to Indo-Pacific security.
South Korea and Australia may not share borders, but they share a strategic horizon. As trusted, capable and forward-looking democracies, their ability to co-create defence capabilities will be a critical measure of their regional relevance. It’s time to move from procurement to partnership, and from aligned interests to shared capabilities.