Following a prolonged period of COVID-19 lockdowns, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) re-emerged in August 2023 with a markedly anti-Western posture, diminishing hopes for a diplomatic refresh after the failure of the Hanoi summit. In the initial wake of North Korea’s post-COVID re-opening, Pyongyang maintained limited and selective access for Western embassies, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Western tourists. At the same time, North Korea renounced peaceful reunification with South Korea as a national policy and drastically strengthened ties with Russia, even deploying North Korean troops to support Russia’s war with Ukraine.

Yet, despite these shifts, Pyongyang has paid particular attention to revitalizing ties with Southeast Asian states. This article argues that North Korea’s recent engagements with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore reflect efforts to prioritize enhancing political legitimacy, exploring potential economic opportunities, and hedging for future diplomacy. This trend presents both challenges and opportunities to the region and those looking forward to engagement with Pyongyang. Southeast Asia possesses longstanding ties with the DPRK, but the scope and feasibility of its future role remain unclear with legal, political and reputational factors limiting practical cooperation. Nonetheless, the region’s principles, mechanisms and track record of informal diplomacy with the DPRK suggests continued potential for facilitating constructive engagement. Sustaining such efforts will require careful consideration of regional norms and long-term interests.

Post-COVID Developments

The majority of North Korea’s diplomatic interactions in the post-COVID era have predominantly focused on Russia, with occasional delegations sent to countries such as Mongolia or Iran. While China has long been North Korea’s primary trade partner, recent exchanges have been notably limited despite 2024 being heralded as the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship” to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties. In addition, Pyongyang has closed nearly 25 percent of its overseas missions, while only allowing friendly countries, such as Mongolia and Cuba, or Sweden, which functions as a protective power for the United States and some other Western states, to reopen their embassies in Pyongyang.

Yet, the DPRK’s decision to actively resume exchange and cooperation across Southeast Asia, though far more limited in scale than its engagement with Russia or even China, is worth noting. In addition to local embassy engagements and sociocultural exchanges, North Korea dispatched two senior delegations to the region in 2024, primarily to reaffirm bilateral cooperation and explore future opportunities. This included a Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) delegation led by Kim Song Nam, alternate member of the WPK Politburo and director of the WPK International Department, to China, Vietnam and Laos in March; and a DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Pak Sang Gil to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Indonesia in September.

North Korea’s interactions with Vietnam and Laos have been particularly prominent, as seen by both delegations’ trips to these two countries in 2024. Vietnam is the only Southeast Asian state to have sent multiple delegations on official visits to Pyongyang since North Korea reopened its borders. In 2024, Vietnamese delegations visited Pyongyang in June, September, and October for discussions related to public security, military cooperation and the Fifth Vietnam-North Korea Deputy Foreign Ministerial policy dialogue, respectively. Correspondingly, the WPK delegation visit to Vietnam in March met with senior officials of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). High-level DPRK-Vietnam Foreign Ministry talks in Hanoi in September also discussed bilateral cooperation and delegation exchanges ahead of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2025.

DPRK-Laos relations have made nearly as many strides. A Lao Foreign Ministry delegation visited Pyongyang in March 2025 for a deputy minister-level meeting, where the two countries discussed future cooperation, high-level visits, and commemorations for the 60th anniversary of the first summit between former Presidents Kaysone Phomvihane and Kim Il Sung. In 2024, the visiting WPK delegation to Laos in March 2024 also met with senior Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) officials. In addition, lower-level exchanges have resumed, for example a DPRK-Laos Friendship Association meeting in Pyongyang, a visit by the Lao Embassy in the DPRK to a Pyongyang middle school, and a reception at the DPRK Embassy in Vientiane to commemorate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties.

By comparison, North Korea has had limited interactions with other key Southeast Asian states, such as Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia, since its borders reopened.[1]

Patterns and Constraints

North Korea’s interest in engaging with Southeast Asian states is not unusual. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, a DPRK MFA delegation visited Malaysia, Cambodia and Laos in 2019; North Korea also sent high-level delegations to Southeast Asia in 2014 and 2012.

Pyongyang has developed longstanding bilateral ties with the region since the Cold War, grounded in shared political ideologies, close personal relations between leaders, and strategic interests. Vietnam and Laos, for example, are fellow Communist states, with the DPRK providing material and political support to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. In the 1960s, Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Indonesian President Sukarno developed close friendships with Kim Il Sung, with Pyongyang providing diplomatic refuge to Sihanouk later during periods of political upheaval in Cambodia. Moreover, Southeast Asia, such in Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, has historically been an accessible hub for North Korea to pursue alternative trade channels. However, enhanced United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions—and in Malaysia’s case, the assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Kuala Lumpur and the extradition of a North Korean citizen to the United States—led to a decline in regional ties from 2017. Since then, ASEAN states, except for Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Myanmar, have largely sustained functional but limited ties with North Korea through sociocultural and diplomatic channels.

While North Korea has sought to explore bilateral cooperation, practical and legal limitations nevertheless restrict areas of cooperation beyond political and sociocultural sectors. Resource constraints, UNSC sanctions enforcement, and the risk of spillover from North Korea’s security escalations into regional flashpoints, act as natural impediments. North Korea’s illicit operations in Southeast Asia, such as in cybercrime, oil and luxury goods smuggling, arms trafficking, and high-level political assassinations, also compound the region’s concerns for engagement. Broader geopolitical considerations also play a key role: amid intensifying US-China trade war, Southeast Asian states have paid greater attention to adhere to international law and rules-based systems. Southeast Asian nations’ bilateral interactions with North Korea are mostly people-to-people exchanges, be they through friendship association visits, humanitarian aid, or activities and receptions organized by local embassies. In the past decade, only Cambodia and Indonesia have signed state-level agreements with the DPRK, centered on sociocultural cooperation, from 2014–2017 and 2020–2023, and sports cooperation from 2016-2026.

North Korea’s concentration on Vietnam and Laos over the past year is unsurprising, given their ideological alignment and historical reliability as partners in strengthening Pyongyang’s political legitimacy. Both countries’ bilateral interactions with the DPRK have mainly revolved around party-to-party ties, with high-level exchanges remaining consistent in recent decades. With Vietnam, key visits include a 2007 visit to Pyongyang by Nong Duc Manh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV); a visit to Hanoi in 2012 by Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA); and Kim Jong Un’s visit to Hanoi in 2019. Several cooperation agreements were also signed following president Tran Duc Luong’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002. With Laos, General Secretary of the LPRP Choummaly Sayasone visited Pyongyang in 2011. The two countries signed cooperation agreements in 2008, 2010, 2019, and 2020. Institutionalized mechanisms have also been developed with the DPRK, such as inter-governmental committees on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with Vietnam in 2007, and with Laos in 2008. In 2008, North Korea also established deputy minister-level political consultations with Vietnam. [2]

Broader regional engagements are cordial but measured, demonstrating a careful willingness to sustain pre-existing ties with the DPRK and contribute to diplomatic efforts for peace, despite occasional internal concerns. ASEAN’s principles—such as mutual respect for sovereignty, equality, and non-interference—are consistently emphasized by North Korea as shared values for cooperation, enabling the region to incrementally socialize the country into its regional mechanisms and norms. North Korea has been a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 2000 and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2008. Notably, both Singapore and Vietnam have been credible diplomatic partners, hosting the 2018 and 2019 Trump-Kim summits. ARF meetings in Southeast Asia have also allowed for the facilitation of formal and informal sideline talks between the DPRK and actors such as the United States, China, South Korea and Japan.[3] Importantly, as a region navigating a global decline in multilateralism and rules-based architectures, North Korea’s positive participation in the ARF suggests the potential for the region to utilize its mechanisms and facilitate future engagement.

Strategic Implications for Constructive Engagement

In line with pre-COVID trends, Southeast Asia continues to remain a region of familiarity and strategic utility for the DPRK, enabling Pyongyang to diversify its engagements and hedge its diplomatic options. Although there are more constraints in dealing with Pyongyang now, specifically reputational and geopolitical risks, the global shift toward transactional, multipolar diplomacy offers alternative opportunities for engagement.

Importantly, the DPRK’s current alignment with Russia may not last for the long term, and preserving diplomatic flexibility is key to navigating an uncertain international landscape, which is where Southeast Asia can be an option. DPRK-Russia relations have been central to Pyongyang’s post-COVID turnaround, with the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024 and stepping up cooperation across the economic, sociocultural, and military sectors. However, the second Trump administration has actively sought to end the Ukraine War, and signaled an interest to restart engagement with North Korea. Southeast Asia thus offers the ideological familiarity, political neutrality, and a track record for informal and backchannel diplomacy for all sides.

Furthermore, given the natural evolution of Southeast Asia’s relations and diplomatic role with North Korea, it would be prescient for regional states to move beyond viewing North Korea as a latent security issue, and instead consider more proactive approaches that leverage their neutral ties with the DPRK to safeguard their regional interests. To do so will require both advancing scholarship of DPRK affairs across the region and capitalizing on emergent opportunities.

For Thailand and Singapore, 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of formal relations with the DPRK. This could be a timely opportunity for the two countries to develop their diplomatic channels with North Korea. While the current and upcoming ASEAN chairs, Malaysia and the Philippines, do not maintain official ties with Pyongyang, the next chairs, Singapore in 2027 and Thailand in 2028, possess both the historical basis and political space to play a more proactive role in facilitating regional engagement with North Korea during the second Trump term. Moreover, the new DPRK Ambassador to Singapore, Ri Kil Song, held a uniquely high rank of vice minister in the DPRK Foreign Ministry prior to his appointment, which suggests North Korea is attaching importance to its ties with Singapore.

Utilizing Southeast Asia as a means of pursuing constructive engagement with the DPRK will require a careful balance between strategic goals and acceptance of regional diplomatic norms. For a region of small and middle powers, North Korea represents a subset of a larger, complex diplomatic puzzle—one that requires careful navigation by committing to regional centrality, unity, and respect for international law.

Progress will depend on leveraging and building on cooperation in a sustained manner through non-sensitive and non-sanctioned channels. There are past examples of cooperation in areas such as education, culture, humanitarian aid, and sustainable development. As such, these areas offer feasible gateways to spur further engagement. Encouraging North Korea’s renewed participation in regional multilateral mechanisms of which it already is a part—such as the Track 2 (unofficial ) Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the ARF—would be critical for attracting broader political interest and innovate future minilateral avenues of dialogue between willing partners.[4] Navigating future engagements with the DPRK and winning Southeast Asian nations’ support for long-term efforts will ultimately require patience and political will, as well as key stakeholders’ respect for Southeast Asia’s regional principles and priorities.