U.S. soldiers from the 11th Engineer Battalion and 2nd Infantry Combined Division participate in a joint river-crossing exercise with South Korean 5th Corps Engineer Brigade soldiers as part of the Freedom Shield 25 training exercise, in Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi province, South Korea, in March. File photo by Eon Heon-Kyun/EPA

Aug. 1 (UPI) — The alliance between the Republic of Korea and United States is one of America’s most enduring and strategically significant security relationships.

It is not merely a legacy of the Korean War, but a linchpin of U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific and a critical component of the rules-based international order.

The ROK/U.S. alliance must be understood not simply as a bilateral military arrangement, but as a global comprehensive strategic alliance — a strategic agility platform for integrated defense, deterrence, regional stability and global influence.

As reported in the Chosun Ilbo, “on July 24, the U.S. Department of State signaled a formal shift in the trajectory of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.” Discussions are to begin on what the Trump Administration is calling “alliance modernization.” The is wise, important, and necessary. The alliance must modernize for the 21st century and build on the successes of the last seven decades.

To begin this process, we should recognize our alliance partner: The Republic of Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, is now a major partner in the arsenal of democracies and is like-minded with the United States and allies in the pursuit of a free, open, secure, stable and prosperous Asia-Indo-Pacific.

What are we trying to achieve in Korea?

At the heart of U.S. interests in Korea is the pursuit of a durable peace, deterrence of conflict and the protection of a vibrant liberal democracy that serves as a model for the region and the world.

The United States and South Korea seek to prevent war, maintain stability and, ultimately, support conditions for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula under a free and democratic system.

The alliance also enables both nations to project influence and uphold a free and open Asia-Indo-Pacific, resisting coercive authoritarian revisionism led by China and supported by North Korea and Russia.

The goal is not simply to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack. It is to shape the strategic environment in ways that promote liberal values, deter aggression and ensure prosperity across the region — and most importantly, to solve the “Korea question,” which is the unnatural division of the peninsula as outlined in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

This cannot be achieved by offshore balancing or episodic engagement. It requires a consistent, credible and forward-stationed U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula.

Why a forward U.S. military presence matters

The “tyranny of distance” remains a central challenge in the Asia-Indo-Pacific theater. Korea provides the United States with a strategic agility platform, a base from which U.S. and ROK forces can respond rapidly across Northeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait and even Southeast Asia. With North Korea’s continued hostility and China’s growing aggression, the ability to project force, reassure allies and deter adversaries hinges on proximity and presence.

The ROK’s geographic position offers a unique vantage point, only 300 miles from Beijing and Vladivostok. U.S. forces in Korea are not only positioned to deter a resumption of a second Korean War, but also to reinforce allies and partners such as Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines in a broader crisis. The alliance is thus a force multiplier for U.S. strategy in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, anchoring regional deterrence and amplifying American influence.

The Kim regime’s enduring strategy

Do we believe Kim Jong-un has abandoned his seven-decade strategy of subversion, coercion and force to achieve unification under his rule? The answer is unequivocally no.

His so-called “charm offensives” and nuclear brinkmanship are tactical tools in service of a strategic goal: to split the ROK/U.S. alliance, evict U.S. forces from the peninsula and eventually absorb the South. His recent declaration ending the policy of peaceful unification reveals the regime’s clarity: there is no intent to reform or co-exist, only to conquer.

The United States must not fall for illusions of detente. Rather, Washington must recognize that Kim remains committed to driving a wedge between the allies. However, his greatest vulnerability lies in his fear of an informed population and his inability to compete with South Korea’s political legitimacy, economic dynamism and cultural influence.

A durable political arrangement: unity against tyranny

A fundamental question the alliance must answer is: What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that protects U.S. and ROK interests on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

The answer lies not in appeasement or abandonment, but in preserving a strong, modernized alliance, grounded in shared democratic values and mutual security interests. This includes continuing to support the long-term vision of a free and unified Korea, as outlined in the ROK’s 8.15 Unification Doctrine, and ensuring the alliance is resilient to political shifts in Seoul, Washington, Beijing or Pyongyang.

Such an arrangement requires recognizing that change must come from within in North Korea, catalyzed by the Korean people themselves. Kim Jong-un fears the Korean people, armed with knowledge and information, far more than he fears foreign military power.

Thus, the alliance must blend hard power with information and psychological operations that empower the Korean people in the north and disrupt the regime’s control so that new leadership can emerge that will seek a free and unified Korea.

Force optimization for a global alliance

The right question now is: How do we optimize our combined force posture to support this global strategic alliance?

The answer lies in modernizing rather than simply seeking to reduce our presence. However, more capable force with a small footprint could result from modernization. Effectiveness is not measured in mere troop numbers. The force must evolve to meet new domains of conflict, cyber, space and information, but it must remain forward-stationed, combat-ready and deeply integrated with ROK forces.

This includes enhancing multi-domain operations, joint command and control, and combined rapid response capabilities. In addition, the alliance should consider returning U.S. forces to combat patrolling on the DMZ fully integrated into ROK frontline commands. Proposals to reduce or withdraw U.S. troops only embolden adversaries and shake allied confidence.

Rather than cut forces, we should focus on increasing interoperability, joint training and technological integration. We must invest in capabilities that enable swift deployment across the region, from defense of the Korean Peninsula to response in a Taiwan contingency. The ROK/U.S. alliance should be seen not just as a peninsula-focused alliance, but as a pillar of Asia-Indo-Pacific security.

Perception equals commitment

Any perception of U.S. disengagement is dangerous. History shows that U.S. presence deters conflict and absence invites aggression. As the Chosun Ilbo recently reported, calls to reduce troop levels in Korea, whether driven by isolationism or budget constraints, would be a gift to Pyongyang and Beijing. They would interpret it as a collapse of American will. Do not repeat the 1950 Acheson mistake.

After the debacle of the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021, questions remain as to U.S. commitments. To abandon the ROK or to present ambiguity about its commitment would erode deterrence, weaken regional stability and signal to other allies that American support is conditional and transactional. This must never happen.

Conclusion: no retreat, full commitment

The United States must reaffirm, through word and deed, its ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea along with the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as the only path to denuclearization. But more than that, we must harness the alliance as a strategic platform for promoting freedom, security and prosperity across the Asia-Indo-Pacific.

To modernize the alliance, we must begin by answering the right questions: What are our goals? What kind of peace are we building? Who and what are the real threats? What strategy are our adversaries pursuing? And how do we align our combined military and diplomatic posture accordingly?

The alliance is not a legacy. It is a living, vital, strategic instrument of American power and democratic purpose. We must never abandon it. We must optimize it, for the United States, for Korea, for Asia and for the future of the free world.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.