The Indonesian KAAN deal holds significant strategic relevance for other potential export partners, most notably the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). As a close defense partner of Turkey, the PAF now has a clear-eyed view of a real-world KAAN export agreement, providing a benchmark for its own future fighter considerations.

This deal effectively moves the KAAN program from a theoretical concept to a tangible export product with established parameters. For the PAF, the key takeaways from the Indonesian agreement include:

Costing and Contractual Transparency: The Indonesian contract provides the first concrete data points on unit cost, long-term support packages, and the financial terms required for partnership in a fifth-generation fighter program. This allows Pakistani defense planners to model their own potential procurement with a much higher degree of accuracy.Co-Production and Offset Model: The PAF can now analyze the specific workshare and technology transfer benefits TAI has granted to Indonesia. This serves as a template for what Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) could expect in a similar partnership, from component manufacturing to the potential for a local final assembly line and MRO hub.De-risking a Future Decision: By observing the trajectory of the TAI-Indonesian partnership over the next few years – including its industrial successes and challenges – the PAF can make a more informed and lower-risk decision about its own engagement.

While the PAF has expressed interest in the KAAN, its participation has always been contingent on a critical factor: the development of an ITAR-free variant. The current KAAN prototypes are powered by American General Electric F110 engines, which are subject to U.S. export controls, making a sale to Pakistan highly problematic.

Therefore, the PAF’s interest remains a long-term option, viable only once TAI integrates a domestically produced engine, such as the planned TF35000. The Indonesian deal provides a crucial waiting-period advantage; the PAF can observe, plan, and prepare, positioning itself to engage decisively once an ITAR-free KAAN becomes a reality.

However, it should not be too slow in making a decision. While there is a measure of risk in joining the KAAN at this stage, the potential industrial and technology sharing benefits are also higher now than they would be if the PAF were to wait for the ITAR-free variant. If it waits until that stage, TAI could have enough other customers and partners to build a consortium around the KAAN and generate sufficient initial economies of scale. The PAF would lose its leverage.

Moreover, the PAF must not assume that its contributions to the KAAN would be too limited or non-existent. Pakistan can effectively compete on cost when it comes to supply chain inputs, so its integration could help make the KAAN more competitive from a lifecycle cost standpoint. The Pakistani defence industry could also contribute towards the MUM-T aspect of the KAAN; major state-owned entities (SOE) like NESCOM have a strong grasp of drones and munitions, so they can actively participate in unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) and decoy programs. 

Finally, TAI is already nurturing a base of skilled Pakistani engineers in its current office located in the country. While modest in scope, this team is making crucial progress in projects, such as the IQBAL technology demonstrator. A KAAN purchase would incentivize TAI to invest in these Pakistani facilities and, as importantly, provide a major conduit to channel Pakistani graduates and even seasoned expatriate engineers back into the Pakistani economy.