Eastern Shield also on the border with Lithuania [OPINION]

Exercises for testing the elements of the “Eastern Shield” took place at the Orzysz training ground.

Photo. Polish Ministry of Defence

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Eastern Shield is a flagship operation to strengthen our border with Russia and Belarus, but also to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. For Poland, it not only involves engineering and land development, but also ensures the mobility of NATO forces. As part of force projection, these forces will move, among other places, through the Suwałki Gap, the only land route connecting Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with other NATO member states. This means that this area must be protected in peacetime and prepared for the possible redeployment of troops. Terrain and Infrastructure The Polish-Lithuanian border is 104 kilometers long, but the straight-line distance between its extreme points is approximately 65 kilometers. The Polish-Lithuanian border comprises the East Suwałki Lake District and part of the Augustów Plain, bordering the Lithuanian Lake District to the east. 

The East Suwałki Lake District is a region with a highly varied topography. The lake district is home to numerous moraine hills. Terminal moraine ridges, kames, drumlins, eskers, and very deep troughs (the troughs of the Hańcza and other rivers) with few roads limit military movement. 

The Augustów Plain is a vast outwash plain, rising near Suwałki at an elevation of approximately 190 meters above sea level and dropping to approximately 120 meters above sea level near Augustów. The flat surface of the outwash plain is punctuated by the meltwater basins of numerous lakes. The largest of these are Lakes Wigry and Necko. The Augustów Forest occupies most of the plain. A significant feature of the landscape is the Augustów Canal, which connects the surrounding lakes and the Vistula and Neman river basins. 

The topographically diverse Suwałki Isthmus region is essentially limited by two national roads: the E67 Suwałki-Budzisko road (part of the S61 expressway) and the No. 16 Augustów-Ogrodniki road, which is scheduled for modernization in the future. 

Rail transport is limited to a single, single-track, non-electrified railway line, which will eventually form part of the trans-European Rail Baltica corridor connecting Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and, in the longer term, Finland. 

In addition, several local roads lead to the Lithuanian border, between hills, lakes, and narrow isthmuses. Unfortunately, the condition of these roads, as well as the bridges over the canals and rivers, indicate that the permissible vehicle weight is limited to 8, 10, or at most 20 tons. 

The Vulnerability of the Suwałki Gap

This brief assessment of the Suwałki Gap region highlights the fact that the movement of heavy equipment is only possible along two main communication routes, and the possibilities of bypassing the damaged road sections are very limited. An additional difficulty may be the movement of people undergoing evacuation – both organized and self-evacuated. This also applies to Lithuanian citizens seeking to escape from threatened areas. 

While the evacuation is intended to be carried out along designated routes that do not conflict with military routes, we should take this issue into account in the planning process. The worst-case scenario seems to be one in which the evacuation, or perhaps even the flight of the population, could be caused by enemy sabotage. Attacks on critical infrastructure, especially cyberattacks, destruction of energy and water infrastructure, including water treatment plants, fuel depots, fires, etc. – all this, reinforced by hostile propaganda, can lead to a reduction in social resilience and uncontrolled population flight. 

So how can we ensure the movement of troops as part of power projection? In my opinion, we should prepare forces and resources to continuously maintain the capacity of existing roads. These resources should be deployed near critical locations, so that even moving units, including engineering units within their formations, can utilize the prepared materials (Light Road Cover, components for culvert repairs, reinforcement of damaged bridge spans, etc.), depending on their capabilities. 

It also seems essential to gather the components necessary for the expansion of the state border fortifications. These storage locations must be appropriately camouflaged and protected, to the extent possible. Another issue is the supervision of the border itself. This control should be exercised during peacetime, ensuring maximum situational awareness of what’s happening on and around the border, including near sensitive points. Economy of force requires the use of electronic security systems reinforced by mobile, interventionist patrols. Some elements of such a system are being developed on the borders with Belarus and Russia, but there’s no mention of surveillance of the border with Lithuania. 

It should be noted that some hybrid activities, blurring the lines of cross-border crime (people smuggling, but also smuggling of hazardous materials and weapons), can (and do) occur during peacetime. Applying electronic surveillance and mobile surveillance to the Polish-Lithuanian border should curb these phenomena, and evidence of their existence is already evidenced by the almost daily arrests of people smugglers. Therefore, although the Polish-Lithuanian border is formally within the Schengen Area, it should in fact be subject to special surveillance, including electronic surveillance and the East Shield program. It should be emphasized that this is not an action against Lithuania. 

On the contrary, by effectively preparing and securing the Suwałki Gap, we will reduce the vulnerability of both Poland and Lithuania to hybrid operations and, above all, ensure the safer deployment of allied forces to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the event of a full-scale force projection. This is in the shared security interest of Poland and Lithuania. 

A Necessary Integrated Approach

Success in implementing these operations will be achieved when we change the „ministerial” approach to border protection and the Eastern Shield. This begins with the Operation Plan, which is, of course, available and based on tasks and competencies. The speed and effectiveness of a response to threats usually stems from well-organized reconnaissance and protection. 

I believe that effective reconnaissance and protection of facilities will be achieved when we integrate reconnaissance sensors into a single system: those of the Polish Armed Forces throughout the entire Eastern Shield in the direction of the Suwałki Gap, the Border Guard – directly on the border and in depth, and Critical Infrastructure protection elements. The system may become overwhelmed with too much information, but an AI-based system will handle it without any problems. Furthermore, the final intelligence picture will pinpoint threats, facilitate response, and identify weaknesses. If such a system is expanded to include information on codified quantities of materials required for road maintenance, engineering expansion of defense areas, and repair elements for restoring critical infrastructure located in individual warehouses/depots, this will significantly facilitate response to losses and the replenishment of supplies. Such a proposal in the current conditions of the „ministerial/silo” approach to planning the State’s defense seems to be a pipe dream. Isn’t it time to go back to history, as General Waldemar Skrzypczak proposed in one of his articles a few months ago, and, in accordance with the currently applicable legal system, establish, on the model of the Committee for the Defense of the Republic of Poland, which operated under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Poland in the years 1935-1939, a body operating above political divisions, whose tasks would include, among others, considering tasks related to the State’s defense and coordinating the work preparing for the State’s defense? 

Author: Major General (Ret.) Jerzy Michałowski, former Deputy General Commander of the Armed Forces.